

Department of Education, Maharashtra

TARKA-SAMGRAHA-SAN 3137

OF

ANNAMBHATTA

WITH THE AUTHOR'S OWN DĪPIKĀ, AND
GOVARDHANA'S NYĀYA-BODHINĪ

EDITED WITH CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

BY THE LATE

YASHWANT VASUDEV ATHALYE, M. A., LL. B.

TOGETHER WITH

INTRODUCTION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT

BY THE LATE

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Vakil, High Court, Bombay

REVISED AND ENLARGED

Second Edition — Second Impression

BY

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1963

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Price Rs. 15


BOMBAY SANSKRIT SERIES, No. LV

MUNSHI RAM MANOHAR LAL
Oriental & Foreign Book-Sellers,

ORIENTAL

EC
25
A56
1963/1

Printed and Published by Dr. R. N Dandekar, M. A., PH. D.
Hon. Secretary, B. O. R. I., at the
Bhandarkar Institute Press, Poona 4.



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Preface to the Second Edition

The first edition of this book was published in 1897 and was soon out of print. Annambhaṭṭa's work having been appointed a text-book for examinations by Bombay and other Universities, there was a great demand for a second edition, but various reasons interrupted the work of revision. It was at first intended to omit the *Nyāya-Bodhinī* which had nothing special about it, and insert in its place *Tarka-Dīpikā-Prakāśa* of *Nīlakaṇṭha* and also a few useful extracts from other commentaries by way of footnotes; but as the plan would have increased the bulk of the volume it was abandoned and the text of the first edition was retained. Three additional copies, marked Q, U and W, were available for consultation and the necessary corrections and additions suggested by them have been made in the text, more particularly in the *Nyāya-Bodhinī*. Copies U and W especially afforded considerable help in settling many doubtful passages of this commentary, and many of their variants have been adopted in this edition. The new commentaries published in W were also useful in clearing ambiguities in the text of the *Saṃgraha* and the *Dīpikā*, and the text may now therefore be said to be finally settled for all practical purposes.

The most important addition to the Notes was a literal translation of the text of the *Saṃgraha*, printed in italics at the top of each section, which will be found useful to students. Ambiguities and mistakes left in the hurry of the first edition have now been removed as far as possible, and many passages in the Notes have been re-written for the purpose. Some paragraphs had to be re-numbered and some sections have been rearranged. The portion of the preface in the first edition dealing with the author has been placed after the Introduction, and another portion dealing with Mss. collated for the text has been transferred to the end as Appendix C. The Index at the end is a new feature added in this edition.

The Introduction required very few alterations. Where new facts have been brought out by later researches additional foot-

notes have been inserted at the proper places. The discovery of unknown Jain and Buddhistic literature in India as well as in Tibet and China by the researches of distinguished scholars like Dr. Sarat Chandra Das and Mahāmahopādhyāya Satish Chandra Vidyabhushana is likely to throw new light on many dark spots in the history of Indian philosophy, and many of our current notions are also likely to be altered. All speculations on this subject must therefore be accepted as only provisional at present. It would be a very interesting and instructive study to trace the gradual development of many philosophical problems, such as the atomic theory, the identity of cause and effect, the Nyāya syllogism, and the notion of *Abhāva*. But until fuller materials are available, it will be worse than useless to indulge in idle guesses. It is now fully recognized that Indian philosophical systems are not the creations of individual promulgators, but organic growths from out of various currents of thoughts germinating through ages and collected in the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and the more ancient Smṛtis and Purānas. A critical and comparative study of these philosophies will assuredly reveal the lines of this growth as well as its reaction on the religious development of the Hindus. It is to be hoped that Indian scholars will devote greater attention to the study of this aspect of Indian Philosophy.

Bombay, }
30th September 1918 }

M. R. BODAS

Second Edition (Second Impression)

This is a second reprint of the Second Edition, with the necessary corrections.

Poona, }
August, 1963 }

A. D. PUSALKER.

Extract from the Preface to the First Edition

(Dated March 1897)

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A few words as regards the explanatory and critical notes appended to this edition will suffice. The chief aim in writing these annotations was to make them as exhaustive as the limited scope of a book mainly intended for students would permit. The notes will not appear disproportionate to the text, if the difficulty of the subject as well as the want of a proper guide to these systems are taken into account. The notes are designed to give the student a tolerably complete and accurate idea of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems as a whole; and hence many topics, although omitted or only cursorily glanced at in *Annambhaṭṭa's* work, have been discussed in the notes, because they form essential ingredients of the systems. Manuals like the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā* are to be studied only as stepping stones to the knowledge of a great and intricate science; and the notes have been written with a view to facilitate the further progress of the student as much as possible.

An attempt has been made in the *Introduction* prefixed to this edition to trace the gradual development of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* literature from the age of the *Sūtras* up to the latest period. A historical sketch like this is sure to give the students a better notion of these systems than any amount of study of isolated works. The attempt is of course only tentative, but it at least opens a vast field for inquiry which may be profitably pursued in future. It was at first intended to discuss some of the more important doctrines of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems in the *Introduction*, especially with reference to their evolution and bearing, on the general course of thought in India. The task, however, was found to be too vast for such a work as the present and the plan had to be abandoned for want of space: but a few hints of the kind will be found in the notes in their proper places.

It will not be proper to conclude this preface without briefly explaining the circumstances under which this work is published. The present edition of *Tarka-Saṅgraha* with commentaries and notes was undertaken by the late Mr. Y. V. Athalye more than twelve years ago and it was an ambition of his life to devote all his leisure time to the writing of the notes so as to make them really exhaustive and useful, not only to students in Indian Colleges, but also to advanced scholars. He saw that in order to popularise the study of *Nyāya* it was necessary to clear the many disputed points that beset the path of a conscientious student and to place the cardinal doctrines of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy in their true light. No man was better fitted for such a work than Mr. Athalye, whose profound scholarship and legal acumen enabled him at once to unravel the intricacies of the *Nyāya* logic. Pressure of official and other business, however, hardly left him any time to complete a task upon which he had set his heart. The work had to be constantly put aside, and consequently much labour and time were wasted in these interruptions; while latterly ill health made him more and more unable to bear the strain of a continuous effort. In spite of these difficulties he hoped to bring out this edition at an early date, and would have done so had not premature and almost sudden death carried him off at a time when he was most wanted. He had however left ample materials behind him, which required only a final revision and arrangement to make the book acceptable to the public; and so it was resolved to publish it as a posthumous work.....

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INTRODUCTION

*A Historical Survey of Indian Logic.*¹

“THE foundation of logic as a Science”, says Ueberweg, “is a work of the Greek mind, which, equally removed from the hardness of the Northern and the softness of the Oriental, harmoniously united power and impressibility.”² The supple mind of the Oriental is said to be wanting in the mental grip and measure required for strictly scientific thinking. Ueberweg, when he laid down the above proposition, was not wholly ignorant of the existence of *Nyāya* philosophy, but his knowledge of it seems to have been very meagre. Had he known some of the standard works of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems, he would not have passed such a sweeping remark about the incapacity of the Oriental mind to develop a rigorous science like Logic. The same ignorance has led many eminent writers to belittle Indian philosophies in general or, where striking coincidences are discovered between Greek and Indian speculations, to assume a Grecian importation of philosophical ideas into India at some ancient time. Thus Niebuhr unhesitatingly asserts that the close similarity between Indian and Greek philosophies cannot be explained “except by the intercourse which the Indians had with the Græco-Macedonic kings of Bactria.”³ On the other hand, there are writers like Gorres who as positively declare that the Greeks borrowed their first elements of philosophy from the Hindus. Max Müller is probably nearer the truth in saying that both Greek and Indian philosophies were autochthonic, and that neither of the two nations borrowed their thoughts from the other⁴. As the human mind is alike everywhere, it is quite possible that philosophers in both India and Greece unconsciously adopted the same mode of reasoning and ar-

1 This paper was read by me at a meeting of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society on the 24th September 1896 and is published in the Journal of the B. B. R. A. Society, Vol. XIX, p. 306.

2 Dr. F. Ueberweg, *System of Logic*, p. 19.

3 Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, Appendix, p. 285.

4 Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, Appendix, p. 285.

rived at similar results quite independently. A closer study of Indian philosophical literature is already producing a conviction among European scholars that it is tolerably indigenous and self-consistent, and that it does not need the supposition of a foreign influence to explain any portion of it. It should also be noticed that notwithstanding many coincidences between the Indian and the Grecian currents of philosophical thought there are several features in each so peculiar as to make any inter-communion between them highly improbable. The fact, for instance, that Indian Logic retained a close similarity to Pre-Aristotelian Dialectics up to a very late time is a legitimate ground for believing that the influence of Aristotle's works was never felt in India. Besides, as a history of Indian philosophy is still unwritten, and will probably remain so for years to come, it is advisable for every student to keep an open mind on the subject. Preconceived theories, however ingenious or plausible, are more likely to mislead than help such investigations. We shall therefore assume, until the contrary is indubitably proved, that Indian philosophy, including Indian logic, is a home-grown product, created by the natural genius of the people and capable of historical treatment.

That it is possible to write a history of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* philosophies will be readily admitted; but a history of philosophy, such as it ought to be, presupposes a good many things, which may not find universal acceptance. It assumes, for instance, that the Indian systems of philosophy were gradually evolved out of a few broad principles by a succession of writers and under particular circumstances. The idea that philosophical speculations in India were the spontaneous brain-creations of a few mystic Brahmans, dreaming high thoughts in lonely forests and totally unaffected by the passing events of the world, must be discarded once for all. There is no reason why philosophy in India should have followed a different course from what it did in Greece and other civilized countries. Systems of philosophy are as much liable to be influenced by past and contemporary events as any other branch of science or literature; and Indian philosophy should be no exception to the rule. But the task of writing such a history is beset with innumerable difficulties. The chief of these is absence of any reliable historical data which might serve us as landmarks in the ocean of Sanskrit literature. Not only are the dates of the principal writers and their works unknown, but even the existence of some of them as historical personages is doubted. Many of these works,

again, are not available for reference,¹ while of those that are printed or can be procured in Ms. only a few have yet been critically studied. European scholars are still too much engrossed in their Vedic and antiquarian researches to devote serious attention to a systematic study of Indian philosophies; while as to native Pandits, however learned, the very notion of a history of philosophy is foreign to their minds. There are works in Sanskrit, like the *Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha* of *Mādhavācārya* and the *Ṣaḍ-Darśana-Samuccaya* of *Haribhadra Sūri*, which profess to treat of all current systems of philosophy; but the historical view is totally absent in them. There the systems are arranged either according to their religious character or according to the predilections of the author. In modern times, scholars like Colebrooke, Weber, Hall and Banerjee have made some valuable contributions, but many of their opinions and criticisms are now antiquated and stand in need of revision in the light of further researches. A good deal has also been added to our knowledge of the Buddhist literature, but even there the attention of scholars has not yet been sufficiently directed to its philosophical portion. It is not possible, therefore, under these circumstances, to do more than throw out a few hints which, while dispelling some of the prevalent errors on the subject, will serve as a basis for future inquiries in the same direction. The following pages will not have been written in vain if this aim is even partially achieved.

The value of a history of philosophy will be appreciated by those who know how much our knowledge of Greek philosophy has been deepened by the accounts left by Plato, Xenophon and Thucydides. Systems of philosophy as well as individual doctrines are never the products of personal caprice or of mere accident; they are evolved out of a long chain of antecedent causes. They are in fact the tangible manifestations of various latent forces which mould the character and history of the nation. There could have been no Aristotle without a Plato or a Socrates, and no Socrates without the Sophists. A knowledge of this sequence is therefore essential to a true appreciation of every system and every doctrine, an isolated study of them being either insufficient or misleading. Besides, theories and schools are often the work not

1 Most of the writings of eminent Buddhist logicians like *Dīnāga* and *Dharmakīrti* are now available only in Chinese and Tibetan translations, their Sanskrit originals having been apparently lost. See Sadajiro Sugiura's *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*.

of one individual or of one age, but of a succession of thinkers who fashion and refashion them, as it were, until they become worthy of general acceptance. Such seems to have been the case with doctrines of God, of causality and of creation, in India as well as in Greece. The true aim of a history of philosophy may be explained in the words of Zeller:—

“The systems of philosophy, however peculiar and self-dependent they may be, thus appear as the members of a larger historical inter-connection; in respect to this alone can they be perfectly understood; the further we follow it the more the individuals become united to a whole of historical development, and the problem arises not merely of explaining this whole by means of the particulars conditioning it, but likewise of explaining these moments by one another and consequently the individual by the whole.”¹

A history of Indian philosophy, such as would fulfil this purpose, is not of course possible in the present rudimentary state of Indian chronology. Still even a crude attempt of that kind will give truer insight into each system or each doctrine than can be got by a study of isolated works. The need of such a connected view of philosophy is all the greater in the case of systems like the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* whose real merits lie hidden under a heavy load of scholastic surplusage. They have not the halo of religion and mysticism which makes the *Vedānta* and the other theological systems so attractive to students of Hindu philosophy, while the scholastic subtleties of the most modern *Nyāya* writers, such as *Śiromaṇi* and *Gadādhara*, inspire positive terror in untrained minds. If the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems, therefore, are to be popularized and their value to be recognized, it is necessary to divest them of their excrescences. A large mass of rubbish is to be found in the works of modern *Naiyāyikas*, and the task of extracting the pure ore out of it is very difficult; but it is worth performing. The process of sifting and cleaning will have to be repeated several times before we can really understand some of the profoundest conceptions that are interwoven in these systems. Philosophy is the stronghold of Hinduism, and the system of *Nyāya* forms as it were the back-bone of Hindu philosophy. Every other system accepts the fundamental principles of *Nyāya* logic, while even where there are differences, the dissentients often borrow the very arguments and phraseology of the *Nyāya* for their own pur-

1 Zeller, *Outline of Greek Philosophy*, p. 3.

pose. A study of the *Nyāya* as well as *Vaiśeṣika* system is therefore a necessary step to a popular understanding of most of the systems. It forms as it were an introduction to the general study of philosophy, and hence no scholar who would seek the truth in the latter can afford to neglect them.

Among the numerous systems of philosophy that have been evolved in India during the last three thousand years, the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* occupy a unique position, both on account of their cardinal doctrines and of the mass of learning that has accumulated around them. A general view of these doctrines will not, therefore, be out of place in a sketch like this. *Nyāya*, which is the more compact and perhaps also the more modern of the two, is much more a system of dialectics than one of philosophy. The aphorisms of *Gotama* and the works founded on them treat no doubt of metaphysical and theological questions occasionally, but they come in rather as digressions than as inseparable parts of the system. The *Vaiśeṣika*, on the other hand, is essentially a system of metaphysics with a disquisition on logic skilfully dovetailed into it by later writers. It is these peculiarities which have earned them the name of logical systems and which distinguish them from each other as well as from other systems of Indian philosophy. These peculiarities must be carefully noted, for inattention to them has led many to misunderstand the true scope and function of these systems.¹

Gotama begins by enumerating 16 topics, which have been erroneously called *padārthas*.² These topics are not a classification of all sublunary things or categories. They look like headings of so many chapters in a treatise on logic. Of these the first nine, *viz.* प्रमाण, प्रमेय, संशय, प्रयोजन, दृष्टान्त, सिद्धान्त, अवयव, तर्क, and निर्णय, constitute what may be called logic proper, while the last seven may be collectively termed illegitimate or false logic. प्रमाण includes the four proofs, *Perception, Inference, Comparison* and *Word*;³ while प्रमेय comprises all objects which are known by means of those proofs, *viz.* soul, body, organ, material qualities,

1 Logic in Sanskrit is designated by various names, such as *Nyāya, Hetu-Vidyā, Hetu-Sāstra, Ānvikṣikī, Pramāna-Sāstra, Tatva-Sāstra, Tarka-Vidyā, Vādārtha* and *Phalṅkikā-Sāstra*. Some of these names are found in works of 4th and 5th centuries B. C.

2 G. S., I. 1. 1.

3 G. S., I. 1. 3.

cognition, mind, effort, fault, death, fruition, pain and salvation.¹ These multifarious things have obviously nothing in common except the capacity of being known by one or other of the above proofs; and *Gotama* accordingly treats of them only in that light. He rarely troubles himself about the nature or form of these things, or of their production and destruction, as *Kaṇāda*, for instance, does. This is the reason why *Gotama's* definitions of soul, cognition, mind, etc., only tell us how they are known, but say nothing as to what kind of things they are. *Gotama's* theory of knowledge is essentially material. *Perception* is a physical process consisting in the contact of organs with their appropriate objects;² while *Inference*, which is threefold, springs from *Perception*.³ *Comparison* and *Word* are of course exceptional cases, and may be called imperfect inferences. Having thus dealt with the chief ingredients of knowledge, namely, the proof and its object, *Gotama* describes several accessories to knowledge, *viz.*, doubt, aim, instance or precedent, general truths, premises, hypothetical reasoning and conclusion. Doubt and aim as incentives to every inquiry are necessary to knowledge. Precedents and general truths form the material, while premises and hypothetical reasoning are the instruments of acquiring fresh knowledge. Conclusion is the final and combined product of all these things.⁴ The seven topics forming the second group have a negative function in logic, namely, of preventing erroneous knowledge. By exposing errors they teach us how to avoid them. They are rather like weapons for destroying the enemy's fortress than tools to build one's own. Continued argument (वाद), sophistry (जल्प), wrangling (वितण्डा), fallacies (द्वैत्वाभास), quibbling (छल), far-fetched analogies (जाति), and opponent's errors (निग्रहस्थान)—all these are useful where the object is to vanquish an opponent or to gain a temporary triumph; but they do not legitimately belong to the province of logic. *Gotama's* treatise may therefore be appropriately called the theory and practice of controversy rather than a science of logic. It resembles in this respect the dialectical work of *Zeno* who founded the sophistic dialectics in Greece.

The system, however, underwent considerable modifications in later times. The sixteen *padārthas* were practically ignored,

1 G. S., I. 1. 9.

2 G. S., I. 1. 4.

3 G. S., I. 1. 5.

4 See for definitions of these, G. S., I. 1. 23-32, 40, 41.

and the theory of the four proofs absorbed almost the whole attention of later *Naiyāyikas*. The philosophical views of *Gotama* mostly came out in the digressions which are numerous in his work. They are generally introduced by way of illustrations to his method; and yet his followers have accepted these views as cardinal principles and built a regular system of philosophy upon them. The most characteristic of these doctrines are the non-eternity of sound,¹ the agency of God,² the theory of atoms,³ the production of effects,⁴ and its corollary, the reality of our knowledge. From the fragmentary discussions on these points contained in *Gotama's* work the modern *Naiyāyikas* have evolved elaborate theories which have made the system what it is. The radical and realistic tendency of these later doctrines came at every step into conflict with the more orthodox views of the two *Mīmāṃsās*.

The system of the *Vaiśeṣikas* is even more radical than the *Nyāya*. As a system of philosophy, the *Vaiśeṣika* is more symmetrical and also more uncompromising. Its enumeration of the six categories,⁵ with the seventh *Abhāva* added afterwards, is a complete analysis of all existing things. These categories again are not enumerated for a special purpose only, like the 16 *padārthas* of *Gotama*; but they resolve the entire universe, as it were, not excepting even the Almighty Creator, into so many classes. *Kaṇāda's* categories resemble in this respect those of Aristotle. *Gotama* treats of knowledge only, but *Kaṇāda* deals with the wider phenomena of existence. The first three categories, Substance, Quality, and Motion, have a real objective existence and so form one group designated अर्थ by *Kaṇāda*.⁶ The next three, Generality, Particularity, and Intimate Union, are products of our conception and may be called metaphysical categories, while the last one, Negation, appears to have been added afterwards for dialectical purposes. The nine substances comprise all corporeal and incorporeal things, and the twenty-four qualities exhaust all properties that can reside in substance. बुद्धि is a quality of the Soul, and the whole theory of knowledge therefore consists in the production of this quality in its substratum, the Soul. The process by

1 G. S., II. 3. 13-40.

2 G. S., IV. 1. 19-21.

3 G. S., IV. 2. 4-25.

4 G. S., IV. 1. 22-54.

5 V. S., I. 1. 4.

6 V. S., VIII. 2, 3.

which the cognition of an external object is produced in the Soul is something like printing or stamping on some soft material. Mind is the movable joint between the Soul and the various organs which carry those impressions from external objects. Logic as a science of knowledge falls under बुद्धि, and is so treated in all *Vaiśeṣika* treatises. *Vaiśeṣikas* recognize only the first two of the four proofs mentioned by *Gotama*,¹ and they differ from the *Naiyāyikas* on some other points also. What specially distinguishes the *Vaiśeṣikas*, however, is their remarkable power of analysis; and their system may for that reason be appropriately called analytical philosophy. They divide and subdivide each class of things, and dissect every notion into its minutest components. No doubt the process of analysis is sometimes carried to an extreme where it ends into fruitless distinctions, but its influence on philosophical speculations in general must have been enormous. It is this feature of the *Vaiśeṣika* system that has made it the source of all liberal thought in Indian philosophy. None are so unrestrained in their speculations, and none are such powerful critics of time-worn prejudices as the followers of *Kaṇāda*. No wonder that they were looked upon with distrust by the orthodox school, and were labelled *Ardhā-Vaiśeṣikas* (Semi-Buddhists) by their opponents.² The *Vaiśeṣikas* never declared any open revolt against orthodox faith, nor is there any reason for supposing that *Kaṇāda* or his immediate followers were atheists; but the tendency of their doctrine was none the less unmistakable. As the devout Lord Bacon produced a Hume and a Voltaire in Europe, so the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines must have led ultimately to many a heresy in India, such as those of the *Bauddhas* and the *Jainas*.

A remarkable feature of both the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* systems, as in fact of all the Indian systems of philosophy, is the religious motive which underlies them. Religion is the incentive to all these speculations, and religion is also the test of their truth and utility. Salvation is the goal which both *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* promise the people as the reward of a thorough knowledge of their respective systems.³ Amidst all the differences one idea appears to be common to all the ancient Indian systems, namely, that knowledge is the door and the only door to salvation. Opinions differ as to what things are worth knowing. Consequently the bit-

1 B. P., Ben. ed., p. 213.

2 Saṅkarācārya, *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, II. 2. 18.

3 G. S., I. I. 1; V. S., I. I. 4.

terest controversies have raged among these rivals as to what things ought to be known for the speedy attainment of salvation. These controversies usually take the form of attacks on the rival classifications of categories as being either defective or superfluous or illogical. Another effect of the religious character of these systems is the discussion of many apparently irrelevant topics which have made them look somewhat heterogeneous and unsystematic. The many digressions in the works of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* as well as their followers are easily understood if we look to the bearing which those topics have upon the end and aim of philosophy. Take for instance the controversy about non eternity of sound¹ What has the eternity of sound to do with logic? An inference would be just as right or wrong whether the words conveying it are eternal or not. But the question of the eternity of sound is vitally connected with the infallibility of the *Vedas* which are final authority in all matters of doubt; and all orthodox systems, therefore, must have their say on the point. We thus find that questions of the most diverse character are discussed wherever the context leads to them while others more closely related to the subject are neglected. Each system has consequently become a mixture, as it were, of the fragments of several sciences such as logic, metaphysics, psychology, and theology. This is not however a weakness as some superficial critics have supposed. It arises from the very conception of a *Darśana*, and could never have been avoided by those who in these systems sought to provide a complete guide, as it were, to the road to salvation. Indian philosophy is not singular in this respect. Everywhere philosophy grows out of religious instincts. The sense of dependence on supernatural powers and a desire to conciliate them were the first incentives which led men at a very early period to think of their religious well-being. "Philosophy", says Zeller, "just begins when man experiences and acts upon the necessity of explaining phenomena by means of natural causes."² The *Rgveda*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads* abound in passages showing how in India this feeling grew in intensity until it became the ruling passion of the Brahmans. Salvation was the sole purpose of life, and knowledge of the universe was the means to it. The ancient *Upaniṣads* were the repositories of the speculations which rose like bubbles out of this fermentation of thought, and which appear to have ultimately crystallized into the various

1 G. S., II. 2. 13.

2 Zeller, *Outline of Greek Philosophy*, p. 6.

systems of philosophy.¹ In Greece philosophy tended to become more and more ethical and worldly; in India it could never free itself from its religious setting. This is the reason why in spite of additions and modifications Indian *Darśanas* never lost their original character completely. A history of each of these systems is therefore a history of its gradual evolution within certain limits, while its relations outside of them remained practically unchanged.

The period before the rise of Buddhism is almost a blank page. We know nothing of it except that a large amount of free speculation must have been stored up at that time in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*. The only system which dates prior to Buddhism is the *Sāṅkhya*, and possibly the *Vaiśeṣika* also; but the other *Darśanas* are presumably of a post-Buddhist origin, at least in the form in which we possess them. In fact the very notion of a system seems to be post-Buddhist. The severe conflict between Buddhism and Brahmanism which stirred men's minds in the century after Buddha's death must have compelled both the parties to systematize the doctrines and express them in a compact methodical form. The same cause or causes which led the Buddhists to collect their ethical and philosophical teachings in their *suttas* during the period which elapsed between the First and the Second Council must have also induced their Brahman rivals to compose similar works for the defence of Vedic orthodoxy. The two collections of aphorisms belonging to the Prior and the Posterior *Mīmāṃsās* and known by the names of *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa* respectively have a strong controversial flavour about them, and appear to be the first products of this reaction against Buddhism. The aphorisms of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* could not have been of any prior date, and as we do not know of any *Nyāya* or *Vaiśeṣika* works older than these *Sūtras*, the history of those systems may safely be said to begin in the 5th or the 4th century before Christ.

Roughly speaking, the literature of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems extends over a period of 22 centuries, that is, from about the 4th century B. C. till very recent times, of which the last two hundred years, not being distinguished by any original works, may be left out of account. The history may be divided into three periods: the first from about 400 B. C. to 500 A. D., the second from thence to 1300 A. D., and the third after that till the end of

1 See my paper entitled "A Brief Survey of the Upaniṣads", J. B. B. R. A. Society, Vol. XXII, p. 67.

the last century. The only known representatives of the first period are the two collections of aphorisms going under the name of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* respectively, and perhaps the scholium of *Praśastapāda* also; but there must have existed other works now lost. The second period is pre-eminently distinguished by a series of commentaries on these *Sūtras* beginning with *Vātsyāyana* and comprising several works of acknowledged authority. The third period saw the introduction of independent treatises and commentaries on them which at last dwindle down into short manuals like *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and *Tarka-Kaumudī*. These three periods also mark three successive stages in the development of the two systems. The first may be called the age of the formation of doctrines in the *Sūtras*; the second that of their elaboration by commentators; and the third that of their systematization by writers of special treatises. The first is characterised by great originality and freshness, the second by a fulness of details and the third by scholastic subtlety ultimately leading to decadence. These divisions may sometimes overlap, for we have treatises like *Tārkikavakṣū* and *Sapta-padārthī* before the 14th century, so we have commentaries on the *Sūtras* like *Śaṅkara Miśra's Upaskāra*, and *Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, written afterwards. This does not however affect our general conclusion that the writings of the 14th century and onwards are in marked contrast with those of the preceding age. The exact duration of these periods may have varied a little in the case of the two systems, but the order is the same. The mutual relation of these two systems, however, appears to have changed at different times. During the first period they seem to have been two different systems, independent in origin but treating of the same topics and often borrowing from each other. *Vātsyāyana* regards them as supplementary.¹ In the second period, however, they become somewhat antagonistic, partly owing to an accumulation of points of difference between the two, and partly on account of the alliance of the *Vaiśeṣikas* with the Buddhists. The third period saw the amalgamation of the two systems, and we come across many works, like the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* for instance, in which the authors have attempted to select the best portions of each and construct from these fragments a harmonious system of their own. This is a curious phenomenon, no doubt, and we do not yet sufficiently know the causes which brought about these successive changes in the attitude of the exponents of these two systems

1 *Vāt.* on G. S., I. 1. 4.

towards each other; but the fact is important in as much as it must have been a powerful factor in moulding both of them. At any rate it accounts for the difficulty, which every student meets with at the threshold, whether to regard these systems as really supplementary or antagonistic to each other. They are spoken of as both, and yet no Sanskrit writer seems to have perceived the inconsistency of doing so. The only explanation that can at present be suggested is that the twins after quarrelling for some time reunited under the influence of a reaction.

Having premised so much we may proceed to consider the three periods in order; and the first thing we shall have to do is of course to fix the age of the *Sūtras* of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda*. They are the recognized basis of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* systems, and they are, so far as we know, the oldest works on those systems. Not that they were the first of their kind; perhaps they were preceded by cruder attempts of the same sort that have perished; perhaps the present works are improved editions of older ones. For all practical purposes, however, the works of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* may be taken as the starting points for the two systems. Now before adverting to the evidence that exists for determining the dates of these two *Sūtras* it is necessary to notice one or two misconceptions that would otherwise hinder our task. The first of these is the confusion that is often made between the system and the *Sūtra* work expounding it; and the second is a similar want of distinction between the system as a whole and the particular doctrines composing it. The three things, viz., *Gotama's* work, the *Nyāya* system, and the individual doctrines embodied in it, are quite distinct, and ought not to be confounded with one another. They may for aught we know have originated at different times, and no inference can therefore be safely drawn as to the probable date of the one from any ascertained fact relating to the other. The fact for instance that some of the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines are controverted in *Bādarāyaṇa's* *Brahma-Sūtras*¹ has been made the ground for inferring that *Kaṇāda's* *Sūtras* were composed prior to those of *Bādarāyaṇa*, and yet there are cogent reasons for believing that they were of a much later origin. We must therefore suppose that the doctrines controverted in *Brahma-Sūtras* existed prior to their incorporation into a regular system as set out in *Kaṇāda's* work. Similarly many of the arguments as to the

1 *Brahma-Sūtras*, II 3, 11 et seq.

relative priority of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems are based on assumptions made from some doctrines of the one being cited or refuted by the other. Such arguments however are misleading and often produce confusion. The *Nyāya* doctrine of अस्तकार्यवाद must have existed before the rise of Buddhism and even before the formation of the *Sāṅkhya* system, the oldest works of which controvert it. Does it follow therefore that *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* preceded both the *Sāṅkhya*s and the *Bauddhas*? And if so, how are we to account for the fact that several doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya*s as well as the *Bauddhas* are in their turn quoted in the *Sūtras* of both these authors? Here is a dilemma which can only be solved by supposing that the doctrine of अस्तकार्यवाद and many others like it subsequently adopted by the *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* must have formed topics of hot discussion long before the *Sūtras* of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* were composed. In like manner, even supposing that the system as such existed at or before a particular date it will not be right to argue that *Kaṇāda's* *Sūtras* also must have existed at that time¹. Nor should it be supposed that the whole system as conceived later is to be found in these works. Many doctrines now looked upon as cardinal principles of *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, are conspicuous by their absence in *Kaṇāda's* work, such as, for instance, *Abhāva* as a seventh category, the last seven qualities, and the doctrine of *Viśeṣa*². This much however is certain, that when the *Sūtras* were composed the two systems had assumed a definite form which was never to be substantially changed. There are important gaps that were filled up afterwards: but the skeleton is there and it is the skeleton that gives shape to the body. The process may have been something like this. First bold thinkers started theories of their own on the burning questions of the day, and then these theories after much discussion crystallized into specific doctrines such as those of अस्तकार्य, समवाय and others. The ancient *Upaniṣads* abound in passages in which we find such definite principles being actually worked out of a mass of general speculations. The next step is for some eminent teacher to adopt and develop some of these doctrines and form a school which might in time grow up into a system. The difference between a school and a system is that of degree. A school adopts a theory about a particular phenomenon, while a system aims at explaining consistently the whole order of nature

1 Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 354, Cowell's note.

2 V. S., I. 1. 4; I. 1. 6; I. 2. 3.

by reducing several of these theories into harmony. *Auśulomi*, *Kāśakṛtsna*, *Bādari* and many others whose names occur in the philosophical *Sūtras*, seem to have been founders of the schools which preceded the regular systems. The system when thus formed required an authoritative exposition, and many must have been the failures of inferior persons, before a master mind like *Gotama* or *Kaṇāda* could produce a work that would live into futurity. The present *Sūtras* of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* must, therefore, be regarded as representing the end rather than the commencement of this evolutionary process. They did not originate the systems, they only stereotyped them, by giving them as it were a body and shape. Besides, it is probable that the fashion of propounding philosophical systems in the form of *Sūtras*, if not the systems themselves, came into vogue after the rise of *Buddhism*. The ethical teachings of *Gautama Buddha* were expressed in the shape of pithy sentences which were easy to remember and possessed a certain attraction for the popular mind. The Brahmans, probably with a desire to beat their rivals with their own weapons, composed *Sūtras* on their own philosophical systems modelled on the Buddhistic *suttas*, and possessing in some cases literary finish of a very high order. The necessity of meeting their opponents in controversies which became frequent from this time compelled the orthodox philosophers to put their cardinal doctrines in a definite shape; and this they did by expressing them in an incisive and dogmatic form so as to produce immediate conviction. The uncompromising tone and rigid logic of these post-Buddhistic *Sūtras* are in strong contrast with the loose reasoning and poetical imagery which abound in earlier philosophical books, such as the *Upaniṣads*. While morality was the stronghold of the Buddhists, philosophy was their weakest point in these early times; naturally the shrewd Brahmans cultivated this latter branch with the greater vigour in order to outshine their rivals. The *Sūtras* of *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa* must have been composed with some such object in view; and the example, once set, was of course followed by other teachers belonging to the orthodox party.

It is difficult to determine the chronological order of the several systems of philosophy, and the attempts hitherto made have not been very successful. The *Sāṃkhya* system and many of the doctrines of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, if not the whole of their system, are most probably Pre-Buddhistic. The *Vaiśeṣika* system pre-sup-

poses the *Sāṃkhya*, and there is evidence to show that the *Vaiśeṣika* not only preceded Buddhism and Jainism, but directly contributed to the rise of those sects, many of their peculiar dogmas being closely allied to *Vaiśeṣika* theories. The Buddhistic doctrines of total annihilation, for instance, is only a further and an inevitable development of the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine of अस्तकथ्यवाद; while the categories or *Padārthas* of the latter find their counterpart in the five *Astikāyas* or essences of the *Jainas*. The atomic theory moreover is largely adopted by the *Jainas*, and even enters into their legendary mythology. The epithet *Ardha-Vaiśeṣika* or Semi-Buddhists, contemptuously bestowed upon the *Vaiśeṣika* by *Śaṅkharācārya*,¹ concealed a historical truth, if the *Vaiśeṣikas* as suggested above were the half-hearted precursors who by their materialistic speculations paved the way for the extreme radicalism of *Gautama Buddha*. The *Vaiśeṣika* school is specifically named in the sacred texts of the *Jainas* and also in the *Labita-Vistāra*.² Several of their doctrines are refuted in *Bādarāyaṇa's* *Brahma-Sūtras*, and it is possible that they may have existed then in some systematic form. As to the other systems, the two *Mīmāṃsās* appear to have come immediately after the rise of Buddhism and before the advent of the *Nyāya* and the *Yoga*. Neither *Bādarāyaṇa* nor *Jaimini* refers to any peculiar *Nyāya* doctrine, while the few aphorisms in *Bādarāyaṇa's* work which mention *Yoga* look like interpolations. It will be shown presently that *Gotama* himself borrows from *Bādarāyaṇa's* work.³

Looking to the *Sūtras*, however, the two *Mīmāṃsā* collections appear to be the oldest of them, while the works of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* come next in succession. The date of *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*, who quote each other and might have been contemporaries, is not yet settled. They are certainly aware of the Buddhistic sect, many of whose doctrines they quote and refute.⁴ The two *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* therefore could not have been composed before the 6th century B. C. They may for the present be assigned to the 5th or the earlier part of the 4th century B. C. The *Sūtras* of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* must be still later productions, as will appear from a

1 See foot-note *supra*.

2 Weber, *History of Indian Literature*, p. 236, foot-note.

3 Garbe holds that *Vaiśeṣika* was prior to *Nyāya*; *Vide*. Die *Sāṃkhya Philosophie*, p. 116.

4 *Brahma-Sūtra* II, 2, 18, *et seq.*; *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* I, 2, 33; see also Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 354.

comparison of them with the *Brahma Sūtras*. The opening *sūtras* of both *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* appear to recognize the *Vedāntic* doctrine of knowledge being the means to salvation; while throughout their works whenever they treat of soul, salvation, pain, knowledge, and such other topics, their language seems to be strongly tinged with *Vedāntic* notions. The phraseology is often the same, and in several places even direct references to the *Brahma-Sūtras* may be detected in these works. For example the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, अनित्य इति विशेषतः प्रतिषेधभावः and अविद्या¹ appear to be answers to *Bādarāyaṇa's* objections to the eternity of atoms;² while the *Sūtra* अहमिति शब्दस्य व्यतिरेकाज्ञागमिकम्³ is evidently aimed at the *Vedāntic* view explained in the four preceding *sūtras*; that the Soul is to be known only through *Śruti*.⁴ Similarly V. S. IV. 2. 2-3 controvert the *Vedāntin's* view that our body is formed by the union of five or three elements.⁵ Again many of the terms used by *Kaṇāda* such as अविद्या, लिङ्ग, प्रत्यगात्मा, and व्याख्यात, appear to be borrowed from *Bādarāyaṇa*. The same holds good of *Gotama*. In several places he propounds views very similar to well-known *Vedāntic* doctrines;⁶ while a comparison of G. S. III. 2. 14 with *Brahma-Sūtra* II. 1. 24 will show that *Gotama* borrows even illustrations and arguments from *Bādarāyaṇa*.⁷ G. S. II. 1. 61-67⁸ would likewise show that *Gotama* was also posterior to *Jaimini*. It may be argued that the borrowing may have been on the other side, or that the particular *sūtras* may be later additions. But we must in such cases judge by the whole tone and drift of the authors. While in all the cases noted above the topics form essential parts of the two *Mīmāṃsā* systems, they come only incidentally in the works of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama*. We can, therefore, confidently assert that the works of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda*, as we have them at present, cannot be older than the 4th century B. C.

The question as to the relative priority of these two systems *per se* is beset with many difficulties. Opinions have been advanced

1 V. S., IV. 1. 4-5.

2 *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. 2. 14-15.

3 V. S., III. 2. 9.

4 Cf. also G. S., III. 1. 28-30.

5 *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. 2. 21-22.

6 Cf. G. S., IV. 1. 64.

7 क्षीरविनाशे कारणानुपलब्धिवद्दृश्युपत्तिवच्च तदुत्पत्तिः । *Gotama-Sūtra* ; उपसंहारदर्शनाच्चेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि । *Brahma-Sūtra*.

8 विध्यर्थवारानुशास्त्रमवचनवियागात् G. S., II. 1. 61.

on both sides. *Condrakānta Tarkalāmkāra*, in the preface to his edition of *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, strongly contends for the priority of *Vaiśeṣika* system, while others maintain the opposite view.¹ Goldstücker calls the *Vaiśeṣika* only a branch of the *Nyāya* without deciding their relative priority;² while Weber is undecided on the point.³ Much of the confusion, however, on this point can be avoided by making a distinction, as already noted, between the *Vaiśeṣika* system and the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*. There are strong grounds for believing, as Mr. *Tarkalāmkāra* contends, that the *Vaiśeṣika* system preceded *Gotama's* and yet the *Sūtras* of *Kaṇāda*, or at least many of them, may be of a later date. The fact that, while *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines are noticed in *Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-Sūtras*, *Gotama's* system is not even once alluded to, shows that some *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines at least were promulgated not only before *Gotama* but even before the composition of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. *Vātsyāyana's* remark that omissions in *Gotama's* work are to be supplied from the cognate system of the *Vaiśeṣikas* may likewise be taken to imply that that system existed before *Gotama's* time;⁴ while the latter's reference to a प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त⁵ by which he probably means doctrines taught by some allied school such as the *Vaiśeṣikas* would support such an inference. The posteriority of *Gotama* may also be inferred from the fact that many topics summarily disposed of or imperfectly discussed by *Kaṇāda* are fully treated by him, as for instance, inference, fallacies, eternity of sound, and the nature of soul. It is true that some of these arguments would also prove that *Kaṇāda's sūtras* were anterior to *Gotama's* work, and it is possible that a collection of *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* was known to *Gotama*. But we must also take account of the fact that several *sūtras* in the present collection of *Kaṇāda's* aphorisms appear to be suggested by *Gotama's* work.

V. S. III. 2. 4,⁶ for instance, is clearly an amplification of G. S. I. 1. 10.⁷ V. S. III. 1. 17⁸ again gives an illustration of the

1 Bhīmācārya, *Nyāya-Kośa*, Intro., p. 2-3, note.

2 Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, p. 153.

3 Weber, *History of Indian Literature*, p. 245.

4 *Vāt.* on G. S., I. 1. 4.

5 G. S., I. 1. 29.

6 प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषर्जावनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुःखच्छाद्रेषप्रयत्नाश्चात्मनो लिङ्गानि *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*.

7 इच्छाद्रेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति । *Gotama-Sūtra*.

8 यस्माद्विषाणी तस्माद्गौरिति चानैकान्तिकस्योदाहरणम् ।

अनेकान्तिक fallacy, although the name, strange to say, is nowhere explained throughout Kaṇāda's work. The word is, however, used by Gotama as a definition of सव्यभिचार,¹ and it is possible that the author of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* borrowed it from him, and wrongly used it as the name of the fallacy. These *Sūtras*, therefore, if not the whole work of Kaṇāda, must have been composed after Gotama's work was published. Now there are good reasons for suspecting that Kaṇāda's work, as we have it at present, contains a large number of aphorisms which have been either modified or added in after times. A comparison of Kaṇāda's *sūtras*, as found in our printed editions, with the *Bhāṣya* of *Prāśastapāda* shows that many of the *sūtras* are not explained by the scholiast and were probably unknown to him.² Moreover, all these suspicious aphorisms relate to topics that look like having been suggested afterwards. The practice of making such interpolations in ancient works is not uncommon in Indian literature. The *Sāṃkhya Sūtras* are notoriously modern productions, though ascribed to an ancient Ṛṣi; and even the *Brahma Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa* lie under the suspicion of being tampered with. The loose and unsystematic arrangement of the *Vaiśeṣika* aphorisms must have considerably facilitated the task of an interpolator, while such liberties could not have been easily taken with the more compact and finished production of Gotama.³

The most reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing facts is that, although we can say nothing definite about an original collection of *Vaiśeṣika* aphorisms, the present work of that name is comparatively modern. We have no materials at present to fix its probable age. Kaṇāda is a mythical personage and is variously styled *Kāśyapa*, *Kaṇabhakṣa* or *Kaṇabhuk*.⁴ The

1 अनेकान्तिकः सव्यभिचारः G. S., I. 2. 46.

2 See the excellent conspectus showing the *sūtras* corresponding to each section of *Prāśastapāda*'s scholium, prefixed to the Benares Edition of that work.

3 Mahāmahopādhyāya Satishchandra Vidyabhusan thinks that only the 1st book of *Nyāya-Sūtras* was composed by *Akṣapāda*, while the 2nd, 3rd and 4th books bear marks of different hands. The later books contain passages from *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* of *Yogācāra* Buddhistic school, the *Mādhyamika Sūtra* of *Nāgārjuna* and *Sataka* of *Āryadeva* all composed about 300 A. D. *Vātsyāyana* is said to have collected all the later additions together. See *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 161.

4 *P. B.*, Ben. ed., p. 220; *V. S. Up.*, Calc. ed., p. 160-1; *Trikāṇḍa-Śeṣa*.

latter two appellations are, of course, paraphrases of *Kaṇāda*, which literally means "an eater of seeds or atoms".¹ The name is said to be derived from his having lived upon picked-up grain-seeds while practising austerities; more probably it is a derisive appellation invented by antagonists for his atomic theory. The system is also called *Aulūkyā Darśana*,² and a pretty old tradition is told that God Mahādeva pleased by the austerities of the sage *Kaṇāda* appeared to him in the guise of an owl and revealed the system which the latter subsequently embodied in the *Sūtras*.³ A Ṛṣi named *Ulūka* is mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*, but nothing can be said as to what connection he had with the *Vaiśeṣika* system. The name *Aulūkyā* is, however, considerably old, being mentioned by *Udyotakāra* and *Kumārila*.⁴ The name *Vaiśeṣika* occurs even in the scholium of *Prāśastapāda*, who also refers to the tradition about God Mahādeva just mentioned.⁵ *Vāyu-Purāṇa* makes *Akṣapāda*, *Kaṇāda* and *Ulūka* sons of *Vyāsa*,⁶ but no reliance can be placed on such an authority.

It has been already shown that the present collection of *Vaiśeṣika* aphorisms is posterior to the 4th century B. C., and the references to it contained in *Vātsyāyana*'s commentary on Gotama's work prove that it must have existed before the 5th century A. D. *Vātsyāyana* mentions it as समानतत्र, enumerates the six categories⁷ and actually quotes one aphorism of Kaṇāda.⁸ This is the utmost that we can say with certainty about the age of Kaṇāda's work. The date of *Prāśastapāda*, the earliest scholiast of Kaṇāda, is equally uncertain. He cannot be the same as the Ṛṣi *Prāśasta* mentioned in the *Pravarādhyāya* of *Baudhāyana-Sūtra*, for

1 Sugiura on the authority of a Chinese work *Ishiki Jutsuki* says he was called rice-eater because he used to go out and eat rice obtained from women, while he was called Ulūka, because he lived in a mountain and was very ugly. Vide Sugiura's *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, p. 14.

2 *Sarv. D. S.*, Calc. ed., p. 110.

3 Bhīmācārya, *Nyāya Kośa*, Intro., p. 2.

4 *Nyāya-Vārtika*, Bibl. Ind., p. 168; *Tantra-Vārtika*, I. 1. 4.

5 *P. B.*, Ben. ed., p. 234.

6 See the verse quoted in *P. B.*, Ben. ed., Intro., p. 10.

7 अरत्यन्यदपि द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः प्रमेयम् । तद्भेदेन चाऽपरिसङ्ख्येयम् । *Vāt.* on G; S., I. 1. 9.

8 यस्माद्विपाणी तस्मादश्व इति (V. S. III. 1. 16) किमनुमानमिति चेत् सन्तानोपपत्तिरुपपादितः शब्दसन्तानः etc. | *Vāt.* on G. S., II. 2. 36.

Bauddhāyana-Sūtra being composed before the 4th century B. C.,¹ *Prāśastapāda* and a fortiori *Kaṇāda* would have to be placed long before that time. *Prāśastapāda* has also been identified with *Gotama*, the author of *Nyāya-Sūtras*,² but it seems to be a mistake. So no inference as to the age of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* can be drawn from the date of the commentator. The six categories as well as the proofs are mentioned in the medical work of *Caraka*, who has been identified with *Patañjali*, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*.³ But even if this identity is correct, the original work of *Caraka* having been subsequently recast and enlarged by *Dyḍhabala*, particular passages from it cannot be relied upon for historical purposes.

Happily we can obtain better results in the case of *Gotama's* work. That it is posterior to the rise of Buddhism is evident on its face, for Buddhistic doctrines are expressly mentioned therein.⁴ It is also, as has been already shown, later than the latter part of the fifth century B. C., the time of *Bādarāyana's* *Brahma-Sūtras* which, while refuting *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines, make no mention of the cognate school of *Naiyāyikas*. Goldstücker says that both *Kātyāyana* and *Patañjali* knew of the *Nyāya-Sūtras*.⁵ Now *Patañjali* is said to have written his great work about 140 B. C.;⁶ but *Kātyāyana's* date is not so certain. According to a story told in *Kathā-Sarīt-Sāgara*, *Kātyāyana* was a pupil of *Upavarṣa* and a minister of king *Nanda* who reigned about 350 B. C.⁷ Goldstücker makes light of the authority of *Kathā-Sarīt-Sāgara*, but it is hard to believe that such a story could have got currency without some sort of foundation. If the story is true, the *Nyāya-Sūtras* would have to be placed before 350 B. C. *Kātyāyana's* date is now generally taken to be about the middle of the 4th century B. C.;⁸ and so *Gotama* will have to be placed before that time. There is another fact which confirms this conclusion.

1 Bühler, *Sacred Laws* (S. B. E. Series), Part I, *Āpastamba*, Intro., p. XXII.

2 Bhīmācārya, *Nyāya Koṣa*, Intro., p. 2

3 *Parama-Laghu-Manjūśā*. A verse said to be from *Yogabija* calls *Patañjali*, a writer on three sciences, grammar, medicine and *Yoga*.

4 G. S., III. 2. 11-13.

5 Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, p. 157.

6 Ibid p. 234.

7 *Kathā-Sarīt-Sāgara*, I. 5; Max Müller, *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 240.

8 Eggeling's *Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa* (S. B. E. Series), Intro., p. 30.

Śabara Svāmīn, the scholiast on *Jaimini's Sūtras*, often quotes an ancient author whom he calls *Bhagavān Upavarṣa*, and who must have, therefore, lived a long time before him. This *Upavarṣa* is said to have written commentaries on both the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras*.¹ If he be the same as the reputed teacher of *Kātyāyana* above mentioned, he must have lived in the first part of the 4th century B. C.² Now a passage quoted by *Śabara Svāmīn* from the commentary of this *Upavarṣa*³ shows that he was intimately acquainted with *Gotama's* system and largely adopted its doctrines. *Gotama's* work must, therefore, have been composed before the 3rd century B. C., that is, it belongs to the 4th century B. C.⁴

There is another piece of evidence, which, though apparently conflicting with the above conclusion, really supports it. *Āpastamba*, the author of the *Dharma-Sūtra*, knew both the *Pūrva* and the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* systems, but not the *Nyāya*.⁵ It is true that *Āpastamba* in two passages of his work uses the word न्याय and न्यायविद् respectively;⁶ but there he clearly refers to *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, and not to the system of *Gotama*. Nor is this use of the word uncommon in ancient writings. The fact that the word न्याय, which was subsequently monopolized by the followers of *Gotama*, is applied by *Āpastamba* to the system of *Jaimini*, shows that at his time *Gotama's* system was either unknown, or at least so new as not to have attained any wide celebrity. *Āpastamba* according to Bühler must have lived before the third century B. C. and even 150 or 200 years earlier;⁷ but his knowledge of the two

1 Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 357.

2 Another story in Somadeva-Bhaṭṭa's *Kathā-Sarīt-Sāgara* makes him live in Pāṭaliputra during the reign of *Nanda*, i. e. about 350 B. C.; but no reliance can be placed on the chronological data furnished by this book in the absence of other evidence.

3 *Śabara-Bhāṣya*, *Bibl. Ind.*, p. 10; for an English translation of the passage see Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 328.

4 This conclusion will not be affected by any date that may be assigned to *Pāṇini*. Goldstücker places *Pāṇini* long before the rise of Buddhism and holds that he did not know *Gotama's* work. *Pāṇini* mentions the word न्याय but only in the sense of a syllogism or rather a thesis, such as those in *Jaimini's* work. See Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, p. 152.

5 Bühler, *Sacred Laws* (S. B. E. Series), Part I, *Āpastamba*, Intro., p. xxvii.

6 *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra*, II. 4. 8. 13; and II. 6. 14. 13.

7 Bühler, *Sacred Laws* (S. B. E. Series), Part I, *Āpastamba*, Intro., p. xliii.

Mīmāṃsās shows that he could not have lived long before 400 B. C. *Gotama's* work must therefore be assigned to the end of the 5th or beginning of the 4th century B. C.

It is needless to state after this that our *Gotama* is quite different from *Gotama* the author of a *Dharma Sūtra*, who preceded *Baudhāyana* and was *a fortiori* prior to *Āpastamba*;¹ nor has he anything to do with the mythical sage of that name mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* as the son of *Utathya* and the husband of *Ahilyā*. Nothing is known about the personality of our author, and it is even doubtful whether his real name was *Gotama* or *Gautama*. Being a Brahman he could not have belonged to the race from which the founder of Buddhism sprang. He is also called *Akṣapāda* or *Akṣacaraṇa*, but the origin of the name is not known. Some have conjectured that the epithet was a nick-name given to *Gotama* for his peculiar theory of sensual perception, and means one who stands or walks upon organs of sense (अक्ष); but there is no authority for this. At any rate the author, whoever he may be, possessed great originality and a grasp of general principles that enabled him to systematize the science of logic for the first time. He cannot, however, be said to have founded it, for logical rules seem to have prevailed even before his time. *Manu* proclaims the need of reason for a correct understanding of the sacred law,² while *Bādarāyaṇa* goes to the other extreme of declaring the utter futility of our reasoning power to discover truth.³ Besides, it is quite obvious that, unless the art of reasoning had been practised for a long time previous, and had been considerably developed, neither the philosophical speculations in the *Upaniṣads* nor the rise of heretical sects, such as the *Cārvākas*, *Bauddhas* and *Jainas*, could have been possible. What then did *Gotama* achieve? What is his place in the history of Indian logic? This is an interesting question, and would, if satisfactorily answered, throw a flood of light on the early history of Indian philosophy.

Gotama was certainly not the pioneer. The very fact that he has evolved a logical system complete and well knit in all essential respects would lead us to suspect that he must have used materials left by his predecessors and profited by their errors. This is not a

1 *Ibid.* p. xx and lv.

2 *Manu-Smṛti*, xii, 106.

3 *Brahma-Sūtra*, II, 1, 11.

mere inference however, for *Vātsyāyana* in his Commentary on G. S., I. 1. 52 actually tells us that there was a school of *Naiyāyikas* who required ten premises in a syllogism, and that *Gotama* reduced their number to five.¹ This is quite probable, for Indian systematists always favour brevity, and even *Gotama's* five premises were subsequently reduced by others to three. *Gotama*, therefore, must have been preceded by other labourers in the same field whose works have been eclipsed by his superior treatise. External evidence would lead us even a step further. The two passages from *Āpastamba Dharma-Sūtra*, referred to above, show that the word न्याय was formerly applied to *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. Similarly passages are also found in many ancient *Smṛtis* and also some modern works in which the same word or its derivatives are used in connection with *Jaimini's* system. So late a writer as *Mādhavācārya* calls his epitome of *Jaimini's* work न्यायमालाविस्तर, while many other *Mīmāṃsā* works have न्याय as part of their title. The various theses propounded in *Jaimini's* work are called *Nyāyas*, and even *Pāṇini* uses the word in a similar sense.² How then are we to explain the fact that a word so generally used by the *Mīmāṃsakas* came afterwards to designate the rival and totally dissimilar system of *Gotama*? As a general rule we find that when a new school arises it coins its own phraseology to distinguish itself from its predecessors. In this case, however, the followers of *Gotama* appropriated an old word, and that word stuck to them so fast as to become afterwards their exclusive property. The explanation, it seems, lies in the fact that the science of logic which afterwards developed into a separate system was originally the child of *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*.

Analogy of other arts and sciences points to the same conclusion. All sciences in India appear to have sprung out of sacrificial necessities. Astronomy was founded on the rules by which Vedic *Ris* ascertained the correct time for performing periodical sacrifices, from the movements of heavenly bodies. While medicine had its germ in the analysis of the properties of *Soma* plant and other sacrificial substances, music was first cultivated by the *Udgātṛ* priest for singing his *Sāman* hymns, and a knowledge of architecture and geometry was found to be essential in constructing the sacrificial pandal and the *Vedī*. It is probable, therefore, that the

1 *Vāt.* on G. S., I. 33.

2 *Pāṇini's Sūtra*, III, 2, 122.

art of reasoning also originated in some requirement of the all-important sacrifices. Such requirements were mainly two, the correct interpretation of Vedic texts on which the due performance of the sacrifices depended, and victory in the philosophical and other discussions which were usually held in the intervals of sacrifice. It was a special function of the *Brahman* priest to give decision on any disputed points that might arise in the course of a sacrifice, and this he could not have done unless he was a master of ratiocination. Such decisions, which may be likened to the chairman's rulings in a modern assembly, are scattered through the ancient *Brāhmaṇas*, and are collected together as so many *Nyāyas* in the ancient *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* aphorisms of *Jaimini*. The philosophical disquisitions were collected in the various *Upaniṣads* and produced the system of *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā*. *Jaimini* lays down many rules of exegesis which seem to be the direct progenitors of the logical rules of *Gotama*. The various tests for instance illustrated in the third chapter of *Jaimini's* attempt to determine whether a rite or a *Vedic* direction is principal or auxiliary are only so many varieties of inference. The लिङ्ग so often mentioned by *Jaimini* must have suggested the हेतु and अपदेश of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* respectively. We may therefore suppose that it is the *Mīmāṃsakas* who, first prompted by exegetical necessity, developed sundry rules of logic which they illustrated by means of what they called *Nyāyas* or theses. When therefore *Manu* or *Āpastamba* speaks of तर्क or न्याय we must understand by the term these rules of inference as applied to Vedic interpretation. The utility of these rules for other purposes, founded as they mainly are on the broad basis of common sense, could not but have been perceived very soon and naturally taken advantage of. This secularization so to say of these exegetical rules of *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* gave birth to a science which was at first known by the name of आन्वीक्षिकी. It probably got its modern appellation of *Nyāya*, when *Gotama* raised it into a philosophical system by including in his treatise disquisition on sundry metaphysical topics, such as the origin of knowledge, eternity of sound, nature of proof and the agency of God. If this hypothesis is correct, we can form a tolerably clear idea of the task *Gotama* set before himself and which he has performed so admirably. From a bundle of experimental rules which were known only as a secular art called आन्वीक्षिकी and said by some to be subsidiary to अथर्ववेद *Gotama* evolved a system which at once became the rival of the two *Mīmāṃsās* and which from thence

forward exercised a strong sway over generations of Indian Pandits. *Gotama* can very well be compared in this respect with Aristotle or Immanuel Kant. Nay in one sense his influence has been even greater; for Kant and Aristotle failed to supplant their predecessors completely, while *Gotama* constructed a new system, as it were, which eclipsed all previous attempts and which has from his time become the sole standard for posterity.

The work of *Gotama* differs in many respects from that of *Kaṇāda*. While the former is methodical and details a system of logic practically complete, the latter discloses no consistent aim and no arrangements of parts. It has the appearance of a loose bundle of critical notes on the principal philosophical topics of the day. This fact raises a doubt as to whether *Kaṇāda's* aphorisms were ever the real basis of the *Vaiśeṣika* system as we find it now. The oldest exponent of the complete system as described in all modern *Vaiśeṣika* works is *Praśastapāda*, and he may, for aught we know, be its real founder also. The supposition is not so improbable as it might appear at first sight. Almost all the peculiar doctrines that distinguished the later *Vaiśeṣikas* from the *Naiyāyikas* and other schools are to be found in *Praśastapāda's* work and are conspicuously absent in *Kaṇāda's Sūtras*. The doctrines about द्वित्व पाक-जोत्पत्ति, विभागजविभाग, and several others, which are regarded as peculiarities of the *Vaiśeṣika* system, are not even touched upon in *Kaṇāda's* aphorisms, although they are pretty fairly discussed in *Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya*. The seven categories on which the whole *Vaiśeṣika* system is based are probably an afterthought; and even the doctrine of विशेष which according to some gave the name to the system appears to be a later development. *Kaṇāda* restricts the word अर्थ (categories properly so called) to three things only, द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म;¹ *Praśastapāda* enlarges the number to six, and some later author added अभाव.²

It is true that the aphorism धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्य-विशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निश्रेयससिद्धिः³ enumerates the six categories; but this aphorism is most probably a later interpolation. It is inordinately long, unlike other aphorisms of *Kaṇāda*, and contains a number of distinct propositions that

1 अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु । V. S., VIII. 2. 3.

2 Several Mss. of *Praśastapāda's* Bhāṣya end with the colophon इति प्रशस्तपादाविरचितं द्रव्यादिषट्पदार्थभाष्यं समाप्तम्.

3 V. S., I. 1. 4.

would have sufficed for half a dozen *Sūtras*. Besides it is very awkwardly worded if not positively ungrammatical. A comparison of this aphorism with the opening passage of *Prāśastapāda's* scholium leaves hardly any doubt about its spuriousness. *Prāśastapāda's* passage runs thus:— द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां षण्णां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यतत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः । तच्चेश्वरचोदनाभिव्यक्ताद्धर्मादेव ॥¹

Now one of these two passages must be an adaptation of the other. According to *Kiraṇāvali* this passage of *Prāśastapāda* explains only the first three *sūtras* of *Kaṇāda*, which implies that the fourth *sūtra* quoted above was unknown to the scholiast. Hence if *Kiraṇāvali* is to be believed, the aphorism must be the later of the two. *Śrīdhara*, the author of *Nyāya-Kandali*, speaks to the same effect. In introducing the last sentence he says that it was added to remove any apparent inconsistency between the preceding sentence and *Kaṇāda's* second aphorism यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः । The inconsistency is that while according to the scholiast knowledge of categories is the means of निःश्रेयस, *Kaṇāda* speaks of it as resulting from धर्म; and this inconsistency is removed by the scholiast by adding that the knowledge of categories itself springs from धर्म as revealed in divine commandments. So according to *Śrīdhara* this last clause is an addition of the scholiast intended to remove the apparent inconsistency, and yet it is the opening words of the fourth *Sūtra*, धर्मविशेषप्रसूतात्. Either these words or the whole aphorism must therefore have been suggested by *Prāśastapāda's* passage. If the aphorism, as it stands now, had existed before, there would have been no सूत्रविरोध and therefore no necessity for *Prāśastapāda's* additional clause तच्चेश्वरचोदनाभिव्यक्ताद्धर्मादेव. We must, therefore, suppose that the aphorism was added by some later writer in order to supply what appeared to him an oversight of *Kaṇāda*. Besides, the fact that there should have been even the suspicion of a contradiction between the enumeration of six categories and *Kaṇāda's* second *sūtra* proves that the six categories were not thought of by *Kaṇāda* and were for the first time mentioned by his scholiast, *Prāśastapāda*. We must, therefore, construe the aphorism अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु² as implying that *Kaṇāda* mentioned only three categories to which the scholiast added three more, while the seventh was added still

1 P. B., Ben. ed., pp. 6, 7.

2 V. S., VIII. 2. 3.

later.¹ If any doubt is felt on the point, a critical examination of the aphorisms which are supposed to define सामान्य and विशेष will dispel it. These aphorisms speak of विशेष as well as of सामान्य in a way quite different from the later conceptions of the two categories. Aphorisms सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् and अन्यत्रान्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः are especially significant. The first shows that *Kaṇāda* used the word विशेष as a relative term opposed to सामान्य, meaning that the notions of *genus* and *differentia* are always relative, and that the same property may be a *genus* with respect to one class, and a *differentia* with respect to another class of things. घटत्व, for instance, is a *genus* as including all jars under one class, and a *differentia* as distinguishing all jars from other substances, as cloth and men. The second aphorism shows that *Kaṇāda* distinguishes *ultimate difference* of things from other *differentiae* by giving to the former the special name of अन्यविशेष. It is these *ultimate differences* that are denoted by the later *Vaiśeṣikas* by the category विशेष; and the fact that *Kaṇāda* regards them only as one species of *differentia* shows that he did not include them in a separate category having absolute and not merely relative existence. The conclusion is irresistible that the अन्यविशेष, which were at first only one kind of *differentia*, were afterwards developed into an independent category. The notions of सामान्य and समवाय can also be shown to have originated in the same way.²

It will be thus seen that, unlike *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* was never given out to the world as a cut and dry system. It was gradually evolved as the ever-flowing stream of controversy suggested new points or disclosed the faults of old ones. *Prāśastapāda* thus occupies a somewhat intermediate position between *Kaṇāda* and his later commentators. He is sufficiently removed in time from *Kaṇāda* to call him a *muni* and a disciple of *Maheśvara*,³ while he himself is regarded almost as a semi-mythical personage by later writers. His age cannot, however, be ascertained even approximately. The earliest known commentary on *Prāśastapāda's* work is that of *Śrīdhara* who gives his own date as 991 A. D. He must also have preceded *Śaṅkarācārya* who seems to quote

1 V. S., I. 2. 3-6.

2 Similarly while *Kaṇāda* mentions only 17 qualities, the scholiast adds seven more, गुरुत्व and others, making in all 24, which number has been accepted by all later writers.

3 P. B., Ben. ed., pp. 1 and 329.

from him several times. The opinions ascribed by *Śaṅkarācārya* to the *Kaṇāda* school are all found in *Prāśastapāda's* work.¹ *Śrīcarāṇa*, in his commentary on *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* called *Prakāṭārtha*, says that a particular view criticised by *Śaṅkara* belongs to the older school of *Vaiśeṣikas* though opposed to that contained in *Rāvaṇa's Bhāṣya*. The view referred to is propounded by *Prāśastapāda* who must therefore be older than *Rāvaṇa*.² This *Bhāṣya* of *Rāvaṇa* which may be a commentary either on *Kaṇāda's Sūtras* or *Prāśastapāda's* own work, is not available, nor is its date known. *Udayana's Kiraṇāvāli* is, however, said to have been based upon it.³ If this *Rāvaṇa* is the same as the reputed author of a commentary on *Rgveda*, he appears to have been a very ancient author, and *Prāśastapāda* must be still older. Moreover, if *Prāśastapāda* was, as suggested above, the first to enumerate the six categories, he must have preceded *Vātsyāyana* who mentions them.⁴ Nothing more definite can be said on the point for the present and we must, therefore, leave *Prāśastapāda's* date too as one of the uncertainties of Indian chronology.⁵

The age of commentaries proper begins with *Vātsyāyana*, otherwise known as *Pakṣila-Svāmin*, whose commentary on *Gotama's* work is the oldest known work of the kind we now possess.⁶ *Vātsyāyana* must have lived about the end of the 5th century A. D. for he preceded the well-known Buddhist teacher *Diṅnāga* who is

1 Cf. the passages in *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* (Anandashram ed., pp. 514-5, and p. 519) with the passages in *P. B.*, Ben. ed., p. 48 and p. 328 respectively.

2 *Prāśastapāda* has also been referred to as प्रशस्तचरण, प्रशस्तकर and प्रशस्तदेव and some even identify him with *Gotama*. See *Vindhyeśvarīprasāda's Intro. to Vaiśeṣika Darśana* (Bibl. Ind. ed.).

3 *P. B.*, Ben. ed., Intro., p. 12 note.

4 *Vāt.* on *G. S.*, I. 1. 9.

5 If *Caraka*, the writer of medicine, is correctly identified with *Patañjali*, *Prāśastapāda* must be anterior to him. See pp. XXVII-XXVIII *supra*.

6 Was *Vātsyāyana* a Buddhist? Some have supposed him to be so because his work does not begin with a prayer to any of the Hindu deities. But the epithet *Svāmin* as well as the fact that the Buddhist writer *Diṅnāga* controverts his views should leave no doubt about his orthodoxy. He was also called *Dramila* (*Dravida*?) or *Pakṣilasvāmin*. He was a native of *Conjeeveram* and lived about A. D. 400, i. e. a century before *Diṅnāga* and *Vasubandhu*. See *S. C. Vidyabhusana's Indian Logic, Mediaeval School*, pp. 68-72.

said to have lived in the early part of the 6th century.¹ *Diṅnāga* was succeeded by the celebrated *Udyotakara* who is mentioned by *Subandhu* writing in the 7th century.² *Udyotakara* is said to have written his work to dispel the errors of *Diṅnāga* and others, and *Vācaspati* in his *Tīkā* adds that his principal object was to defend *Vātsyāyana* against the attacks of *Diṅnāga*.³

According to the Jain *Śloka-Vārtika*, *Udyotakara* was in his turn answered by *Dharmakīrti*.⁴ Now *Dharmakīrti* is known to have lived in the first half of the 7th century⁵; *Diṅnāga* and *Udyotakara* therefore must have belonged to the 6th, and *Vātsyāyana* at the latest to the end of the 5th century. *Vātsyāyana* is not, however, the earliest scholiast on *Gotama's Sūtras*. The alternative interpretations of *G. S.*, I. 1. 5 given by him show that the traditional meaning was obscured at his time, and that several writers before him had interpreted the *Sūtras* in different ways. The interval between *Gotama* and *Vātsyāyana* is considerable and could not have passed without producing some notable writers; yet no relics of the period appear to have been left behind. Either the Scythian inroads which ravaged the country from the 1st century B. C. to the 4th century A. D. must have swept away all literary records of the period or some unknown cause must have lulled philosophical activity for the time.

After *Udyotakara* there seems to have occurred another long gap in the succession of orthodox *Nyāya* writers until the end of

1 Max Müller, *India, What can it teach us?* 1st ed., p. 320. *Diṅnāga* is said to have introduced the universal proposition ॐत्तु into the Indian syllogism for the first time.

2 *Vāśavadattā* (Calc. ed., p. 235) has न्यायस्थितिनिर्वाचनकरस्वरूपाम् । See also Dr. Hall's Preface to his edition of that work. *Udyotakara* was called *Bhāradvāja* and lived at *Thaneshwar* near *Delhi*. He was a preceptor of the *Pāsupata* sect.

3 See quotation at *P. B.*, Ben. ed., Intro., p. 10. *Udyotakara* himself says :—

यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां शमाय शास्त्रं जगतो जगाद ।

कुतार्किकज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः करिष्यते तस्य मया निबन्धः ॥

Also see *Weber, Zeitschr. D. M. G.*, XXII. 727, and *Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 282, *Cowell's* note.

4 *J. B. B. R. A. S.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 229.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 90. *Dr. Satiscandra Vidyabhusana* thinks that *Dharmakīrti* and *Udyotakara* were contemporaries and flourished about 633 A. D. See *Indian Logic, Mediaeval School*, p. 105, and *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 164.

the 10th century, when a revival took place under the influence of the author of न्यायकन्दली which is the earliest known commentary on *Prāśastapāda's Bhāṣya*. Śrīdhara wrote at least three other works named अद्वयसिद्धि, तत्त्वबोध and तत्त्वसंवादिनी. The absence of any eminent Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika writer between Udyotakara and Śrīdhara makes it highly probable that the tradition was broken in the interval. This interregnum so to say is the more inexplicable as the period was one of intellectual activity. Controversies between the Brahmins as represented by the *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Vedāntins* on the one hand and the Buddhists and the Jainas on the other occupy almost the whole of this period; and it is strange that the followers of Gotama and Kaṇāda did not freely enter into the fray. Vātsyāyana and Udyotakara set the ball of controversy rolling, but no Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika writer seems to have taken up the cudgels on their behalf immediately after Dharmakīrti's strictures. The task of answering the great Buddhist writer was left to *Mīmāṃsakas* like Kumārila, Śaṅkarācārya and Maṇḍana, who were by no means favourable either to the Nyāya or to the Vaiśeṣika system. Dharmottara defended Dharmakīrti against the criticism of Kumārila and Maṇḍana, and we again find Śrīdhara, a *Naiyāyika*, answering Dharmottara. Though the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems had thus no spokesman of their own during this interregnum, the individual doctrines inculcated by them were not a bit neglected. They were fully handled by the rival disputants as if they had by that time become the common property of all schools. The *Mīmāṃsakas* strongly controverted the doctrine of non-eternity of sound, and the *Vedāntins* criticized the atomic theory. The *Prābhākaras* started novel views about *Samavāya* while all the schools fought over the proper number and nature of proofs. The answer to these criticisms came partly from the Buddhists and the Jainas and partly from the later Nyāya writers. The fact seems to be that at this time the Nyāya and much more the Vaiśeṣika doctrines, despite smaller differences, found their strongest supporters among the Buddhists and the Jainas, many of whose tenets closely resembled the peculiar doctrines of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The *Nyāya-Bindu*, for instance, which can now be safely ascribed to Dharmakīrti,¹ is a purely Vaiśeṣika treatise while the *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya* of Diṇnāga and Dharmakīrti's *Vārtikas* on it must also have been largely indebted to previous

1 JBBRAS, Vol. xxx, p. 47, and S. C. Vidyabhusana's *Indian Logic, Mediaeval School*, p. 109.

Vaiśeṣika works. This must also be the reason why *Vaiśeṣikas* were at this time looked upon almost as heretics.¹

The alliance of the *Vaiśeṣikas* with the Buddhists and the evident tendency of many of their theories towards atheism and materialism alarmed the orthodox writers of the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* schools who at once consigned them to the purgatory of non-believers. Śaṅkarācārya calls them *Ardha-Vaiśeṣikas* (Semi-Buddhists), while Kumārila brackets them with *Śākyas* as heretics who are frightened out of their wits by the advent of the faithful *Mīmāṃsakas*. And yet a glance at *Prāśastapāda's Bhāṣya* will show that the *Vaiśeṣikas* were at least as orthodox and as decidedly anti-Buddhistic as either the *Mīmāṃsakas* or the *Vedāntins*. *Prāśastapāda* begins with a prayer to God and concludes by ascribing the origin of the world as well as of the *Vaiśeṣika* system to Maheśvara. He accepts the authority of *Śruti* and occasionally controverts the views of the Buddhists. The notion of *Vaiśeṣikas* being heretical probably originated in the din of controversy between the Buddhists and the *Mīmāṃsakas*, and the prejudice thus created stuck to them for a long time afterwards. The system of *Nyāya*, however, seems to have escaped the stigma of heresy, probably owing to its comparative neglect in this period. The controversies of this period mainly raged round metaphysical and theological questions which were monopolized by the *Vaiśeṣika*, while the purely logical part of Gotama's system did not provoke much opposition. Only one doctrine of the *Naiyāyikas* was made the subject of controversy, namely the theory of a personal Creator of the universe. This doctrine was strongly advocated by the sect of *Pāśupatas*, and various sub-sections of *Bhāgavatas*. These theistic Schools probably derived their inspiration from Gotama's work, but they very soon became distinct religious sects.² On the whole it appears that, although there is a lack of special Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika works in this period, the various doctrines laid down by Gotama and Kaṇāda were fully threshed out and underwent additions and alternations which were not even dreamt of by previous writers.

The interregnum from Udyotakara's time to the end of the 10th century may have been produced by various causes which

1 For a detailed account of Jaina and Buddhist Logicians, see Dr. Satisandra Vidyabhusana's *Indian Logic, Mediaeval School* and for Chinese and Japanese writers see Sugiura's *Hindu Philosophy as preserved in China and Japan*.

2 Max Müller, *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 48.

cannot be known at present; nor can we say for certain how the subsequent revival was brought about. Perhaps learned men at this time were too much occupied with religious and sectarian disputes to attend to the drier subtleties of logic. The fact, however, cannot be denied, for while none of the known works of *Nyāya* or *Vaiśeṣika* proper can be assigned to the interval between the 7th and the 10th centuries, the succeeding age is marked by such an inrush of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* writers as more than atoned for the inactivity of the previous period. The most notable productions of this later age are a series of commentaries on the works of *Prāśastapāda* and *Vātsyāyana* who had then come to be looked upon as ancient authorities to be explained and enlarged with reverence, rather than criticized or corrected by abler successors. In this later period boldness and originality of thought dwindle in proportion to an increase of scholastic subtlety. The range of topics is limited, but each is treated with a greater fullness and ingenuity. There is a distinct tendency towards scholasticism, which afterwards assumed such abnormal proportions in the Nuddea school, but the change was not completed till four centuries later. It may be described as an age of transition from the genuine philosophy of mediaeval India to the scholastic verbiage of modern times; and it is a striking fact that this age nearly coincides with the growth of scholasticism in mediaeval Europe. It is not a little remarkable that the history of Indian logic bears in this respect a close analogy to the progress of thought in Europe. If *Gotama* lived about the same time as Aristotle, *Vātsyāyana* was probably the contemporary of Boethius and the Revivalists; while the modern *Ācāryas*, such as *Śrīdhara*, *Vācaspati* and *Udayana* flourished in the same age which produced Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus in the West. Are we then to suppose that human mind in India as well as in Europe passed successively through the same phases of philosophic development and nearly at the same rate of progress? The question is difficult to answer, but the coincidences are none the less interesting.

The first writer of this age of revival was *Śrīdhara* who wrote his *Nyāya-Kandali* in 991 A. D.¹ *Śrīdhara* takes great pains to refute the opinions of *Kumārila* and *Sureśvara* alias *Maṇḍana* on

1 See *P. B.*, Ben. ed., p. 331. The colophon contains the line, अथिक-दशोत्तरनवशतशाकाब्दे न्यायकन्दली रचित्त। which gives Sake 913 i. e. 991 A. D. as the date of the composition of the work. Bhandarkar (Report

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the one hand as well as *Dharmottara* on the other, a fact which seems to show that *Śrīdhara* was the first eminent *Nyāya* writer after them. *Rājasekhara*, a Jaina commentator on *Nyāya-Kandali*,¹ mentions three other commentaries on *Prāśastapāda's Bhāṣya*, besides *Śrīdhara's* work, viz., the *Vyomavatī* of *Śivācārya*, the *Kiraṇāvalī* of *Udayana* and the *Līlāvatī* of *Śrī Vatsa* or *Vallabha*, all of which were written after *Śrīdhara's* work but before the end of the 13th century. The chronological order of these writers may be fixed as *Śrīdhara*, *Vallabha*, *Udayana*, and *Śivāditya*. All of them came to be looked upon as eminent authorities and honoured with the title of *Ācārya*. Each of them was distinguished for some new conception, or original treatment of old topics. The works of *Vallabha* and *Śivāditya* are not yet available so as to enable us to form any definite opinion about them, but their views are frequently quoted and criticized in later works. *Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī* was probably left unfinished by the author, as all the Mss. hitherto available contain only the chapters on द्रव्य and गुण.² *Śrīdhara* lived as stated above at the end of the tenth century. He was followed by *Vācaspati Miśra* in the 11th century, who wrote commentaries on all the principal philosophy systems, and whose works have been deservedly held in the highest estimation by the succeeding generations.³ *Vācaspati*, the author of *Bhāmatī* and *Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī*, wrote an equally able commentary on the *Vārtikas* of *Udyotakara*, called *Vārtika-Tātparyā-Tīkā* and this *Tīkā* of *Vācaspati* became the text of another commentary, *Tātparyā-Parīśuddhi* by *Udayana*.⁴ *Udayanācārya*, the author of *Kiraṇāvalī* and *Parīśuddhi* lived, therefore, some time after *Vāca-*

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on Search of Sk. Mss. for 1881-4, p. 314) reads the line as अधिकदशोत्तर which gives the date Sake 910 or 988 A. D., but this must be a mistake, for the word अधिक is inexplicable without त्रि.

1 *P. B.*, Ben. ed., Intro. p. 19.

2 See the opening passages of *Tarka-Dīpikā*, p. 1, and Note thereon, p. 72 infra.

3 *J. B. B. R. A. S.*, Vol. xviii, p. 90. Cowell in the preface to his translation of *Kusumāñjali* tries to prove that *Vācaspati* lived in the 10th century; but his view cannot be accepted as *Vācaspati* quotes राजवातिक of King Bhoja who reigned in A. D. 993. Satiscaandra Vidya-bhusana also places *Vācaspati* in 976 A. D. when he is said to have composed his *Nyāya-sūci-nibandha*.

4 Bhandarkar, *Report on search of Sk. MSS. for 1883-4*, p. 81.

spati, and may be assigned to the end of the 12th century.¹ *Udayana* is the greatest *Naiyāyika* writer of this age. He combines in himself the two-fold character of an eminent dialectician and a religious revivalist, and has consequently become the centre of a number of traditions which have perhaps little foundation in fact. A story, for instance, is told of his having once made a pilgrimage to the temple of Jagannatha, where he found the temple-door shut against him. On this the irate *Naiyāyika* addressed the following couplet to the Deity :—

ऐश्वर्यमदमत्तोऽसि मामवज्ञाय वर्तसे ।
उपस्थितेषु बौद्धेषु मदधीना तव स्थितिः ॥²

"Infatuated with omnipotence as thou art, thou treatest me with contempt; but (remember) when the heretics approach, thy very existence depends upon me."

This irreverent apostrophe was probably founded on the fact that *Udayana* wrote two well known treatises to prove the existence of God and to refute the atheistical objections of the *Bauddhas* and other heretics. These treatises respectively known as *Kusumāñjali* and *Bauddha-dhikkāra*, though small, prove *Udayana* to be a very acute and powerful writer. *Udayana* is said to have carried on a vigorous crusade against the *Bauddhas* and the *Jainas*; and if Monier Williams is right in assigning the complete decay of Buddhism in India to the beginning of the thirteenth century,³ *Udayana* must have taken a leading part in giving the death-blow. At any rate the great prominence given in all the later works to ईश्वरकारणवाद or the doctrine of a personal Creator of the Universe may be ascribed to *Udayana's* influence. It is highly probable that *Udayana's* works gave a strong impetus to the *Śaiva*, *Vaiṣṇava* and other theistic sects which arose in large numbers at this time. *Naiyāyikas* amongst all the Indian systematists were from henceforward the strongest supporters of monotheism, and the Nuddea School in later times produced one of the greatest leaders of a modern theistic movement, viz., *Caitanya* of Bengal.

1 Cowell's Preface to his translation of *Kusumāñjali*, p. x; J. B. B. R. A. S., Vol. XVIII, p. 89, 90. Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusana places him about 984 A. D. on the authority of a verse in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. Vide *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 165.

2 Nehemiah Gore's *Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophy* translated by F. Hall, p. 6, note.

3 Monier Williams, *Buddhism*, p. 170.

Tradition ascribes to *Udayana* the first conception of the idea of uniting the two sister systems of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* into one harmonious whole. *Udayana's* extant works do not however support this theory, although it is not improbable that he threw out hints to that effect, which led some later writer to make the experiment. The earliest known work in which the two systems are found actually combined, as in many later works, is the *Sapta-Padārthī* of *Śivāditya Miśra*,¹ and it is possible that he was the first to put the idea into practice. *Śivāditya* is also the first writer to mention *Abhāva* as the seventh category and to introduce a systematic discussion of logical questions under बुद्धि. *Sapta-Padārthī* may, therefore, be regarded as the model of all such later manuals as *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, *Tarka-Kaumudī* and *Tarkāmṛta*.

As to *Vallabhācārya* his exact date is uncertain, but he appears to have preceded the author of *Sapta-Padārthī* if not also *Udayana*. This seems probable from the mention of *Nyāya-Līlāvatī* in a Canarese poem named *Darśana-sāra* written by a contemporary poet in praise of King *Singhaṇa* of the Yādava dynasty of Devagiri, who reigned from A. D. 1210 to 1247.² *Darśana-sāra* also mentions *Udayana* and some other writers;³ but nothing further can be said about it until the work is available to the public. It is superfluous perhaps to remark that this *Vallabha*, the author of *Nyāya-Līlāvatī*, was quite a different personage from the great Vaiṣṇavite reformer of that name who flourished in the 15th century.⁴

1 A MS. of Jinavardhana's commentary on *Sapta-padārthī* is in the Deccan College Library. This Jinavardhana lived in *Samvat* 1471. Peterson mentions a MS. of सप्तपदार्थवृत्ति named मित्तमाषिणी by *Mādhava-Sarasvatī*, as dated *Samvat* 1405. See Report of the Search of Sanskrit MSS. for 1896, p. 24. Also Bhandarkar's Report for 1882-83, p. 25. Prof. Ghate mentions a third commentary पदार्थचन्द्रिका by *Seṣānanta*. Prof. Ghate places *Udayana* in 984 A. D. and *Gaṅgeśa* in the 11th century, and *Śivāditya* between the two. J. B. B. R. A. Society, xxiii, p. 34.

2 Bhandarkar, *Early History of the Dekkan*, p. 82.

3 I am indebted for this information to my friend Mr. K. B. Pathak, formerly of the Deccan College. He saw a Canarese Ms. of दर्शनसार in the library of Brahma-Sūri Śāstri of Śrāvana Belgole in Mysore territory. It is not known when the book was written, but the author appears to have been a contemporary of सिद्धा.

4 Another writer *Jayanta* wrote *Nyāya-Mañjarī*, an independent commentary on *Nyāya-Sūtras*. He was a native of Kashmir and lived in the 11th century. He quotes *Vācaspati* and refutes Buddhists.

A host of smaller writers such as *Varadarāja* and *Mallinātha* may be mentioned as belonging to this second period, but they do not seem to have left any lasting mark on subsequent literature. The period may be roughly said to have closed about the beginning of the 14th century. It is marked by a great activity in the beginning and at the end, with an intervening blank which lasted for about 3 centuries and which sharply divides the older from the later school of writers. The conflict of opinions between the *Vaiśeṣikas* and the *Naiyāyikas* as well as the differences between the ancient and the modern schools of *Naiyāyikas*, which are so frequently discussed in modern works, seem to have originated in this period; and it was perhaps the growth of these minute differences that created at the end of this period a reaction in favour of amalgamating the two systems. This attempt at amalgamation, however, produced an effect exactly contrary to what was intended, for it stereotyped the differences instead of removing them. We find that in this period almost all the principal doctrines were evolved and the details were worked out, on which the dialecticians of the third period were exclusively to spend their scholastic ingenuity and produce volumes after volumes without making any real progress. With *Udayana* and *Sivāditya* we lose sight of writers who deserve to be called *Ācāryas*, as having aimed at originality and written epoch-making books. The class of *Ācāryas*, or masters, was henceforward to give place to that of mere *Upādhyāyas* or ordinary pundits. The race of giants was to be succeeded by a remarkably versatile and disputatious troop of dwarfs. Philosophy lost its freshness as well as its charm, and gradually degenerated into a bundle of endless controversies.

The end of the 14th century saw the commencement of the third period of *Nyāya* literature; and *Gaṅgeśa*, or *Gaṅgeśopādhyāya*, the author of *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*, may be said to be its oracle. He founded a new school of text-writers and commentators who afterwards came to be known as the Nuddea school owing to their having chiefly flourished in the toils of Nuddea or Navadvīpa in Lower Bengal. The distinguishing features of the writers of the school were their overwhelming pride, an abnormal development of the critical faculty, and a total disinclination to go out of the narrow grooves of traditional doctrines. The original *Sūtras* and the scholia on them recede into background, while *Gaṅgeśa's* work itself becomes the centre of a mass of literature unparalleled in any other country or age. Here we see at one and the same time

scholasticism at its climax and true philosophy at its lowest depth. We might wade through volumes of controversial jargon without coming across a single flash of deep thought or real insight into the nature of things. Mere conventionalities and distinctions without a difference are the weapons in this wordy warfare, with which one disputant tries to defend his thesis or to vanquish a rival. It may be doubted if either the writer or the reader is made a whit the wiser by all this labour.

All the writers of this school are not however equally faulty in this respect. The earlier ones especially show a considerable freedom of thought which is quite refreshing. The most notable of this kind is *Gaṅgeśopādhyāya*, the founder of the Nuddea school, whose exact date is not known, but who probably lived about the end of the 14th century. *Gaṅgeśa* quotes *Vācaspati*, while his son *Vardhamāna* wrote commentaries on *Udayana's Kirāṇāvālī* and *Vallabha's Līlāvātī*. *Gaṅgeśa* must have therefore lived after the 12th century. *Gaṅgeśa* was followed by two writers of note, *Jayadeva* and *Vāsudeva*. According to Burnell *Jayadeva*, otherwise known as *Pakṣadhara Mīśra*, wrote his *Maṅyāloka*, a commentary on *Gaṅgeśa's Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*, about 5 centuries ago, that is, about the middle of the 14th century, but this is highly improbable.¹ *Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma*, a fellow student of *Jayadeva* and the author of a commentary on *Gaṅgeśa's* work, had four pupils of whom the first *Gaurāṅga*, popularly known as *Caitanya*, the celebrated religious reformer in Bengal, was born about 1485 A. D.² Both *Sārvabhauma* and *Jayadeva* must, therefore, have lived in the latter part of the 15th century, and *Gaṅgeśa* at least a generation or two earlier. *Jayadeva* is said to have studied

1 Burnell, *Catalogue of Tanjore MSS.*, Vol. II, p. 117. *Jayadeva* was noted for his intellectual powers. He got the nickname पक्षधर for having mastered a difficult book in a fortnight. He is probably the same as the author of प्रसन्नराजव but is different from the poet who composed गीतगोविन्द. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi is said to have been his pupil for some time.

2 Cowell (Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 281) give the date of *Caitanya's* birth as 1489; but see Bose's *History of Hindu Civilization*, Vol. I, p. 43. *Caitanya* died in A. D. 1527. *Vindhyeśvarīprasāda* quotes a verse current among Nuddea Pundits ज्ञाकि मुनिस्वोमयुगेन्दुगण्ये पुण्ये त्रिथौ फाह्युनपौर्णमास्याम् । त्रैलोक्यभाग्योदयपुण्यकीर्तिदेवः शचीनन्दन आविरासीत् ॥ Here the word युग may mean two or four and so will give either Śaka 1207 or 1407 as the date of *Gaurāṅga's* birth. See Intro. to *Vaiśeṣika Darśana* (Bibl. Ind. ed.), p. 32.

Tattva-Cintāmaṇi with his uncle *Harimīśra*, which shows that *Gaṅgeśa's* work was already a standard book in the first half of the 15th century. We shall not be wrong therefore in placing *Gaṅgeśa* in the latter part of the 14th century at the latest.¹

Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma must have been a remarkable man, for all of his pupils distinguished themselves in different fields. The first, *Caitanya*, founded a *Vaiṣṇava* sect which soon spread over the whole province of Bengal and revolutionized as it were the religious life of the people. The fact is noteworthy that the greatest exponent of the doctrine of faith in modern times received his early training in the dialectics of *Nyāya* philosophy. The devout mind of *Caitanya* must have no doubt recoiled from the scholastic subtleties of *Gaṅgeśa*, but they could not have failed to influence many of his views. *Vāsudeva's* second pupil *Raghunātha*, otherwise known as *Tarka-Śiromaṇi* or simple *Śiromaṇi*, wrote *Dīdhiti*, the best commentary on *Gaṅgeśa's Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*, and is acknowledged to be the highest authority among the modern *Naiyāyikas*. The third was *Raghunandana*, the lawyer and the author of a commentary on *Jīmūta-vāhāna's Dāya-vibhāga*, and is now held to be the best current authority on the Bengal School of Hindu law. The fourth, *Kṛṣṇānanda*, also wrote works on charms and other kindred subjects.² All these writers being contemporaries of *Caitanya* must have flourished in the beginning of the 16th century. *Raghunātha Śiromaṇi* wrote besides *Dīdhiti* commentaries on *Udayana's* works and a few other treatises, one of which is *Padārtha-Khaṇḍana* or a refutation of *Vaiśeṣika* categories. He was succeeded by a series of commentators whose sole ambition seems to have been to make the *Dīdhiti* as unintelligible and terrible to the student as possible. *Raghunātha's* immediate successors were *Mathurānātha*, *Harirāma Tarkālaṅkāra* and *Jagadīśa*, who were followed by their respective pupils, *Raghudeva* and *Gadādhara*. *Gadādhara* may be called the prince of Indian schoolmen, and in him the modern *Nyāya* dialectics reached its climax. He was such a thorough-going *Naiyāyika* that when asked to think of the prime cause of the universe on his death-bed, instead of contemplating God he is said to have repeated the words **पीलवः**:

1 Prof. Ghate places *Gaṅgeśa* in the 11th century on the authority of a Ms. of *Jayadeva's Āloka* transcribed in *Lakṣmaṇa Saṁvat* 159 corresponding to A. D. 1267. See *JBRAS*, xxiii, p. 93 and *Vindhyeśvarī-prasāda's* Intro. to *Vaiśeṣika Darśana* (*Bibl. Ind.*), p. 82.

2 *Bhīmācārya, Nyāya-Kośa*, Intro., p. 6.

पीलवः पीलवः (atoms, atoms, atoms)! His sixty-four treatises of *Vādas* as they are called on as many topics noticed in *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi* form a continuous commentary on *Śiromaṇi's Dīdhiti* and *Jayadeva's Āloka*; but several of them are not yet available. *Gadādhara* having come about two generations after *Raghunātha* must be assigned to the end of the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century. He was thus nearly contemporaneous with Lord Bacon whose denunciations of scholasticism may be most appositely illustrated by extracts from *Gadādhara's* writings. Akbar's was an august age in India, and scholars like *Gadādhara* found a congenial atmosphere in the peaceful times of the great and enlightened Mogul; but Akbar's death put an end to all dreams of a revival of letters. The wars and anarchy of the next two centuries afforded little scope for the cultivation of philosophy, and we accordingly find that even scholastic *Nyāya* could not flourish after *Gadādhara*.

The generation next after *Gadādhara* is represented by two writers standing on a somewhat lower level but equally famous. These were *Śaṅkara Miśra*, the author of *Upaskāra*, a commentary on *Kaṇāda's Sūtras*, and *Viśvanātha* who wrote *Siddhānta-Muktāvali* and *Gotama-Sūtra-Vṛtti* which is a commentary on *Gotama's* aphorisms. *Śaṅkara Miśra* was a pupil of *Raghudeva* the fellow student of *Gadādhara*. There is some doubt as to the date of *Viśvanātha*, but he most probably belonged to this age.¹

It is remarkable that the *Sūtras* of both *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* should have attracted the attention of commentators at about the same time. *Śaṅkara Miśra* and *Viśvanātha* who respectively commented upon the works of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* greatly resembled each other and were probably contemporaries. A kind of reaction against the excesses of *Gadādhara* seems to have led these writers to seek the fresher fountains of *Sūtras*. Another sign of this reaction was the production of manuals adapted to the understanding of the beginners and explaining the latest ideas in the simplest language. The *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda*, the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Tarkāmṛta* are instances of this class of books, which must have come as a relief to those students of *Nyāya* who were hitherto lost in the mazes of *Pañca-Lakṣaṇī* and *Dāśa-Lakṣaṇī*. In course of

1 *Rudrabhaṭṭa*, brother of *Viśvanātha*, wrote a commentary on *Raghunātha's Dīdhiti*, called *Raudrī*. MSS. of two of *Rudrabhaṭṭa's* works are mentioned by *Aufrecht* (*Catalogus Catalogorum*) as dated 1640 and 1657 respectively.

time these manuals too were overloaded with commentaries but fortunately the commentaries on them, except perhaps two, never became as popular as the originals. The two exceptions are *Viśva-nātha's Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* and *Annambhaṭṭa's Tarka-Dīpikā* which being written by the authors of the original works are more like larger editions of those texts than mere explanatory glosses. These manuals proved very handy and useful to students, but they also marked the lowest watermark of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems. Henceforward all originality was dead and the writers chiefly aimed at explaining the ideas of their predecessors instead of expounding their own. The *Upādhyāyas* were now succeeded by writers whose high-sounding names were in strange contrast with the worth of their productions. *Kroḍas* or annotations became plentiful, but original thinking was dead and gone completely. Even these are now rare, and the once famous class of *Naiyāyikas* is in danger of being extinct for ever.

The preceding résumé of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* literature brings out, it is hoped, at least the one fact that that literature is as capable of a historical treatment as any other class of writings. It is the story of a gradual development of two philosophical systems which, springing out of a few elementary notions, attained their present proportions after many vicissitudes and in the course of several centuries. There must have been during this time considerable additions and alterations in the fundamental doctrines as conceived by the founders of the systems. The original nucleus was comparatively small, but the accretions and outgrowths seem to have assumed in time quite large proportions. What an amount of earnest thought and labour must have been devoted to this work of elaborating complete systems out of a few primary principles! It was a process of evolution brought about partly by the natural law of growth and partly by the mutual action and reaction of the several systems of Indian philosophy. In the beginning the chief rivals of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems were the *Sāṃkhya*s, whose theory of the anti-production reality of effects was diametrically opposed to the *Naiyāyika* doctrine of non-existent effect. Later they encounter the more formidable critics of the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* schools who differed from them in so many particulars that a severe conflict between the rivals was inevitable. The *Mīmāṃsakas* affirmed the eternity of sound, while the *Naiyāyikas* denied it. The first enumerated six proofs, the *Naiyāyikas* four, and the *Vaiśeṣikas* only two. The *Naiyāyika* assumed a personal

Creator, the Vedāntins an impersonal *Brahman*, while the *Mīmāṃsakas* would recognize nothing but the eternal Vedas. Again the Vedāntins derived all creation from one universal spirit, the *Naiyāyikas* from hard minute atoms. The former were idealists *par excellence*, the latter out and out realists. The doctrines of the former always tended towards mysticism and idealism, those of the latter towards materialism and disbelief. It was natural that systems so widely divergent should come into conflict with each other. The long-continued controversies between these rivals systematically influenced the tenets of all of them. While the Vedāntins incorporated much of the logic of the *Naiyāyikas* into their works, the latter did not disdain to borrow many of the theological views of the former. It would be absurd therefore to expect that any of these systems as propounded in modern works would agree in all respects with the views of the ancient authors. The *Naiyāyikas* themselves recognize this fact by contrasting wherever necessary the views of the moderns with those of the ancients. It is also noteworthy that there is no sharp line dividing the ancient and the modern schools of *Naiyāyikas*. Sometimes the terms are applied to the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Naiyāyikas* respectively; sometimes to older authors like *Vātsyāyana* and *Praśastapāda*, as opposed to the later ones of the Nuddea school; and occasionally even in that school to the author of *Dīdhiti* as dissenting from *Gaṅgeśa*. As an instance of the last, the student may compare the two definitions of करण, one insisting upon the qualification व्यापारवत् and the other making proximity to the effect the sole test of causation.¹ The line dividing the ancients and the moderns has thus continuously moved forward and forward, thereby showing that the *Naiyāyikas* themselves acknowledged a progressive development of their philosophy. It ought to be an interesting study to mark the successive stages of this development, and discover the causes that may have led to them. The time may come when a deeper knowledge of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* literature will enable us to solve this problem.

The foregoing observations have been mostly based on material obtainable from the literature of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems themselves; but works belonging to other philosophical systems as well as the vast literary treasures produced in ancient and mediæval India will, if properly examined, yield still more important

1. For a discussion of these two views, see Notes on Sec. 37, pp. 186-90, *infra*.

data for a history of Indian philosophy. A comparison of Greek logic with the logic of the *Nyāya* must also be very instructive. Such a comparison will not only show how similar ideas and modes of thought occurred almost simultaneously and in the same historical order to thinkers in two such distant countries as India and Greece, but it may also throw new light on some of the dark chapters in the history of Indian Logic. Space will not, however, permit me to enter into these interesting inquiries at present; and I must content myself with noting only one important fact which cannot be decently passed over in such a sketch as this. I, of course, refer to the striking resemblance which the syllogistic method of the *Nyāya* bears to the Pre-Aristotelian dialectics in Greece. Zeno the Eleatic was the founder of this latter, and Zeno must have been a contemporary of *Gotama*, or of at least some of his immediate predecessors.¹ Zeno's work, which is divided into three parts — upon consequences, upon the interrogatory method of disputation, and upon sophistical problems respectively — has many points of similarity with that of *Gotama*, while the interrogatory method, cultivated by Zeno's followers, the sophists, and brought to perfection in Plato's Dialogues, was almost identical with the syllogistic process of the *Naiyāyikas*. The essence of this method consisted in driving an opponent to a point where he was either totally silenced or the absurdity of his position became self-evident. So far as the *Naiyāyikas* were concerned this was not an accidental feature, for they have laid down a special rule that no premise in a syllogism can proceed without having a previous **शक्यं** or doubt, presumably started by an opponent in the controversy. Take the stock-example, "Mountain is fiery". "Why?" "Because it has smoke." "What then?" "Wherever there is smoke, etc.", and so on, every premise being a reply to some previous question, assumed until the imaginary querist has no more questions to ask. This is exactly the way Socrates used to argue with his real interrogators, or Euclid proved his theorems of geometry. Obviously this method is better suited for controversy than for purely didactic reasoning; and consequently we find that Indian thinkers who came after the *Naiyāyikas* such as the *Bauddhas* and the Vedāntins modified it to a considerable extent just as Aristotle did in Greece.² The tripartite syllogism of

1 Whateley, *Elements of Logic*, p. 3.

2 Colebrooke thinks that the three-membered syllogism of the later Vedānta was borrowed from the Greeks, but this is mere guess. See *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 356.

Aristotle was nothing more than a re-adjustment of the ancient dialectical syllogism, although Aristotle himself made too much of it and expected from it results which it was incapable of producing. Similarly those who claim superiority for the Aristotelian over the five-membered syllogism of the *Naiyāyikas* forget that both are mere instruments or mechanical aids for thinking, and as such cannot by themselves furnish an absolute guarantee for truth. Both have their peculiar merits as well as drawbacks, and consequently both must be judged from their proper standpoints. Aristotle distinguished between the dialectic and the apodictic, *i. e.* the old and the new or his own syllogism, by asserting that the former proceeded from mere belief or an assumed hypothesis while the latter was based on scientific truth. There is much force in this distinction, and it may to some extent apply to the five-membered syllogism also. But Aristotle's criticisms can no longer be accepted without reservation even with respect to doctrines intimately known to him. Much less can he be accepted as a safe guide in adjudging the merits of Indian logic.

It will not be proper to conclude this introductory sketch without noticing one more objection that is often advanced against the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* systems, namely that their heterogeneous character detracts considerably from their value as systems of pure logic. Indian Logicians, say these objectors, have, by their frequent digressions on metaphysical and other topics, such as the categories, the sources of knowledge and the theory of atoms, been led into treating the strictly logical questions either perfunctorily or in a wrong manner altogether. On a closer consideration, however, this heterogeneity of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems will be found to have been inevitable. The narrow conception of logic as being only a theory and art of proof and nothing more is no longer tenable. Modern investigations, such as those of Kant, Ueberweg and others, show that the purely logical questions are inseparably connected with others comprehended in the wider province of metaphysics. The best answer to the above objection can therefore be given in the words of an eminent modern writer:—

"Start as we may", says Prof. Adamson, "in popular current distinctions, no sooner do logical problems present themselves than it becomes apparent that, for adequate treatment of them, reference to the principles of ultimate philosophy is requisite; and logic, as the systematic handling of such problems, ceases to be an indepen-

dent discipline and becomes a subordinate special branch of general philosophy."¹

And again the same writer remarks :—

“ Any criticism of a general conception of logic or special application thereof which does not rest upon criticism of the theory of knowledge implied in it must be inept and useless. It will also have become apparent that a general classification of logical schools as opposed to the reference of these to ultimate distinctions of philosophical theory is impossible.”²

The *Naiyāyikas* seem to have arrived at the same conclusion at an early period, and faced it boldly by embodying their views on all cognate and interdependent questions in a fairly consistent system. *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* were not therefore such fools in mixing logical and metaphysical topics in their works as some of their modern critics would believe them to be. Logic is no longer regarded as a theory of proof only ; it is a theory of knowledge in general, and as such treats of many psychological and metaphysical topics which do not fall within the domain of the narrower science. Looked at from this standpoint *Gotama's* conception of his subject will be found to be remarkably accurate and just. Let us first understand him ; and there will be then time enough to pick holes in his monumental work.³

1 Prof. Adamson in his Art. *Logic* in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., Vol. XIV, p. 781.

2 See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., Vol. XIV, p. 799.

3 Max Müller in noticing my Brief Survey of Indian logic remarks at p. 476 of his *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* : “ But unfortunately that period in the historical development of the Nyāya which is of the greatest interest to ourselves, namely that which preceded the composition of the Nyāya-Sūtras, had by him (i. e. myself) also to be left a blank, for the simple reason that nothing is known of Nyāya before *Gotama*”. It should be remembered, however, that Nyāya was recognised as a separate system only after *Gotama* and that all traces before him must be sought in the general philosophical literature such as the *Upaniṣads*.

Annambhatta and his works.

Annambhatta, the author of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā*, shares the fate of many Sanskrit writers of being known only in his works. The name itself looks anomalous, and is either a contraction of *Ananta Bhatta* or a Sanskritized form of the Canarese name *Anna Bhatta*. Little do we know about him, and that little mostly consists of traditions which cannot be accepted as true without the strongest corroboration. Mr. R. B. Godbole, in his ‘Dictionary of Modern History of India’,¹ gives a detailed account of our author without however mentioning the source of his information. According to him, *Annambhatta* was a Tailang Brahman by birth and resided in a village named *Garikapāda*, formerly in the possession of Nizam Ali. He lived in the 15th century at the time of the Cālukyas, studied *Nyāya* at *Kaṇḍi-nyapura* or *Kondu Vidu* for 12 years and became a famous *Naiyāyika*. He established a College for teaching *Nyāya* in his native town where he instructed his pupils in a graduated series of *Nyāya* works consisting of *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, *Tarka-Dīpikā*, *Siddhānta-Muktāvali* and *Gadādhara*. He had many children none of whom survived him, and is said to have travelled out of his village only once in his life when he visited the shrine of *Mallikānjuna* at the advanced age of 55. From this it would appear that *Annambhatta* was posterior to both *Gadādhara* and *Viśvanātha*, which is very probable; but then he could not have lived in the 15th century as stated by Mr. Godbole. It has been shown elsewhere,² that *Gadādhara* must have flourished in the latter part of the 16th century and *Viśvanātha* one generation later. Obviously *Annambhatta* who taught the works of these writers could not have lived before the beginning of the 17th century. Another of Mr. Godbole's statements, viz. that *Annambhatta* travelled only once in his life, is contradicted by a tradition embodied in a well-known couplet that has passed into a proverb, काशीगमनमात्रेण नान्न-भद्रायते द्विजः meaning that a man does not become a great scholar like *Annambhatta* simply by going to Benares. If the verse refers to the author of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, he must have visited and studied at Benares. The proverb would also show that he became

1 R. B. Godbole, भरतखंडाचा ऐतिहासिक कोष, p. 10.

2 See *Introduction*, p. XLVII, *supra*.

famous for his learning at a very early period, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that his works became very popular and have been in use as elementary text-books in all parts of India. No reliance can therefore be placed on Mr. Godbole's account, and in the absence of any other authentic source of information we are left to such meagre data as are supplied by the writings of *Annambhaṭṭa* himself.

Apart from such vague traditions, we can unhesitatingly say that *Annambhaṭṭa* is comparatively a modern writer. He belonged to the class of manual writers, who mostly flourished after the 16th century and whose chief aim was to simplify the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems by pruning all superfluous technicalities out of them, and bringing them within the comprehension of beginners. The *terminus ad quo* of our author may for the present be fixed at about 1600 A. D., the time when *Gadādhara* flourished. *Annambhaṭṭa* rarely refers to any previous writer or work that might enable us to fix his age accurately. He however notes the controversy about व्यापारवत्करण, first started by *Raghunātha*, the author of *Dīdhiti*¹; while in another passage of the *Dīpikā*, he seems to quote directly from the *Dīdhiti*, for the sentence प्रतिश्रुतिगतावच्छेदकारोऽयं etc., which occurs at the bottom of p. 62 *infra* and which is misread in many Mss. of *Dīpikā*, appears to have been taken from a corresponding passage in the *Dīdhiti*.² It has been shown elsewhere that *Raghunātha Śīromani*, the author of *Dīdhiti*, lived in the first quarter of the 16th century.³ The *Dīdhiti* must have been written about 1520 A. D. and *Annambhaṭṭa* necessarily came after it. *Gadādhara* came two generations after *Raghunātha* with whose grand pupil *Raghudeva* he was contemporary. *Gadādhara* therefore lived about the end of the 16th century, either in *Mithilā* or *Nuddea*; and if it be true that *Annambhaṭṭa* taught his works in his own college in the far-off town of *Kauṇḍinyapura*, some time must have elapsed between *Gadādhara* and *Annambhaṭṭa* to allow the fame of the former's works to reach the Southernmost province of India. The story of *Annambhaṭṭa* teaching *Gadādhara*'s work in his College derives support from another tradition, according to which the *Tarka-Dīpikā* was specially composed for the use of those who could not understand *Gadādhara*'s larger work and came to be called बाल-

1 Page XLVII, *supra*.

2 See Note 5 under Sect. 80, p. 371, *infra*.

3 See *Introduction*, p. XLVI, *supra*.

गदाधरी on account of its being an epitome of the erudite commentary of the great schoolman. It may be therefore fairly presumed that *Annambhaṭṭa* lived some time after *Gadādhara* i. e. after 1600 A. D. If *Viśvanātha*, the author of the *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* also preceded him, this *terminus* will have to be shifted still further. *Viśvanātha* and his brother *Rudrabhaṭṭa*, who wrote a commentary on the *Dīdhiti*, lived most probably in the first quarter of the 17th century,¹ and *Annambhaṭṭa* could not have lived earlier.

The *terminus ad quo* of our author may be fixed at 1700 A. D. The *Tarka-Saṅgraha* must have become a standard work, and a difficult one also in the latter part of the 18th century, since *Śrīkṛṣṇa Dhūrjati* wrote his commentary called *Siddhānta-Candrodāya* about that time for the instruction of *Rājasimha*, son of King *Gajasimha*, who flourished in 1774 A. D. The *Tarka-Candrikā* by *Vaidyanātha Gadgil* seems to be an earlier commentary on the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, for a Ms. of it in the Deccan College Library gives, as the date of its composition, Śake 1644, i. e. 1722 A. D. This *Vaidyanātha* is probably identical with *Tatsat Vaidyanātha*, the pupil of *Nāgeśa* and the author of a commentary on his *Udyota*. *Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa* is known to have been invited to a grand sacrifice in 1714 by *Savai Jayasimha*, and his pupil *Vaidyanātha* may therefore have written his commentaries in the next decade. Obviously *Annambhaṭṭa* must have lived before this time. The evidence of Mss. of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* is conclusive on the point. Stein mentions a Ms. of T. S. dated 1740 A. D. and another of T. D. dated 1735 A. D.² The oldest known Ms. however of these two works is the one now in the possession of Dr. Jacobi of Bonn and marked J in the present edition. It is dated Śake 1634, i. e. 1712 A. D. As this Ms. contains several corrections and marginal additions, it will not be wrong to assume that the two works were written several years before they were copied. Hence we can safely place *Annambhaṭṭa* before the beginning of the 18th century. The period from A. D. 1625 to A. D. 1700 is neither too long nor too short to cover one lifetime, and if we can place *Annambhaṭṭa* between these two *termini* the result ought to be regarded as pretty satisfactory under the present circumstances. Besides, if Mr. Godbole's statement that *Annambhaṭṭa* visited *Mallikārjuna* temple at the age of 55 has any foundation, he must have lived

1 See *Introduction*, p. XLVII, *supra*.

2 Stein, *Catalogue of Sk. Mss. at Jammu*.

up to an advanced age and may, for aught we know, have covered the whole of the period above indicated.

All attempts to push *Annambhaṭṭa's* date before the first quarter of the 17th century must therefore fail. The colophon of a Ms. of T. S. mentioned by Weber¹ is said to give the date 1425 A. D. which if true would conclusively prove him to have lived at least two centuries before the time we have assigned to him. But this is not possible. The verse runs thus :—

तपोमास्यसिते कृष्णे चन्द्रनागाब्धिचन्द्रकैः ।
वाराणस्यां मिते वर्षे स्वार्थमिन्द्रुल्लिलेख वै ॥

Here the expression चन्द्रनागाब्धिचन्द्रकैः has been incorrectly taken to mean *Sainvat* 1481 or 1425 A. D. अब्धि ought to be taken for 7 and not 4, and then the date becomes 1725 A. D., making the Ms. 12 years later than that of Dr. Jacobi. Whatever uncertainty may still remain on the point, one thing is unquestionable that *Annambhaṭṭa* could have by no means been anterior to *Rāghunātha* whose date is now tolerably settled.² It has also been suggested that the *Tribhuvana-Tilaka* of Kanchi mentioned in T. D.³ may be some king contemporary with our author; but this is also not possible, for no king of that name is to be found in the genealogies of Kanchi after the 12th century. Even if the *Tribhuvana-Tilaka* be a real personage he must have lived before the 10th century, for the illustration in T. D. is literally copied from *Śrīdhara's Nyāya-Kaṇḍalī* which was written in 991 A. D.⁴ No inference can therefore be drawn from the mention of *Tribhuvana-Tilaka* as to the date of our author.

Annambhaṭṭa was the son of *Tirumala*, who is styled *Ācārya* and whose name is preceded by the honorific title of अद्वैतविद्याचार्य in the colophons of several of our author's works. The colophon⁵, which by-the-by has been most useful in proving the identity of the several *Annambhaṭṭas*, is found only in Dr. Jacobi's copy of *Tarka-Dīpikā* (marked J). It however occurs at the end of two other works of *Annambhaṭṭa*, namely *Mitākṣarā*, which is a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*, and the fragment of a grammatical work named *Vivaraṇodyotana* or *Bhāṣya-pradīpo-*

1 Weber's *Berlin Catalogue*, No. 683, p. 203.

2 See *Introduction*, p. XLVI, *supra*.

3 See p. 50, *infra*.

4 See *Introduction*, p. XL-XLI, *supra*; P. B., Ben ed., p. 6.

5 See p. 67, *infra*.

dyotana consisting of annotations on *Kaiyyata's* celebrated gloss on *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya*. *Tirumala*, father of *Annambhaṭṭa*, appears to have been a R̥gvedī *Smārta* Brāhmaṇa, learned in the Vedānta philosophy and descended from a great man named *Rāghava* who performed a *Soma* sacrifice. It is not known whether *Tirumala* wrote any works, but several authors of that name are mentioned by Aufrecht. *Annambhaṭṭa* appears to have been an all-round scholar, for he has left works on at least four sciences, namely *Nyāya*, *Vedānta*, *Vyākaraṇa* and *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. Besides the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Tarka-Dīpikā*, Aufrecht mentions the following works as having been composed by *Annambhaṭṭa*¹:— 1 *Mitākṣarā*, 2 *Tattva-Bodhinī-Tīkā*, 3 *Nyāya-Parīṣiṣṭa-Prakāśa* and 4 *Subodhinī-Sudhāsāra*, otherwise called *Rāṇakoḥjīvinī*. Of these the first is a short commentary on *Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-Sūtras* and is undoubtedly written by the author of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, since it has the same colophon² as is found in our Ms. of the *Dīpikā* marked J. As to the other three nothing can be said with certainty as I have not been able to procure any copy of them. The second appears to be a commentary on some work named *Tattva-Bodhinī*, and Aufrecht marks it as a *Nyāya* work, apparently on the authority of Oppert.³ Aufrecht does not however mention any *Nyāya* work of the name *Tattva-Bodhinī*, and possibly both he and Oppert, were misled. We know only three works bearing the name *Tattva-Bodhinī*, namely, a commentary on *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka* by *Nṛsiṃha*, a Tantric work by *Kṛṣṇānanda*, and thirdly a commentary on *Bhaṭṭoji's Siddhānta-Kaumudī*. So *Annambhaṭṭa's Tīkā* may be a commentary on either the first or the last. Or it is also possible that a Ms. of *Annambhaṭṭa's Vivaraṇodyotana*, presently to be mentioned, has been mistaken by Oppert for an independent work of this name. The third work, *Nyāya-Parīṣiṣṭa-Prakāśa*, is said to be a commentary on *Udayanācārya's Nyāya-Parīṣiṣṭa* and may possibly be *Annambhaṭṭa's Magnum Opus* on the *Nyāya* system. The fourth is said to be a commentary on *Rāṇaka* or *Nyāya-Sudhā* of *Someśvara* which in its turn is a commentary on the *Tantra-Vārtika* of *Kumārila*. Besides these, Aufrecht and Hall mention two other works on grammar called *Kātyāyana-Prātibhāṣya-*

1 Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum*.

2 This colophon is repeated at the end of each chapter in a Ms. of the work which I had seen.

3 Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum*, p. 20.

Vyākhyāna and *Mahā-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇodyotana* written by an author named *Annambhaṭṭa*.¹ The author of the first of these was a pupil of *Sumaṅgala* and may or may not be the same as the son of *Tirumala*. But the second work *Vivaraṇodyotana* also called *Bhāṣyapradīpodyotana* which consists of notes on *Kaiyaṭa*'s commentary on *Patañjali*'s *Mahābhāṣya* can now be safely ascribed to the author of the *Tarka-Dīpikā*. Two Mss. of a fragment of this *Udyotana* are mentioned in Hultsch's recent *Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in Southern India* (Vol. I., p. 66), the colophon at the end of which tallies exactly with that found at the end of the *Dīpikā* and *Mitākṣarā*. Hall's later opinion therefore that this *Udyotana* was written by some other *Annambhaṭṭa* cannot be accepted. *Candraśekhara Śāstrī* of Madras mentions two other works of *Annambhaṭṭa* : *Tattva-Cintāmaṅgaloka-Siddhāñjana* and a *Brahmasūtra-Vṛtti*; while he calls *Mitākṣarā* a gloss on *Pāṇini*'s *Sūtras* according to *Kāśikā*. *Annambhaṭṭa* thus appears to have been a versatile writer, since he has written at least three works on *Nyāya*, one on *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, one or two on *Vedānta*, and two if not three on grammar. *Annambhaṭṭa* is also said to have had an elder brother *Rāmakṛṣṇabhaṭṭa* who wrote *Siddhānta-Ratna*, a commentary on *Bhaṭṭoji*'s *Siddhānta-Kaumudī*.

Of all the works of *Annambhaṭṭa*, only the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā* appear to have attained any wide celebrity. They are the most popular works of their kind, and they have been for several generations used as text-books for beginners. The *Tarka-Saṅgraha* is a model work, because it combines in a remarkable degree the three essential qualities of a good manual, namely, brevity, accuracy and lucidity. It was intended to supply an easy compendium of the main principles of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems, and the author has done his work admirably. Of course the work is not entirely free from faults. Some of its passages are marred by ambiguities of language or confusion of thought such as make them almost unintelligible without the aid of a teacher or a commentary; and even positive errors have crept in in one or two places. These occasional lapses were however inevitable, because they are mostly due to the author's anxiety to avoid all subtleties and controversial topics that may be beyond the comprehension of beginners. The attempt to frame broad and accurate definitions without descending into the niceties of scholastic *Nyāya*

¹ Hall, *Bibliographical Index of Indian Philosophical systems*, pp. 68, 69.

was a difficult one, and it is highly creditable to our author that he has succeeded even so well. Passages like those referring to करण, परामर्श, सोपाधिक and तर्क, as well as several others in the *Dīpikā* only prove that even a clear-headed writer like *Annambhaṭṭa* could not avoid some of the pitfalls that are so plentiful in the path of a student of *Nyāya*.

The most glaring fault of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, however, is that it errs too much on the side to brevity; and the defect is sought to be cured by supplying some of the deficiencies in the *Dīpikā*. In fact, the *Dīpikā* is more like a revised and enlarged edition of the original than a mere commentary upon it. It appears to have been written some time after the *Saṅgraha*, for in several places the author introduces additions and corrections in the commentary, which are obviously later thoughts but which could not be conveniently inserted in the text after its circulation. The clause अनन्यथा-सिद्धत्वे सति¹ which is proposed to be added to the definition of कारण is one instance out of many showing how serious omissions in the text are supplied in the commentary. The way in which some of the new topics are introduced in the *Dīpikā* also shows that they were most probably suggested when the author was actually teaching his primer. It is not therefore unreasonable to suppose that the *Dīpikā* came to be written when the author saw by experience the necessity of elucidating the many obscurities that remained in the *Saṅgraha*. The practice of writing a commentary on one's own work was not uncommon among *Nyāya* writers. In mediaeval times *Diināga* and *Dharmakīrti* had written commentaries on their own works. Similarly *Varadarāja* the author of *Tārkika-Rakṣā* wrote its commentary the *Vyākhyā*, and *Viśvanātha* the author of *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda* and *Siddhānta-Muktāvālī* imitated him. *Annambhaṭṭa* seems to have taken *Viśvanātha*'s works as his models.

Although *Annambhaṭṭa* rarely quotes or refers to any previous writer, there can be no doubt that he was aware of the latest views on the many controversial points. He does not slavishly follow any particular master, nor does he confine himself wholly to any of the ancient or modern schools of *Naiyāyikas*. He chooses his doctrines from all writers with the sole view of constructing a fairly consistent and intelligible system. As the *Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā* are professedly mixtures of both the *Nyāya* and the

¹ See T. D., p. 26, *infra*.

Vaiśeṣika systems, the author borrows from writers of both schools ; but unlike others who have adopted the same plan, he generally adheres to *Gotama's* view with respect to matters coming under logic proper, *i. e.* in the sections treating of *Buddhi* and its subdivisions, but follows *Kaṇāda* in the rest of the book. In cases of conflict between the ancient and modern *Naiyāyikas* he mostly prefers the ancient view as being the simpler or more striking, and generally adopts the older definitions as far as possible. He has greater sympathy with the older *Ācāryas* than with the modern ever-innovating writers of the Nuddea school. But although a conservative in this sense he generally keeps an impartial attitude and steers clear of all disputes without identifying himself with any particular side. It is this characteristic which distinguishes his works from other manuals, and which makes them as primers for beginners preferable even to the otherwise superior treatises of *Viśvanātha*.

Instances of specific borrowing are too numerous to mention. Many of his definitions of categories and their subdivisions he has copied literally from the scholium of *Praśastapāda*, *e. g.* those of द्रव्य, रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, संख्या, परिमाण, त्वंशेष, and several others. Sometimes he adopts the emendation suggested by *Śrīdhara*, and sometimes he rejects *Praśastapāda's* definition *in toto* in favour of a modern one, *e. g.* in the case of आत्मा and बुद्धि. Occasionally he borrows even long passages from *Praśastapāda*, *e. g.* the passage beginning with सा द्विविधा in Sec. 10, p. 6 *Infra*. He also appears to have borrowed largely from the writings of *Śrīdhara*, *Udayana* and *Śivāditya*, as well as the principal writers of the Nuddea school, *Gaṅgeśa*, *Raghunātha* and *Gadādhara*. Outside the circle of *Nyāya* writers, *Annambhaṭṭa* has the greatest sympathy with the *Vedānta* school. He often quotes the views of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, and even inserts a short disquisition on विधि in the concluding portion of the *Dīpikā*.

Besides the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā*, the present edition includes another commentary on the *Saṅgraha* named *Nyāya-Bodhinī* by *Govardhana*. It does not possess any peculiar feature that requires special notice. It is on the whole rather discursive, treating of some topics elaborately and omitting others altogether. Nothing is known about the writer ; but from his work he appears to have been well-versed in the subtleties of the later *Nyāya*. He is apparently different from the writer of a commentary on

Keśavamīśra's Tarka-bhāṣā. He makes valuable suggestions here and there, but his frequent indulgence in scholastic hair-splitting makes the work somewhat difficult for novices. The obscurity of the style and the want of a reliable Ms. are also great drawbacks in the case of this commentary. It is included in this edition for two reasons, first because it is taught to advanced pupils in many parts of India, and secondly because it will familiarize students with the controversial method and formulæ of the modern *Naiyāyikas*.

The popularity of *Annambhaṭṭa's* works can be best measured by the host of writers who have commented upon them. The commentaries on the *Saṅgraha* are too numerous to notice here, but a list of them, complete as far as our present knowledge goes, is given in Appendix B. Only two of these need special mention, the *Vākya-Vṛtti* of *Meru Śāstri*, and the *Siddhānta-Candrodaya* of *Śrīkṛṣṇa Dhūrjati*. The former is very short but always to the point, and usually gives the meaning of the author in a few pithy sentences. The writer was a celebrated Pundit of modern times, and his remarks in cases of doubt or ambiguity are entitled to great weight. The *Siddhānta-Candrodaya* being perhaps too copious and exhaustive is useful to beginners but not always reliable. The best guide to the *Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā*, however, is the *Tarka-Dīpikā-Prakāśa* of *Nilakanṭha*, popularly known as *Nilakanṭhī*.

Nilakanṭha appears to be a recent author. According to Pundit Mukunda Jha of Darbhanga he was a son of *Rāmabhaṭṭa* surnamed Paṇi of Kaunḍinya gotra and was born in Āndhra country. In his later years he lived at Benares and died in 1840. His son *Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha* who also lived and died at Benares wrote a commentary, *Bhāskarodayā* on *Nilakanṭha's Prakāśa*.

ABBREVIATIONS

- B. P.—*Bhāṣā-Pariccheda* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana, edited and translated by Dr. E. Roer (*Bibliotheca Indica*).
- Brahm. Sūt.—*Brahma-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa with the scholium of Śaṅkarācārya.
- Brih. Up. } *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*.
Brih. Ār. Up. }
- Din.—*Dinakarī* or *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī-Prakāśa* by Divākara Bhaṭṭa.
- G. S.—*Gotama-Sūtra* or Gotama's Aphorisms of Nyāya.
- J. B. B. R. A. S.—Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
- Jaimi. S.—Jaimini's *Sūtras* on *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*.
- Kaṭh. Up.—*Kaṭhopaniṣad*.
- Kus.—*Kusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya edited and translated by E. B. Cowell (Calc. 1864).
- N. B.—*Nyāya-Bodhinī* by Govardhana.
- Nil. or Nilakaṇṭha—*Tarka-Dīpikā-Prakāśa* by Nilakaṇṭha.
- Nyāya. B.—*Nyāya-Bindu* edited by Dr. P. Peterson (*Bibli. Ind.*)
- Nyāya. B. T.—*Nyāya-Bindu-tīkā* by Dharmottarācārya edited by Dr. P. Peterson.
- Nyāya. K.—*Nyāy-Koṣa* by Bhimācārya, 2nd ed. (Bombay Sanskrit Series).
- P. B.—*Prāśastapāda's Bhāṣya* with Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-Kandalī* edited by Vindhyeśvarīprasāda (Vizianagaram Series, Benares).
- Sāṅkhya T. K.—*Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī* by Vācaspatimiśra edited by Tārānāth Tarka-Vācaspati (Calc. 1871).
- Sarv. D. S.—*Sarva-Darśana Saṅgraha* by Mādhavācārya (Calc. ed.)
- S. C.—*Siddhānta-Candrodaya*, a commentary on *Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Śrīkrṣṇa Dhūrjaṭī.
- S. M.—*Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana.
- S. P.—*Sapta-Padārthī* by Śivāditya.
- T. A.—*Tarkāmṛta* by Jagadīśa.
- T. B.—*Tarka-Bhāṣā* by Keśava Miśra, edited by S. M. Paranjpe (Poona).

- T. D.—*Tarka-Dīpikā*.
- T. K.—*Tarka-Kaumudī* by Laugākṣi Bhāskara, edited by M. N. Dvivedi (Bombay Sanskrit Series).
- T. S.—*Tarka-Saṅgraha*.
- Vāt.—Vātsyāyana's Commentary on *Gotama-Sūtra*, edited by Jībananda (Cal. 1874).
- Ved. Par.—*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, by Dharmarājadhvarīndra (Cal. ed.).
- V. S.—*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* or Aphorisms of *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy by Kauṇāda.
- V. S. Up.—*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtrapakāra* by Śaṅkara Miśra, edited by Jaya Nārāyaṇa Tarka Pañcānana (Cal. 1861).
- V. S. Vṛtti—*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-Vṛtti* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana (Cal. ed.).
- V. V.—*Vākya-Vṛtti*, a commentary on *Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Meru Śāstri (Bombay 1873).

अथ

तर्कसंग्रहः

तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिण्या च सहितः

[१]

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् ।

बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

अथ तर्कदीपिका

विश्वेश्वरं साम्बमूर्तिं प्रणिपत्य गिरं गुरुम् ।

टीकां शिशुहितां कुर्वे तर्कसंग्रहदीपिकाम् ॥

चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थं शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतिबोधित-
कर्तव्यताकामिष्टदेवतानमस्कारलक्षणं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थं निबन्धंश्चिकीर्षितं
ग्रन्थादौ प्रतिजानीते—निधयेति ।

ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वं नास्ति । मङ्गले कृतेऽपि किरणावल्यादौ^१
^२समाप्त्यदर्शनात् मङ्गलाभावेऽपि कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनादन्वयव्यतिरेक-
व्यभिचारादिति चेन्न ।^३ किरणावल्यादौ विघ्नबाहुल्यात्समाप्त्यभावः ।
कादम्बर्यादौ तु ग्रन्थाद्वहिरेव मङ्गलं कृतमतो न व्यभिचारः ॥

ननु मङ्गलस्य कर्तव्यत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारानुमित-

- 1 *Nal* gives as *v. l.* गिरां गुरुं and explains it निखिलविद्यानामुपदेष्टारम्. Y also reads गिरां.
- 2 A and F read निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यं, but all other copies omit निर्विघ्नं; P has अस्मात्सिं.
- 3 M has बौद्धग्रन्थादौ for कादम्बर्यादौ in this and the following instance. F and Q interchange

कादम्बर्यादौ and किरणावल्यादौ, retaining the remaining sentence as above. N reads differently मङ्गलाभावेऽपि किरणावल्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनात् मङ्गलसत्त्वेऽपि कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्त्यदर्शनात्, and gives the other *v. l.* in a footnote. See Note *loc. cit.*

श्रुतेरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथाहि—मङ्गलं वेदबोधितकर्तव्यताकं, अलौकिका-
विगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वात् दर्शादिवत् । भोजनादौ व्यभिचारवारणाया-
लौकिकेति । रात्रिश्राद्धादौ व्यभिचारवारणायाविगीतेति । शिष्टपदं स्पष्टा-
र्थम् । “न कुर्यान्निष्फलं कर्म” इति जलताडनादेरपि निषिद्धत्वादिति ॥

तर्कसंग्रह इति । तर्क्यन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्त इति तर्का द्रव्यादिसप्त-
पदार्थास्तेषां संग्रहः संक्षेपेण स्वरूपकथनं क्रियत इत्यर्थः । कस्मै प्रयो-
जनायेत्यत आह—**सुखबोधयेति** । सुखेनानायासेन बोधः पदार्थ-
ज्ञानं तस्मा इत्यर्थः ॥ ननु बहुषु तर्कग्रन्थेषु सत्सु किमर्थमपूर्वग्रन्थः
क्रियत इत्यत आह—**बालानामिति** । तेषामतिविस्तृतत्वाद्बालानां
बोधो न भवतीत्यर्थः । ग्रहणधारणपटुर्बालः न तु स्तनन्धयः । किं
कृत्वा क्रियत इत्यत आह—**निधयेति** । विश्वेशं जगन्नियन्तारं शिवं
हृदि निधाय नितरां स्थापयित्वा सर्वदा तद्ग्रहणपरो भूवेत्यर्थः । गुरुणां
विद्यागुरुणां वन्दनं नमस्कारं विधाय कृत्वेत्यर्थः ॥

अथ न्यायबोधिनी

अखिलागमसंचारि श्रीकृष्णाख्यं परं महः ।

ध्यात्वा गोवर्धनसुधीस्तनुते न्यायबोधिनीम् ॥

चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थमिष्टदेवतानमस्कारात्मकं
मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थं ग्रन्थादौ निबध्नाति—**निधयेति** ॥

[२]

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः सप्त पदार्थाः ॥

त. दी.—पदार्थान्विभजते—**द्रव्येति** । पदस्यार्थः पदार्थ इति व्युत्प-
त्त्याभिधेयत्वं ^१पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ नन्वत्र विभागादेव सप्तत्वे सिद्धे
सप्तग्रहणं व्यर्थमिति चेत् । न । अधिकसंख्याव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ^२ ॥ नन्वति-

1 Some Mss. add “समाप्तिकामो
मङ्गलमाचरेत्” इति श्रुतेः । but
the addition is not warranted
as the context refers to अनु-
मितश्रुति only.

2 G reads पदार्थाः सप्तैव.

3 A F M and P add लभ्यते and
also insert इति before it.

4 A F and P add न्यून before
अधिक unnecessarily; Y Z
read लब्धे for सिद्धे. Q has
किमर्थं for व्यर्थम्.

रिक्तः पदार्थः प्रमितो न वा । नाद्यः प्रमितस्य निषेधायोगात् । नान्यः प्रति-
योगिप्रमितिं विना निषेधानुपपत्तेरिति चेत् । न । पदार्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यत-
मत्वव्याप्यमिति व्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ॥ ^१ननु सप्तान्यतमत्वं सप्तभिन्नभिन्नत्व-
मिति वक्तव्यम् । एवं च सप्तभिन्नस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्सप्तान्यतमत्वं कथमिति
चेन्न । द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वं द्रव्यादिभेदसप्तकाभाववत्त्वमित्युक्तत्वात् ।
एवमग्रेसपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. बो.—अथ पदार्थान्विभजते—**द्रव्येति** ॥ तत्र सप्तग्रहणं पदा-
र्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्यमिति व्याप्तिलाभाय । ननु शक्तिपदार्थ-
स्याष्टमस्य सत्त्वात्कथं सप्तैवेति । तथाहि वह्निसंयुक्तेन्धनादौ सत्यपि मणि-
संयोगे दाहो न जायते तच्छून्ये तु जन्यते । अतो मणिसमवधाने
शक्तिर्नश्यति । मण्यभावदशायां दाहानुकूल शक्तिरुत्पद्यत इति कल्प्यते ।
तस्माच्छक्तिरतिरिक्तपदार्थ इति चेन्न । मणेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन तदभावस्य
दाहकारणत्वेनैव निर्वाहे मणिसमवधानासमवधानाभ्यामनन्तेशक्तिस्तद्व्यं-
सतत्तत्प्रागभावकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । तस्मात्सप्तैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम् ॥

[३]

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यग्नेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ॥

त. दी.—द्रव्यं विभजते—**तत्रेति** । तत्र द्रव्यादिमध्ये द्रव्याणि
नवैवेत्यन्वयः । कानि तानीत्यत आह—**पृथिवीत्यादि** । ननु तमसो
दशमद्रव्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात्कथं नवैव द्रव्याणि । ^१तथाहि नीलं तमश्चलती-
त्यबाधितप्रतीतिबलानीलरूपाधारतया क्रियाधारतया च द्रव्यत्वं ताव-
त्सिद्धम् । तत्र तमसो नाकाशादिपञ्चकेऽन्तर्भावो रूपवत्त्वात् । अत एव न
वायौ ^२स्पर्शाभावात्सदागतिमत्त्वाभावाच्च । नापि तेजसि भास्वरूपाभावा-

1 Q omits इति वक्तव्यम् and sub-
stitutes तदर्थत्वात् for इत्युक्तत्वात्
L omits the whole passage
from ननु to उक्तत्वात्; Nil also
appears to have had doubts
about its authenticity. See
Note loc. cit.

2 A and F add after तथाहि a

verse तमः खलु चलं नीलं परापर-
विभागवत् । प्रसिद्धद्रव्यवैधर्म्यान्न-
वेभ्यो भेजुमर्हति; but it seems
to be interpolated from some
other commentary. J omits
तथाहि also.

3 A and J omit स्पर्शाभावात्.

दुष्णस्पर्शाभावाच्च । नापि जले शीतस्पर्शाभावात्नीलरूपाश्रयत्वाच्च । नापि पृथिव्यां गन्धवत्त्वाभावात्स्पर्शरहितत्वाच्च । तस्मात्तमो दशमद्रव्यमिति चेन्न । तमसस्तेजोऽभावरूपत्वात् । तथाहि—तमो हि न^१ रूपवद्द्रव्यमालोकासहकृतचक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वादालोकाभाववत् । रूपिद्रव्यचाक्षुषप्रमायामालोकस्य कारणत्वात् । तस्मात्प्रौढप्रकाशकतेजःसामान्याभावस्तमः । तत्र नीलं तमश्चलतीति प्रत्ययो भ्रमः । अतो नव द्रव्याणीति सिद्धम् ॥

द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ लक्ष्यैकदेशावृत्तित्वमव्याप्तिः यथा गोः कपिलत्वम् । अलक्ष्यवृत्तित्वमव्याप्तिः यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वम् । लक्ष्यमात्रावर्तनमसंभवः यथा गोरेकशफत्वम् । एतद्द्रव्यत्रयरहितो धर्मो^२ लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमनियतत्वमसाधारणत्वम् । व्यावर्तकस्यैव^३ लक्षणत्वे व्यावृत्तावभिधेयत्वादौ चातिव्याप्तिवारणाय तद्विन्नत्वं धर्मविशेषणं देयम् । व्यवहारस्यापि लक्षणप्रयोजनत्वे तु न देयम् । व्यावृत्तेरपि व्यवहारसाधनत्वात् ॥ ननु गुणवत्त्वं न द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् । आद्यक्षणे उत्पन्नविनष्टद्रव्ये चाव्याप्तेरिति चेन्न । गुणसमानाधिकरणसत्ताभिन्नजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्^४ ॥ नन्वेवमप्येकं रूपं रसात्पृथगिति व्यवहाराद्रूपादावतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । एकार्थसमवायादेव तादृशव्यवहारोपपत्तौ गुणे गुणानङ्गीकरणात् ॥

न्या. बो.—द्रव्याणि विभजते—पृथिवीति । नन्वन्धकारस्य दशमद्रव्यस्य सत्त्वात्कथं न वैवेति । तथाहि नीलं तमश्चलतीति प्रतीतेर्नीलरूपाश्रयत्वेन क्रियाश्रयत्वेन च द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । न च क्लृप्तद्रव्येष्वन्तर्भावत्कुतो दशमद्रव्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । आकाशादिपञ्चकस्य नीरूपत्वाद्वायोरपि नीरूपत्वान्न तेष्वन्तर्भावः । तमसो निर्गन्धत्वान्न पृथिव्यामन्तर्भावः ।

1. A F and Q read रूपि for रूपवत्.
2. A F and Q here insert यथा गोः सास्त्रादिमत्त्वम्, while P and Y have यथा गोः सास्त्रादिमत्त्वे सति शृङ्गित्वम्; but the words are found in no other copy.

3. Nil notices लक्ष्यत्वे as v. 4. for लक्षणत्वे, and remarks that the two readings are identical in sense.

4. M adds संयोगसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया द्रव्यत्वजातिः.

जलतेजसोः शीतोष्णस्पर्शवत्त्वान्न तयोरन्तर्भावः । तस्मात्तमसो दशमद्रव्यत्वं सिद्धमिति चेन्न । तमसस्तेजोऽभावत्वेनैवोपपत्तावतिरिक्तद्रव्यकल्पनायां मानाभावात् । न च विनिगमनाविरहात्तेज एवान्धकाराभावस्वरूपमिति वाच्यम् । तेजसोऽभावस्वरूपत्वे सर्वानुभूतोष्णस्पर्शस्याश्रयबाधाद्द्रव्यान्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । तस्मादुष्णस्पर्शरूपगुणाश्रयतया तेजसो द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । तमसि नीलरूपप्रतीतिस्तु^१ भ्रान्तिरेव दीपापसरणक्रियाया एव तत्र मानात् ॥

[४]

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्काराश्चतुर्विंशतिगुणाः ॥

त. दी.—गुणं विभजते—रूपेति । द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्यवान्गुणः ।^२ गुणत्वजातिमान्वा । ननु लघुत्वमृदुत्वकठिनत्वादीनां विद्यमानत्वात्कथं चतुर्विंशतिगुणा इति चेन्न लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वात् मृदुत्वकठिनत्वयोरवयवसंयोगविशेषरूपत्वात् ॥

[५]

उत्क्षेपणावक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्च कर्माणि ॥

त. दी.—कर्म विभजते—उत्क्षेपणेति । संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति संयोगासमवायिकारणं कर्म । कर्मत्वजातिमद्वा ॥ ननु भ्रमणादेरप्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मणः सत्त्वात्^३ पञ्चेत्यनुपपन्नमिति चेन्न^४ । भ्रमणादीनामपि गमनेऽन्तर्भावान्न पञ्चविधत्वविरोधः ॥

[६]

परमपरं चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ॥

1. U and W read स्पर्शाश्रयद्रव्यं.
2. U has नीलत्वादि and W adds एवं कर्मवत्ताप्रतीतिरपि.
3. N here adds सामान्यवानित्युक्ते द्रव्यकर्मणोरतिव्याप्तिरतस्तन्निरासार्थं द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सतीति । द्रव्यकर्मभिन्न इत्युच्यमाने सामान्यादि-

व्यतिव्याप्तिरत उक्तं सामान्यवानिति; but the passage is neither noticed by Nil nor found in any other copy. —

4. A and F add एव after पञ्च.

5. Some Mss. omit this sentence.

त. दी.—सामान्यं विभजते—परमिति । परमधिकदेशवृत्ति । अपरं
न्यूनदेशवृत्ति । सामान्यादिचतुष्टये जातिर्नास्ति ॥

[७]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव ॥

त. दी.—विशेषं विभजते—नित्येति । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य
परमाणव आकाशादिपञ्चकं च नित्यद्रव्याणि ॥

[८]

समवायस्त्वेक एव ॥

त. दी.—समवायस्य भेदो नास्तीत्याह—समवायस्त्विति ॥

[९]

अभावश्चतुर्विधः । प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽन्योन्या-
भावश्चेति ॥

त. दी.—अभावं विभजते—अभावेति ॥

[१०]

गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा द्विविधा नित्यानित्या च । नित्या
परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या कार्यरूपा । पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रियविषय-
भेदात् । शरीरमस्मदादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणं नासा-
ग्रवर्ति । विषयो मृत्पाषाणादिः ॥

त. दी.—तत्रोद्देशादिक्रमानुसारात्पृथिव्या लक्षणमाह—गन्धव-
तीति । नाम्ना पदार्थसंकीर्तनमुद्देशः । उद्देशक्रमे च सर्वत्रेच्छैव निया-
मिका । ननु सुरभ्यसुरभ्यवयवारब्धे द्रव्ये परस्परविरोधेन गन्धानुत्पादाद-
व्याप्तिः । न च तत्र गन्धप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अवयवगन्धस्यैव तत्र

1 A D F K Q W and X add
तत्र before गन्धवती; See note
loc. cit.

2 A and B add इति after च.

3 All copies except A B and F
omit सा before पुनः; see Note
loc. cit.

प्रतीतिसंभवेन चित्रगन्धानङ्गीकारात् ॥ किं चोत्पन्नविनष्टघटादावव्याप्ति-
रिति चेन्न । गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् ।
ननु जलादावपि गन्धप्रतीतेरतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां
पृथिवीगन्धस्यैव तत्र भानाङ्गीकारात् । ननु तथापि कालस्य सर्वाधारतया
सर्वेषां लक्षणानां कालेऽतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । सर्वाधारताप्रयोजकसंबन्ध-
भिन्नसंबन्धेन लक्षणस्याभिमतत्वात् ॥

पृथिवीं विभजते—सा द्विविधेति । नित्यत्वं ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वम् ।
ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमनित्यत्वम् ॥ प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते—पुनरिति ।
आत्मनो भोगायतनं शरीरम् । यद्वचच्छिन्नात्मनि भोगो जायते तद्भो-
गायतनम् । सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारो भोगः ॥ शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेष-
गुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । शरीरेन्द्रिय-
भिन्नो विषयः । एवं च गन्धवच्छरीरं पार्थिवशरीरम् गन्धवदिन्द्रियं पार्थिवे-
न्द्रियम् गन्धवान्विषयः पार्थिवविषय इति तत्तल्लक्षणं बोध्यम् । पार्थिवशरीरं
दर्शयति—शरीरमिति । पार्थिवेन्द्रियं दर्शयति—इन्द्रियमिति । गन्ध-
ग्राहकमिति प्रयोजनकथनम् । घ्राणमिति संज्ञा । नासाग्रेत्याश्रयोक्तिः ।
एवमुत्तरत्रापि ज्ञेयम् । पार्थिवविषयं दर्शयति—विषयेति ॥

न्या. बो.—गन्धवतीति । गन्धवत्त्वं पृथिव्या लक्षणम् । लक्ष्या
पृथिवी । पृथिवीत्वं लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकम् । यद्गर्मावच्छिन्नं लक्ष्यं स धर्मो
लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकः । यो धर्मो यस्यामवच्छेदकः सा तद्गर्मावच्छिन्ना लक्ष्यता ।
तथा च लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं पृथिवीत्वं लक्ष्यता पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्ना । एवं
शीतस्पर्शादिलक्षणेषु जलादीनां लक्ष्यता जलत्वादीनां लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वं
च बोध्यम् ॥

[११]

शीतस्पर्शवत्य आपः । ता द्विविधाः नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्याः
परमाणुरूपाः । अनित्याः कार्यरूपाः । पुनस्त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रिय-

1 A and B insert ताः before
पुनः. See Note on सा in the
last preceding section.

विषयभेदात् । शरीरं वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वाप्रवर्ति । विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिः ॥

त. दी.—अपां लक्षणमाह—शीतेति । उत्पन्नविनष्टजलेऽव्याप्तिवारणाय शीतस्पर्शसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वे तात्पर्यम् । शीतं शिलातलमित्यादौ जलसंबन्धादेव शीतस्पर्शभानमिति नातिव्याप्तिः । अन्यत्सर्वं पूर्वीत्या व्याख्येयम् ॥

[१२]

उष्णस्पर्शवत्तेजः । तद्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणुरूपम् । अनित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनस्त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमादित्यलोके^१ । इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराप्रवर्ति । विषयश्चतुर्विधः । भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् । भौमं वह्न्यादिकम् । अविन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्तस्य परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आकरजं सुवर्णादि ॥

त. दी.—तेजसो लक्षणमाह—उष्णस्पर्शवदिति । उष्णं जलमिति प्रतीतेस्तेजःसंबन्धानुविधायित्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । विषयं विभजते—भौमेति । ननु सुवर्णं पार्थिवं पीतत्वाद्गुरुत्वाद्भ्रिद्रादिवदिति चेन्न । अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सति घृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशदर्शनेन जलमध्यस्थघृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशदर्शनेन असति प्रतिबन्धके पार्थिवद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशाग्निसंयोगयोः कार्यकारणभावधारणात् । सुवर्णस्यात्यन्तानलसंयोगे सत्यनुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकरणत्वेन^२ पार्थिवत्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पीतद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवद्रव्यान्तरासिद्धौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणतया जलत्वानुपपत्तेः रूपवत्तया वाय्वादिध्वनन्तर्भावात् तैजसत्वसिद्धिः । तत्रोष्णस्पर्शभास्वरूपयोरुपष्टम्भकपार्थिवरूपस्पर्शाभ्यां प्रतिबन्धादनुपलब्धिः । तस्मात्सुवर्णं तैजसमिति सिद्धम् ॥

1 A B and X add प्रसिद्धं after आदित्यलोके.

2 A inserts घृतवत् after 'त्वाधिकरणत्वेन.

[१३]

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्वायुः । स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुरूपः । अनित्यः कार्यरूपः । पुनस्त्रिविधः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं त्वक्सर्वशरीरवर्ति । विषयो वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः ॥

शरीरान्तःसंचारी वायुः प्राणः । स चैकोऽप्युपाधिभेदात्प्राणापानादिसंज्ञां लभते ॥

त. दी.—वायुं लक्षयति—रूपरहितेति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्पर्शवानिति । पृथिव्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय रूपरहितेति । ननु प्राणस्य कुत्रान्तर्भाव इत्यत आह—शरीरेति । स चेति । एक एव प्राणः स्थानभेदात्प्राणापानादिशब्दैर्व्यवहित इत्यर्थः । स्पर्शानुमेयो वायुः । तथाहि—योऽयं वायौ वाति सत्यनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शो भासते स स्पर्शः क्वचिदाश्रितो गुणत्वादूर्ध्वत् । न चास्य पृथिव्याश्रय उद्भूतस्पर्शवतः पार्थिवस्योद्भूतरूपवत्त्वनियमात् । न जलतेजसी अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वात् । न विभुचतुष्टयं सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मनः परमाणुस्पर्शस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । तस्माद्यः प्रतीयमानस्पर्शाश्रयः स वायुः ॥ ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षास्पर्शाश्रयत्वाद्भवदिति चेन्न । उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्योपाधित्वात् । यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति घटादौ साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं नास्तीति पक्षे साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । न चैवं तप्तवारिस्थतेजसोऽप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः । इष्टत्वात् । तस्माद्गुरुपरहितत्वाद्वायुरप्रत्यक्षः ॥

इदानीं कार्यरूपपृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्योत्पत्तिविनाशक्रमः कथ्यते । ईश्वरस्य चिकीर्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । ततः परमाणुद्रव्यसंयोगे सति द्यणुकमुत्पद्यते । त्रिभिर्द्यणुकैस्त्र्यणुकम् । एवं चतुरणुकादिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी महत्य आपो महत्तेजो महान्वायुरुत्पद्यते । एवमुत्पन्नस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य संजिहीर्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया । क्रियया

परमाणुद्वयविभागे सति षण्णुकनाशः । ततस्त्रयणुकनाशः । ततश्चतुर-
णुकस्येत्येवं महापृथिव्यादिनाशः ॥ असमवायिकारणनाशाद्द्रव्यणुकनाशः
समवायिकारणनाशात्त्रयणुकनाश इति संप्रदायः । सर्वत्रासमवायिकारण-
नाशाद्द्रव्यनाश इति नवीनाः ॥

किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । जालस्यमरीचिस्थं
सूक्ष्मतमं यद्रज उपलभ्यते तत्सावयवम् चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वात्पटवत् । त्रयणु-
कावयवोऽपि सावयवो महदारम्भकत्वात्तन्तुवत् । यो षण्णुकावयवः स
परमाणुः । स च नित्यः । तस्यापि कार्यत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्^१ । सृष्टिप्रलय-
सद्भावे “ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् ” इत्यादिश्रुतिः प्रमाणम्^२ । सर्वकार्य-
द्रव्यध्वंसोऽवान्तरप्रलयः । सर्वभावकार्यध्वंसो महाप्रलय इति विवेकः ॥

न्या. बो.—एवं पृथिव्यादि त्रिकं निरूप्य वायुं निरूपयति—
रूपरहितेति । रूपरहितत्वे सति स्पर्शवत्त्वं वायोर्लक्षणम्^३ । सतिसप्तम्या
विशिष्टार्थकतया रूपरहितत्वविशिष्टस्पर्शवत्त्वं वायोर्लक्षणम् । विशेष-
षणानुपादाने स्पर्शवत्त्वमात्रस्य लक्षणत्वे पृथिव्यादित्रिकेऽतिव्याप्ति-
स्तद्वारणाय विशेषणोपादानम् । तावन्मात्रोपादान आकाशादिपञ्चकेऽ-
तिव्याप्तिस्तत्रापि रूपरहितत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । अत उक्तं **स्पर्शेति** । अति-
व्याप्तिर्नामालक्ष्ये लक्षणसत्त्वम् । यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वं लक्षणं कृतं चेद-
लक्ष्यभूतगोभिन्नमहिष्यादावतिव्याप्तिस्तत्रापि शृङ्गित्वस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।
अव्याप्तिर्नाम लक्ष्यैकदेशावृत्तित्वम् । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकाश्रयीभूते क्वचिल्लक्ष्ये
लक्षणस्यासत्त्वमेवाव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । यथा गोर्नीलरूपवत्त्वं कृतं चेच्छ्रे-
तगवि नीलरूपाभावादव्याप्तिः । असंभवो नाम लक्ष्यमात्रे कुत्रापि
लक्षणासत्त्वं यथा गोरेकशफत्वं गोसामान्यस्य द्विशफत्वेनैकशफवत्त्वस्य

1 A F N Q and W add after
this तथा च मेरुसर्वपथोरपि समान-
परिमाणत्वापत्तिः, F reads 'पत्तेः',
N has तुस्यैवप्रसङ्गः for समान-
परिमाणत्वापत्तिः, while Q has तु-
ल्यपरिमाणापत्तेः, but as all other
copies omit the sentence it
seems to be an interpolation.

2 A C N P Y Z put the first
part of the sentence in the
form of a पूर्वपक्ष as ननु सृष्टिप्र-
लयसद्भावे किं प्रमाणम्; A C K Z
omit ननु; A K Y read मानम्
for प्रमाणम्.

3 V and W omit this sentence.

कुत्राप्यसत्त्वात् अतिव्याप्यव्याप्यसंभवानां^१ निष्कृष्टलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते ।
लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रति-
योगिताकभेदसामानाधिकरण्यमतिव्याप्तिः । अव्याप्तिस्तु लक्ष्यतावच्छे-
दकसमानाधिकरणत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभाव-
प्रतियोगित्वम् । असंभवस्तु लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकीभूताभावप्रति-
योगित्वम् ॥

[१४]

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । तच्चैकं विभु नित्यं च ॥

त. दी.—आकाशं लक्षयति—**शब्दगुणमिति** । नन्वाकाशमपि किं
पृथिव्यादिवन्नाना । नेत्याह—**तच्चैकमिति** । भेद प्रमाणाभावादित्यर्थः ।
एकत्वादेव सर्वत्रोपलब्धेर्विभुत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमित्याह—**विभ्विति** । सर्वमूर्त-
द्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् । मूर्तत्वं परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणवत्त्वं क्रियावत्त्वं वा ।
विभुत्वादेवात्मवन्नित्यमित्याह—**नित्यं चेति** ॥

न्या. बो.—आकाशं लक्षयति—**शब्दगुणमिति** । अत्र गुणपद-
माकाशे शब्द एव विशेषगुण इति द्योतनाय न त्वतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ।
समवायेन शब्दवत्त्वमात्रस्य सम्यक्त्वात् । तदुक्तं । रूपं गन्धो रसः स्पर्शः
स्नेहः सांसिद्धिको द्रवः । बुद्ध्यादिभावनान्ताश्च शब्दो वैशेषिका गुणाः ॥
तच्चैकमिति । अनेकत्वे मानाभावादिति भावः । **विभ्विति** । सर्वमूर्त-
द्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् । मूर्तत्वं च क्रियाश्रयत्वम् । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुमनांसि
मूर्तानि । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवाकाशपञ्चकं भूतपदवाच्यम् । भूतत्वं नाम
बहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणवत्त्वम् ॥

[१५]

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः । स चैको विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥

त. दी.—कालं लक्षयति—**अतीतेति** । ^{संज्ञात्}कारः कालः सर्वकार्य-
निमित्तकारणं च ॥

1 V reads निर्दुष्टलक्षणमुच्यते for निष्कृष्टलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते.

न्या. बो.—कालं लक्षयति—अतीतेति । व्यवहारहेतुत्वस्य लक्षणत्वे व्यवहारहेतुभूतघटादावतिव्याप्तिस्तद्वारणाय अतीतेतिविशेषणोपादानम् ॥

[१६]

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक । सा चैका विभ्वी नित्या च^१ ॥

त. दी.—दिशो लक्षणमाह—प्राचीति । दिगपि कार्यमात्रे निमित्तकारणम् ॥

न्या. बो.—दिशो लक्षणमाह—प्राच्येति । उदयाचलसंनिहिता दिक्प्राची । अस्ताचलसंनिहिता दिक्प्रतीची । मेरोः संनिहिता दिगुदीची । मेरोर्व्यवहिता दिगवाची ॥

[१७]

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविधः परमात्मा जीवात्मा^२ च । तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मैक एव । जीवात्मा^३ प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नो विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥

त. दी.—आत्मनो लक्षणमाह—ज्ञानेति ॥ आत्मानं विभजते—स द्विविध इति । परमात्मनो लक्षणमाह—तत्रेति । नित्यज्ञानाधिकरणत्वमीश्वरत्वम् ॥ नन्वीश्वरस्य सद्भावे किं प्रमाणम् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्धि बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं वा । नाद्यमरूपिद्रव्यत्वात् । नान्यमात्मसुखादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानं लिङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वाद्धटवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् ।

1 A B C F Q and X read नित्या विभ्वी च but the reading adopted in the text is better as it agrees with the definitions of काल and आत्मा.

2 A B X जीवात्मा प... च; C G जीव for जीवात्मा.

3 A B add सुखदुःखादिरहितः after एव.

4 A F and Q insert नाप्यागमस्तथाविधागमाभावात् after लिङ्गाभावात्, but the words appear to be interpolated and are inconsistent with the Vedic text cited further on. Z has नाप्यनुमानं सादृश्याभावात् नापि शब्दः शब्दस्य वेदात्मकस्येश्वरोक्तत्वेन प्रामाण्यादीश्वरासिद्धौ तत्प्रामाण्यासिद्धेः

उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वं कर्तृत्वम् । उपादानं समवायिकारणम् । सकल्पपरमाप्त्वादिसूक्ष्मदर्शित्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वम् । “यः सर्वज्ञः स सर्वविद्” इत्याद्यागमोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणम् ॥

जीवस्य लक्षणमाह—जीव इति । सुखाद्याश्रयत्वं जीवलक्षणम् ॥ ननु “मनुष्योऽहं ब्राह्मणोऽहम्” इत्यादौ सर्वत्राहंप्रत्यये शरीरस्यैकविषयत्वाच्छरीरमेवात्मेति चेन्न । शरीरस्यात्मत्वे करपादादिनाशे सति शरीरनाशादात्मनोऽपि नाशप्रसङ्गात् । नापीन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वम् । तथात्वे “योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीं त्वंचा स्पृशामि” इत्यनुसंधानाभावप्रसङ्गादन्यानुभूतेऽन्यस्यानुसंधानायोगात् । तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो जीवः । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात्प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नः । स च न परमाणुः शरीरव्यापिसुखाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मध्यमपरिमाणः । तथा सत्यनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्नित्यो विभुर्जीवः ॥

न्या. बो.—आत्मानं निरूपयति—ज्ञानाधिकरणमिति । अधिकरणपदं समवायेन ज्ञानाश्रयत्वलाभार्थम् ॥

[१८]

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच्च प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वादनन्तं परमाणुरूपं^१ नित्यं च ॥

त. दी.—मनसो लक्षणमाह—सुखेति । स्पर्शरहितत्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वं मनसो लक्षणम् । मनो विभजते—तच्चेति । एकैकस्यात्मन एकैकं मन इत्यात्मनामनेकत्वान्मनसोऽप्यनेकत्वमित्यर्थः । परमाणुरूपमिति । मध्यमपरिमाणत्वेऽनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः । ननु मनो नाणु किंतु विभु स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदिति चेन्न । मनसो विभुत्व आत्मनःसंयोगस्यासमवायिकारणस्याभावाज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न च विभुद्वयसंयोगोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम् । तत्संयोगस्य नित्यत्वेन सुषुप्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । पुरितद्यतिरिक्तप्रदेश आत्मनःसंयोगस्य सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात् । अणुत्वे तु यदा मनः पुरितति

1 A B insert दुःख after सुख quite unnecessarily.

2 E H read अणुरूपं

नाड्यां प्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तिः । यदा निःसरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरित्यणुत्व-
सिद्धिः ॥

न्या. बो.—मनो निरूपयति—सुखादिति । उपलब्धिर्नाम साक्षा-
त्कारः । तथा च सुखादिसाक्षात्कारकारणत्वे सतीन्द्रियत्वं मनसो लक्षणम् ।
इन्द्रियत्वमात्रोक्तौ चक्षुरादावतिव्याप्तिरतः पूर्वदलम् । विशेष्यानुपादान
आत्मन्यतिव्याप्तिरात्मनो ज्ञानादिकं प्रति समवायिकारणत्वात् । अत
इन्द्रियत्वोपादानम् ॥

[१९]

चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तहरितकपिश-
चित्रभेदात्सप्तविधं पृथिवीजलतेजोवृत्ति । तत्र पृथिव्यां सप्तविधम् ।
अभास्वरशुक्लं जले । भास्वरशुक्लं तेजसि^१ ॥

त. दी.—रूपं लक्षयति—चक्षुरिति । संख्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय
मात्रपदम् । रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगेऽति-
व्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वं वाच्यम्^२ । रूपं विभजते—त-
च्चेति ॥ नन्वव्याप्यवृत्तिनीलादिसमुदाय एव चित्ररूपमिति चेन्न रूपस्य
व्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमात् । ननु चित्रपटोऽवयवरूपस्य प्रतीतिरस्त्विति चेन्न ।
रूपरहितत्वेन पटस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च रूपवत्समवेतत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्व-
प्रयोजकं गौरवात् । तस्मात्पटस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वानुपपत्त्या चित्ररूपसिद्धिः ।
रूपस्याश्रयमाह—पृथिवीति । आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति—तत्रेति ॥

1 A B X read अभास्वरं शुक्लं and
भास्वरं शुक्लं च respectively; J K
have the same as A without
the last च; E G H have शुक्लं
भास्वरं. The reading adopted
in the text is that of C D and
So., and is preferred as making
the sense clearer. अभास्वर and
भास्वर, when prefixed to शुक्लं,
serve to distinguish the parti-
cular kind of शुक्लं of जल from

that of तेजस; while taken
separately, they can give pro-
per sense only if construed as
adverbs modifying शुक्लं.

2 N has विशेष्यपदं देयं for चक्षुर्मा-
त्रग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वं वाच्यम्. C Y Z
omit the sentence प्रभाभित्ति
&c.; while A omits the next
sentence रूपं &c. G L M P
and W omit both sentences.

न्या. बो.—रूपं लक्षयति—चक्षुर्मात्रेति । चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वविशिष्ट-
गुणत्वं रूपस्य लक्षणम् । विशेष्यमात्रोपादाने रसादावतिव्याप्तिः । अत-
श्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्येति । तावन्मात्रोपादाने रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः । यो गुणो यदि-
न्द्रियग्राह्यस्तन्निष्ठा जातिस्तदभावस्तदिन्द्रियग्राह्य इति नियमात् । तद्वारणाय
विशेष्योपादानम् । चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वं नाम चक्षुर्भिन्नेन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वे सति
चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वम् । मात्रपदानुपादाने संख्यादिसामान्यगुणेऽतिव्याप्तिः संख्या-
दावपि चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वविशिष्टगुणत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । अतस्तद्वारणाय मात्रपदम् ।
संख्यादेश्चक्षुर्भिन्नत्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाच्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वं नास्ति । अतीन्द्रिये
गुरुत्वादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुर्ग्राह्येति । अत्र लक्षणे ग्राह्यत्वं नाम
लौकिकप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वम् । अग्राह्यत्वं नाम तदविषयत्वम् । तथा च चक्षु-
भिन्नेन्द्रियजन्यत्वाच्चाक्षात्काराविषयत्वे सति चक्षुर्जन्यचाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षविषय-
त्वमिति फलितार्थः । ननु प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगे रूपलक्षणस्यातिव्याप्तिस्तस्य
चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यगुणत्वादिति चेन्न । गुणपदस्य विशेषगुणपरत्वात् । न चैवं
विशेषगुणघटितलक्षणे संख्यादावतिव्याप्त्यभावान्मात्रपदवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम् ।
जलमात्रवृत्तिसासिद्धिकद्रवत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय तदुपादानात् ॥ अथवा
चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यजातिमद्गुणत्वस्य लक्षणत्वान्न प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगादावतिव्याप्तिः
संयोगत्वजातेश्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वाभावाद्वटपटसंयोगस्य त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्तद्गत-
जातेरपि त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । अत्र जातिघटितलक्षणे गुणत्वानुपादाने
चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यजातिमति सुवर्णादावतिव्याप्तिः । अतस्तद्वारणाय तदुपादानम् ॥
एवं रसादिलक्षणे विशेषणानुपादाने लक्ष्यभिन्नगुणादावतिव्याप्तिः । विशेष्या-
नुपादाने लक्ष्यमात्रवृत्तिरसत्वगन्धत्वादावतिव्याप्तिः । अतो विशेषण-
विशेष्ययोरुभयोरुपादानम् ॥

[२०]

रसनग्राह्यो गुणो रसः । स च मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषायतिक्त-
भेदात्षड्विधः । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । पृथिव्यां षड्विधः । जले मधुर एव ॥
त. दी.—रसं लक्षयति—रसनेति । रसत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिपरिहाराय

गुणपदम् । रसस्याश्रयमाह—**पृथिवीति** ॥ आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति—**पृथिव्यामिति** ॥

[२१]

घ्राणग्राह्यो गुणो गन्धः । स च द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः ।

त. दी.—गन्धं लक्षयति—**घ्राणेति** । गन्धत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **गुणपदम्** ॥

[२२]

**त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यो गुणः स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः शीतोष्णा-
नुष्णाशीतभेदात् । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवृत्तिः । तत्र शीतो जले । उष्णस्ते-
जसि । अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः ॥**

त. दी.—स्पर्शं लक्षयति—**त्वगिति** । स्पर्शत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **गुणपदम्** । संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **मात्रपदम्** ॥

न्या. बो.—स्पर्शं लक्षयति—**त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्य** इति । अत्रापि **मात्रपदं** संख्यादिसामान्यगुणादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय । अन्यविशेषणकृत्यं पूर्ववद्बोध्यम् ॥ ग्राह्यत्वपदार्थोऽपि पूर्ववत्प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वरूप एव बोध्यः ॥

[२३]

**रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च । अन्यत्रापाकजं
नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ॥**

त. दी.—**पाकजमिति** । पाकस्तेजःसंयोगः । तेन पूर्वरूपं नश्यति रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । अत्र परमाणुष्वेव पाको न ब्रह्मकादौ । आमपाकनिक्षिप्तं घटे परमाणुषु रूपान्तरोत्पत्तौ श्यामघटनाशे पुनर्ब्रह्म-

1 V reads संख्यादावतिव्याप्तिं which is perhaps preferable.
2 N Z and Nil omit पाक.
Other readings are आपाक and अपाक; but all are equally un-

satisfactory. The one adopted in the text may mean a furnace if interpreted as a *Bakurahi* compound; आमस्य (घटस्य) पाको यस्मिन् .

कादिक्रमेण रक्तघटोत्पत्तिः । तत्र परमाणवः समवायिकारणम् । तेजः-
संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । अदृष्टादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । ब्रह्मकादिरूपे
कारणरूपसमवायिकारणम् इति पीलुपाकवादिनो वैशेषिकाः । पूर्वघटस्य
नाशं विनैवावयविन्यवयवेषु परमाणुपर्यन्तेषु च युगपद्रूपान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति
पिठरपाकवादिनो नैयायिकाः । अत एव पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादिकमनित्य-
मित्यर्थः ॥ **अन्यत्रेति** । जलादावित्यर्थः । **नित्यगतमिति** । परमाणुगत-
मित्यर्थः ॥ **अनित्यगतमिति** । ब्रह्मकादिनिष्ठमित्यर्थः । रूपादिचतुष्टय-
मुद्भूतं प्रत्यक्षमनुद्भूतमप्रत्यक्षम् । उद्भूतत्वं प्रत्यक्षप्रयोजको धर्मः । तद-
भावोऽनुद्भूतत्वम् ॥

न्या. बो.—**रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमिति** । एतत्तत्त्व-
निर्णयश्चेत्यम् । पाको नाम विजातीयतेजःसंयोगः । स च नानाजातीयः ।
रूपजनको विजातीयः संयोगस्तदपेक्षया रसजनको विजातीयः । एवं
स्पर्शादावपि । एवंप्रकारेण भिन्नभिन्नजातीयाः पाकाः कार्यवैलक्षण्येन
कल्पनीयाः । तथाहि तृणपुञ्जनिक्षिप्त आम्रादौ उष्मलक्षणविजातीयतेजः-
संयोगात्पूर्वहरितरूपनाशे रूपान्तरस्य पीतादेरुत्पत्तिः पूर्वरसस्याम्लस्यै-
वानुभवात् । क्वचित्पूर्वहरितरूपसत्त्वेऽपि रसपरावृत्तिर्दृश्यते विजातीयतेजः-
संयोगरूपपाकवशात्पूर्वतनाम्लरसनाशे मधुररसस्यानुभवात् । तस्माद्रूप-
जनकापेक्षया रसजनको विलक्षणः । एवं गन्धजनको विलक्षण एवाङ्गी-
कार्यो रूपरसयोरपरावृत्तावपि पूर्वगन्धनाशे विजातीयतेजःसंयोगेन सुरभि-
गन्धोपलब्धेः । एवं स्पर्शजनकोऽपि पाकवशात्कठिनस्पर्शनाशे मृदुस्पर्शा-
नुभवात् । तस्माद्रूपादिजनका विजातीया एव पाका यथाकार्यमुत्पेयाः ।
अत एव पार्थिवपरमाणूनामेकजातीयत्वेऽपि पाकमहिम्ना विजातीयद्रव्या-
न्तरानुभवः । यथा गोमुक्ततृणादीनामापरमाण्वन्तं भङ्गे तृणारम्भकपरमाणुषु
विजातीयतेजःसंयोगवशात्पूर्वरूपादिचतुष्टयनाशे तदनन्तरं दुग्धे यादृशं
रूपादिकं वर्तते तादृशरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शजनकारस्तेजःसंयोगा जायन्ते ।
तदुत्तरं तादृशरूपरसादय उत्पद्यन्ते । तादृशरूपादिविशिष्टपरमाणुभिर्दुग्ध-
ब्रह्मकादिभिर्भ्यते । ततस्त्रयणुकादिक्रमेण महादुग्धारम्भः ॥ एवं महादुग्धा-

रम्भकैः परमाणुभिरेव दध्यारभ्यते । एवं पाकमहिम्नैव दध्यारम्भकैः परमाणु-
भिर्नवनीतारम्भ इति दिक् ॥

[२४]

एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः^१ संख्या ।^२ नवद्रव्यवृत्तिरेकत्वादिपरार्ध-
पर्यन्ता । एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च^३ । नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतम-
नित्यम् । द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव ॥

त. दी.—संख्यां लक्षयति—एकत्वेति ॥

[२५]

मानव्यवहारकारणं परिमाणं । नवद्रव्यवृत्ति । तच्चतुर्विधम् । अणु
महदीर्घं ह्रस्वं चेति ॥

त. दी.—परिमाणं लक्षयति—मानेति । परिमाणं विभजते—
तदिति । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । अणुत्वं महत्त्वं दीर्घत्वं ह्रस्वत्वं चेत्यर्थः ॥

[२६]

पृथग्व्यवहारकारणं पृथक्त्वं । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्ति ॥

त. दी.—पृथक्त्वं लक्षयति—पृथगिति । इदमस्मात्पृथगिति व्य-
वहारकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

[२७]

संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—संयोगं लक्षयति—संयुक्तेति । इमौ संयुक्ताविति व्यवहा-

1 A B C insert असाधारण between व्यवहार and हेतु here and in the following definitions of परिमाण, पृथक्त्व and संयोग, but the reading of the majority of
copies is preferred. See Note loc. cit.
2 A B insert सा before नवद्रव्य-
वृत्तिः.
3 C E K X omit नित्यमनित्यं च.

रहेतुरित्यर्थः । संख्यादिलक्षणेषु सर्वत्र दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाया-
साधारणेति पदं देयम् ॥ संयोगो द्विविधः कर्मजः संयोगजश्च । आद्यो
हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगात्कायपुस्तक-
संयोगः । अव्याप्यवृत्तिः संयोगः । स्वात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणत्वमव्या-
प्यवृत्तित्वम् ॥

[२८]

संयोगनाशको गुणो विभागः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—विभागं लक्षयति—संयोगेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवार-
णाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संयोगनाशक इति । वि-
भागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्च । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तक-
विभागः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकविभागात्कायपुस्तकविभागः ॥

न्या. बो.—विभागं लक्षयति—संयोगेति । संयोगनाशकत्वविशिष्ट-
गुणत्वं विभागस्य लक्षणम् । विशेषणमात्रोपादाने क्रियाया अपि संयोग-
नाशकत्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणत्वं विशेष्यम् ॥

[२९]

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे^१ परत्वापरत्वे । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टय-
मनोवृत्तिनी^२ । ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृते च । दूरस्थे दिक्कृतं
परत्वम् । समीपस्थे दिक्कृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे कालकृतं परत्वम् ।
कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ॥

त. दी.—परत्वापरत्वयोर्लक्षणमाह—परेति । परव्यवहारासाधारण-
कारणं परत्वम् । अपरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणमपरत्वमित्यर्थः । परापरत्वे
विभजते—ते द्विविधे इति । दिक्कृतयोरुदाहरणमाह—दूरस्थ इति ॥
कालकृते उदाहरति—ज्येष्ठ इति ॥

1 H J omit असाधारण, but most of the copies agree in retaining it.

2 E G H J and X omit पृथि-
व्यादि etc.

[३०]

आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं । पृथिवीजलवृत्ति ॥

त. दी.—गुरुत्वं लक्षयति—आद्येति । द्वितीयादिपतनस्य वेगा-
समवायिकारणत्वाद्देगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणायाद्येति ॥

न्या. बो.—गुरुत्वं लक्षयति—आद्येति । द्वितीयादिपतनक्रियायां
वेगस्यैवासमवायिकारणत्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणायाद्येति । उत्तरत्र स्यन्दन
आद्यविशेषणमपि पूर्ववदेव योजनीयम् ॥

[३१]

आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवृत्ति । तद्विविधं
सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च । सांसिद्धिकं जले नैमित्तिकं पृथिवी-
तेजसोः । पृथिव्यां घृतादावग्निसंयोगजन्यं^१ द्रवत्वम् । तेजसि
सुवर्णादौ^२ ॥

त. दी.—द्रवत्वं लक्षयति—आद्यस्यन्दनेति । स्यन्दनं स्रवणम् ।
तेजःसंयोगजन्यं नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वम्^३ । तद्विन्नं सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वम् । पृथिव्यां
नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वमुदाहरति^४—घृतादाविति । तेजसि तदाह—सुवर्णा-
दाविति ॥

[३२]

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुगुणः स्नेहः । जलमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—स्नेहं लक्षयति—चूर्णेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय
गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चूर्णादीति^५ ॥

न्या. बो.—स्नेहं लक्षयति—चूर्णादीति । चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुत्वे
सति गुणत्वं स्नेहस्य लक्षणम् । पिण्डीभावो नाम चूर्णादेर्धारणाकर्षणहेतु-
भूतो विलक्षणः संयोगः । तादृशसंयोगे स्नेहस्यैवासाधारणकारणत्वम् । न

1 C D E J read 'संयोगजं.

2 B omits तेजसि सुवर्णादौ.

3, 4 G J Y Z omit द्रवत्व after

नैमित्तिक.

5 A G J Y Z read पिण्डीभावेति;

A has गुण for रूप wrongly.

तु जलादिगतद्रवत्वस्य । तथा सति द्रुतसुवर्णादिसंयोगे चूर्णादेः पिण्डी-
भावापत्तेः । अतः स्नेह एवासाधारणकारणम् । विशेषणमात्रोपादाने काला-
दावतिव्याप्तिस्तद्वारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । वस्तुतस्तु द्रुतजलसंयोगस्यैव
पिण्डीभावहेतुत्वम् । स्नेहस्य पिण्डीभावहेतुत्वे मानाभावात् । जले द्रुतत्व-
विशेषणात्करकादिव्यावृत्तिः ॥

[३३]

श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः । स द्विविधो
ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति । ध्वन्यात्मको भेर्यादौ । वर्णात्मकः
संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ॥

त. दी.—शब्दं लक्षयति—श्रोत्रेति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय
गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति ॥ शब्दस्त्रिविधः । संयोगजो
विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । तत्राद्यो भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्यः । द्वितीयो वंश
उत्पाद्यमाने दलद्वयविभागजन्यश्चटचटाशब्दः । भेर्यादिदेशमारभ्य श्रोत्र-
पर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः ॥

न्या. बो.—शब्दं लक्षयति—श्रोत्रेति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय
गुणपदम् । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति । स त्रिविधः । संयोगजो
विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्यो भाङ्गारादिशब्दः । हस्ता-
भिघातसंयोगजन्यो मृदङ्गादिशब्दः । वंशे पाठ्यमाने दलद्वयविभागजश्च-
टचटादिशब्दः । शब्दोत्पत्तिदेशमारभ्य कर्णविवरपर्यन्तं वीचीतरङ्गनायेन
कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा निमित्तपवनेन शब्दधारा जायन्ते । तत्रोत्तरशब्दे
पूर्वशब्दः^१ कारणम् ॥

[३४]

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम्^२ । सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च ।

1 V has उत्तरोत्तरशब्दे पूर्वपूर्वशब्दः.

2 C K add गुणः after हेतुः. A E

G X read हेतुर्ज्ञानं बुद्धिः. See
Note loc. cit.

संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । तद्विन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवः ॥

त. दी.—बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह—सर्वेति । ^१जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञान-
त्वमेव लक्षणमित्यर्थः । बुद्धिं विभजते—सेति ॥ स्मृतेर्लक्षणमाह—
संस्कारेति । भावनाख्यः संस्कारः । संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय
ज्ञानमिति । घटादिप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संस्कारजन्यमिति । प्रत्य-
भिज्ञायामतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रेति^२ ॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति—तद्विन्नमिति ।
स्मृतिभिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभव इत्यर्थः ॥

न्या. बो.—बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह—सर्वेति । व्यवहारः शब्दप्रयोगः । ज्ञानं
विना शब्दप्रयोगासंभवाच्छब्दप्रयोगरूपव्यवहारहेतुत्वं^३ बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् । बुद्धिं
विभजते—सा द्विविधेति ॥ स्मृतिं लक्षयति—संस्कारेति । बहिरिन्द्रि-
याजन्यत्वविशिष्टसंस्कारजन्यत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वं स्मृतेर्लक्षणम् । विशेषणानु-
पादाने प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुभवेऽतिव्याप्तिः । तद्वारणाय विशेषणोपादानम् । संस्का-
रध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । ध्वंसं प्रति प्रतियोगिनः
कारणत्वासंस्कारध्वंसेऽपि संस्कारजन्यत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । प्रत्यभिज्ञायामति-
व्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रपदम् ॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति—तद्विन्नमिति । तद्विन्नत्वं
नाम स्मृतिभिन्नत्वम् । स्मृतिभिन्नत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वमनुभवस्य लक्षणम् । तत्र
विशेषणानुपादाने स्मृतावतिव्याप्तिः । विशेष्यानुपादाने घटादावतिव्याप्तिः ।
अतस्तद्वारणाय विशेषणविशेष्ययोरुभयोरुपादानम् ॥

1 J omits मात्र, while the word and the commentary on it are added in G in a marginal note. S. C. also notices the omission of the word in several MSS., while the absence of the sentence referring to it in several copies of T. D. makes it probable that the word may not have existed originally. It is however retained in accordance with *Nil.* See Note on मात्र *loc. cit.*

2 N and Q add कालादावतिव्या-

सिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । रूपादाव-
तिव्याप्तिवारणाय सर्वव्यवहारेति ;
while Q has गुण for ज्ञान ; but
the passage is not found any-
where else, nor noticed by *Nil.*
3 A C J L P Y Z omit this sen-
tence, and G adds it in the
margin ; but it is retained on
the authority of M N Q W
and *Nil.*
4 All copies except V read
ज्ञानस्य.
5 C K R omit बहिरिन्द्रियाजन्य-
त्वविशिष्ट.

[३५]

स द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च । तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो
यथार्थः । यथा रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्^१ । स^२ एव प्रमेत्युच्यते ।
तदभाववति^३ तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः ।^४ यथा शुक्ताविदं
रजतमिति ज्ञानम् ॥

त. दी.—अनुभवं विभजते—स द्विविध इति । यथार्थानुभवस्य
लक्षणमाह—तद्वतीति । ननु घटे घटत्वमिति प्रमायामव्याप्तिः घटत्वे
घटाभावादिति चेन्न । यत्र यत्संबन्धोऽस्ति तत्र तत्संबन्धानुभव इत्यर्थोद्ध-
टत्वेऽपि घटसंबन्धोऽस्तीति नाव्याप्तिः । स इति । यथार्थानुभव एव
शास्त्रे प्रमेत्युच्यते इत्यर्थः । अयथार्थं लक्षयति—तदभाववतीति । न-
न्विदं संयोगीति प्रमायामतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । यदवच्छेदेन यत्संबन्धाभाव^५-
स्तदवच्छेदेन तत्संबन्धज्ञानस्य विवक्षितत्वात् संयोगाभावावच्छेदेन संयोग-
ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात् संयोगावच्छेदेन संयोगसंबन्धस्य^६ सत्त्वात् नातिव्याप्तिः ।

न्या. बो.—अनुभवं विभजते—स द्विविध इति । यथार्थानुभवं
लक्षयति—तद्वतीति । तद्वतीत्यत्र सप्तम्यर्थो विशेष्यकत्वम् । तच्छब्देन
^७प्रकारीभूतो धर्मो धर्तव्यः । तथा च तद्वद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति तत्प्रकारकत्वं
^८यथार्थानुभवस्य लक्षणम् । उदाहरणम् । रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् ।

1 C H J K omit this sentence ;
E G Q X have instead यथार्थं
घट इति ; B adds सत्य before रजत.
2 The reading in all copies of
T. S. and T. D. except J is सैव ;
but स एव is adopted as being
grammatically more correct.
3 Q omits अनुभवः while C E
have तत्प्रकारकश्च.
4 C H J F and Q omit this
sentence. D adds further रज-
तत्त्वाभाववति शुक्लौ रजतत्वप्रकारक-
ज्ञानमयथार्थज्ञानं ; but this as

well as A's addition सैवाप्रमे-
त्युच्यते seem to be interpola-
tions.

5 G reads यदभावः for यत्संबन्धा-
भावः.

6 A has संयोगज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वात् for
संयोगसंबन्धस्य सत्त्वात् ; J reads
विद्यमानत्वात् for सत्त्वात्.

7 V adds ज्ञान before प्रकारीभूतः ;
perhaps better.

8 S T and W read तत्प्रकारत्वे स-
त्यनुभवत्वं, perhaps better.

रजतत्वद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम् । तद्वन्निष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपिततन्निष्ठप्रकारिताशालिख्यमिति निष्कर्षः । अन्यथा यथाश्रुते रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रजतरङ्गे इत्याकारकसमूहालम्बनभ्रमेऽतिव्याप्तिः । तत्रापि रजतत्वद्विशेष्यकत्वरजतत्वप्रकारकत्वयोः रङ्गत्वद्विशेष्यकत्वरङ्गत्वप्रकारकत्वयोश्च सत्त्वात् । उक्तनिष्कर्षे तु दर्शितभ्रमे नातिव्याप्तिः । रजतत्वप्रकारताया रजतत्ववद्रजतविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावात् । एवं रङ्गत्वप्रकारताया रङ्गत्ववद्रङ्गविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावाच्च । किं तु समूहालम्बने भ्रमस्य रङ्गांशे रजतत्वावगाहित्वेन रजतांशे रङ्गत्वावगाहित्वेन च रजतत्वप्रकारतायाः रङ्गत्वद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वात् । एवं रजतांशे रङ्गत्वप्रकारताया रजतत्वद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाच्चेति^१ ॥

अथार्थानुभवं लक्षयति—तदभाववतीति । अत्रापि पूर्ववत्तदभाववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपिततन्निष्ठप्रकारताशालिख्यत्वं विवक्षणीयम् । अन्यथा रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रङ्गरजते इत्याकारकसमूहालम्बनप्रमायामतिव्याप्तिरेतत्समूहालम्बनस्य रजतरङ्गोभयविशेष्यकत्वेन रजतत्वरङ्गोभयप्रकारकत्वेन च रजतत्वाभाववद्रङ्गविशेष्यकत्वरजतत्वप्रकारकत्वयोः रङ्गत्वाभाववद्रजतविशेष्यकत्वरङ्गत्वप्रकारकत्वयोश्च सत्त्वात् । उक्तनिष्कर्षे तु न तत्रातिव्याप्तिः । तादृशप्रमायाः^२ रजतांशे रजतत्वावगाहित्वेन रङ्गांशे रङ्गत्वावगाहित्वेन च रजतत्वप्रकारताया रजतत्वाभाववद्रङ्गनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावादेवं रङ्गत्वप्रकारताया रङ्गत्वाभाववद्रजतनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावाच्च । उदाहरणम् । यथा शुक्ताविति ॥

[३६]

यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् । तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ॥

त. दी.—यथार्थानुभवं विभजते—यथार्थेति । प्रसङ्गात्प्रमाकरणं विभजते—तत्करणमिति । प्रमाकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

1 W reads differently; U adds नानासुख्यविशेष्यताशालिख्यत्वं स-

समूहालम्बनं.

2 The reading is taken from W.

न्या. बो.—यथार्थानुभवं विभजते—यथार्थानुभव इति । तत्करणमिति । फलीभूतप्रत्यक्षादिकरणं चतुर्विधमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षादिचतुर्विधप्रमाणानां प्रमाकरणत्वं सामान्यलक्षणम् । एकैकप्रमाणलक्षणं तु वक्ष्यते प्रत्यक्षज्ञानेत्यादिना ॥

[३७]

असाधारणं कारणं^१करणम् ।

त. दी.—करणलक्षणमाह—असाधारणेति ।^२साधारणकारणे दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायसाधारणेति ॥

न्या. बो.—करणलक्षणमाह—असाधारणमिति । व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं कारणमित्यर्थः । असाधारणकारणत्वं च^३कार्यत्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणताशालिख्यम् । यथा दण्डादेर्घटादिकं प्रत्यसाधारणकारणत्वम् । कार्यत्वव्याप्यधर्मो घटत्वादिरूपधर्मः तदवच्छिन्नकार्यता घटे । तन्निरूपितकारणता दण्डे । अतो घटं प्रति दण्डोऽसाधारणकारणम् । भ्रम्यादिरूपव्यापारवत्त्वाच्च कारणम् । साधारणकारणत्वं कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणताशालिख्यम् । यथा ईश्वरादृष्टादेः कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव कारणत्वात्साधारणकारणत्वम् ॥

[३८]

कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति^४कारणम् ।

1 All copies except B and K insert व्यापारवत् before असाधारण; in J the word is added in margin, apparently by another hand. But the प्रतीक in all copies of T. D. and the remarks of S. C. conclusively show that it did not exist originally. On this see Note *loc. cit.* G adds तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः; but the addition is unwarranted.

2 N here inserts चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्षे जननीये चक्षुःसंयोगरूपो व्यापारः । तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय व्यापारवदि-

त्यपि देयम्. Y adds घटं प्रति कपालद्वयसंयोगवारणाय व्यापारवदिति; but neither passage is found in any other copy.

3 U and W have अतिरिक्त for व्याप्य.

4 The reading in the text is taken from G K Q X, as being most probably the correct one. A B C D F prefix अनन्यथासिद्ध to कार्यनियत°. J adds the word in margin. E has अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति नियत°, while H reads कार्येऽन्यथासिद्धिशून्यत्वे सति नियत°. See Note *loc. cit.*

त. दी.—कारणलक्षणमाह—कार्येति । पूर्ववृत्ति कारणमित्युक्ते रास-
भादावतिव्याप्तिः स्यादतो नियतेति । तावन्मात्रे कृते कार्येऽतिव्याप्तिरतः
पूर्ववृत्तीति ॥ ननु तन्तुरूपमपि पटं प्रति कारणं स्यादिति चेन्न ।
अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वमन्यथासिद्धिविरहः ।
अन्यथासिद्धिश्च त्रिविधा । येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते
तं प्रति तेन तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा तन्तुना तन्तुरूपं तन्तुत्वं च पटं
प्रति । अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते
तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव घटं
प्रत्याकाशस्य । अन्यत्र क्लृप्तनियतपूर्ववर्तिनैव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहभूतम-
न्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाकजस्थले गन्धं प्रति रूपप्रागभावस्य । एवं चान-
न्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् ॥

न्या. बो.—कारणं लक्षयति—कार्यनियतेति । कार्यं प्रति निय-
तत्वे सति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् । नियतत्वविशेषणानुपादाने पूर्ववर्तिनो
रासभादेरपि घटादिकारणत्वं स्यादतो नियतेति विशेषणम् । नियतपूर्वव-
र्तिनो दण्डरूपादेरपि घटकारणत्वं स्यादतोऽनन्यथासिद्धपदमपि कारण-
लक्षणे निवेशनीयं दण्डरूपादीनामन्यथासिद्धत्वात् ॥

[३९]

कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ।

त. दी.—कार्यलक्षणमाह—कार्यमिति ॥

न्या. बो.—कार्यं लक्षयति—प्रागिति । प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वं कार-
यस्य लक्षणम् । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वमिह घटो भविष्यतीति प्रतीतिर्जायते । एत-
त्प्रतीतिविषयोऽभावः प्रागभावस्तत्प्रतियोगि घटादिरूपं कार्यम् ॥

[४०]

कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । यत्समवेतं
कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पटश्च स्व-
गतरूपादेः । कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति

यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम्^१ । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य तन्तुरूपं
पटरूपस्य^२ । तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीवेमादिकं
पटस्य ।

त. दी.—कारणं विभजते—कारणमिति । समवायिकारणस्य
लक्षणमाह यत्समवेतमिति । यस्मिन्समवेतमित्यर्थः । असमवायिकारणं
लक्षयति कार्येणेति । कार्येणेत्येतदुदाहरति तन्तुसंयोग इति । कार्येण
पटेनैकस्मिन्स्तनौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः ।
कारणेन सहेत्येतदुदाहरति—तन्तुरूपमिति । कारणेन पटेन सहैकस्मि-
न्स्तनौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । निमित्त-
कारणं लक्षयति तदुभयेति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारण-
मित्यर्थः^३ ॥

न्या. बो.—कारणं विभजते—कारणमिति । समवायिकारणं लक्ष-
यति—यत्समवेतमिति ॥ यस्मिन्समवेतं सत् समवायेन संबद्धं सत्
कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । उदाहरणं—यथा तन्तव इति ।
तन्तुषु समवायेन संबद्धं सत् पटात्मकं कार्यमुत्पद्यते इति तन्तवः समवायि-
कारणमित्यर्थः । सामान्यलक्षणं तु समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपित-
तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नकारणत्वं समवायिकारणत्वमिति । समवायसंबन्धेन
घटाधिकरणे कपालादौ कपालादेस्तादात्म्यसंबन्धेनैव सत्त्वात् । समवाय-
संबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपिततादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नकारण-
तायाः कपालादौ सत्त्वाल्लक्षणसमन्वयः । समवायेन जन्यभावत्वावच्छिन्नं
प्रति तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन द्रव्यस्यैव कारणत्वाज्जन्यभावेषु द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु

1 E and Q supply यत् and तत्
which though not absolutely
necessary are inserted as mak-
ing the sense clearer.

2 K reads पटगत रूपस्य.

3 N here adds इदं च कारणत्रयं

भावकार्यस्यैव । अभावस्य तु निमित्त-
मात्रम्, but the words are not
found in any other copy.

4 W inserts here कपालत्वाद्य-
वच्छिन्न.

त्रिषु द्रव्यमेव समवायिकारणम् । द्रव्ये द्रव्यावयवाः समवायिकारणम् । अतो गुणादावपि द्रव्यमेव समवायिकारणमित्याशयेनाह पटश्च स्वगत-
रूपादेरिति । समवायिकारणमित्यनुषज्यते । असमवायिकारणं लक्षयति—
कार्येणेति । ^१असमवायिकारणं द्विविधम् । कार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतं
सत् कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्येकम् । कारणेण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतं सत्
कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्यपरमित्यर्थः । अत्र कारणेनेत्यस्य स्वकार्यसमवायि-
कारणेनेत्यर्थः । अन्यद्रव्यमात्रेऽवयवसंयोगस्यैवासमवायिकारणत्वात्पटात्मक-
कार्ये तदवयवतन्तुसंयोगस्यैवासमवायिकारणत्वं दर्शयन्प्रथममुदाहरति—
यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्येति । पटात्मककार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे तन्तौ सम-
वेतं सत् समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानं सत् पटात्मककार्यं प्रति तन्तुसंयोगात्मकं
कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । द्वितीयमसमवायिकारणं दर्शयति—कार-
णेन सहेत्यादिना । तदुदाहरति—तन्तुरूपमिति । ^२कारणेण पटरूप-
समवायिकारणीभूतपटेन सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे तन्तुरूपेऽर्थे समवेतं सत् समवाय-
संबन्धेन वर्तमानं सत् तन्तुरूपं पटगतं प्रति कारणं भवति ।
अतोऽसमवायिकारणं तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । सामान्यलक्षणं तु समवाय-
संबन्धावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपिता या समवायस्वसमवायिसमवेतत्वान्यतर-
संबन्धावच्छिन्ना कारणता तदाश्रयत्वम् । ^३समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्ना कपाल-
द्वयसंयोगनिष्ठा कारणता कपालद्वयसंयोगे वर्तते । एवमाद्यपतनक्रियाया-
माद्यस्यन्दनक्रियायां च गुरुत्वद्रव्यत्वे असमवायिकारणे भवतः । आद्यपतन-
क्रियां प्रत्याद्यस्यन्दनक्रियां प्रति च तयोः समवायसंबन्धेनैव कारणत्वात् ।
अवयविगुणादौ त्ववयवगुणादेः स्वसमवायिसमवेतत्वसंबन्धेनैव कारण-
त्वात्तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नकारणताश्रयत्वमवयवगुणादौ वर्तते । अवयवभूतकपाल-
तन्तुरूपादेः स्वशब्दग्राह्यकपालरूपतन्तुरूपसमवायिकपालतन्तुसमवेतत्व-

- 1 The following two sentences are omitted in C K R.
- 2 W reads differently.
- 3 Before समवाय° S T insert द्रव्यासमवायिकारणीभूतावयवसंबन्धे तु समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघट-

त्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपित°, but all other copies omit the words. S T also read संयोगत्वावच्छिन्ना for संयोगनिष्ठा. W reads differently.

संबन्धेन घटपटादौ सत्त्वात् ॥ निमित्तकारणं लक्षयति— तदुभयभिन्न-
मिति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नमित्यर्थः ॥

[४१]

तदेतन्निविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम् ॥

त. दी.—करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति— तदेतदिति ॥

न्या. बो.—करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति—तदेतदिति । यदसाधारणमित्यत्र
व्यापारवत्त्वे सतीत्यपि पूरणीयम् । अन्यथा तन्तुकपालसंयोगयोरतिव्याप्तिः ।
तन्तुकपालसंयोगयोरपि कार्यत्वातिरिक्तपटत्वघटत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति कारण-
त्वादसाधारणत्वमस्त्येव । अतस्तत्र कारणत्ववारणाय व्यापारवत्त्वे सतीति
करणलक्षणे विशेषणं देयम् । व्यापारत्वं तु तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनक-
त्वम् । भवति हि दण्डजन्यत्वे सति दण्डजन्यघटजनकता भ्रम्यादेर्दण्ड-
व्यापारस्य । एवं कपालसंयोगतन्तुसंयोगादेरपि कपालतन्त्वादिव्यापारत्वम् ।
कपालसंयोगस्य कपालजन्यत्वे सति कपालजन्यघटजनकत्वादेवं तन्तु-
संयोगस्य तन्तुजन्यत्वे सति तन्तुजन्यपटजनकत्वात् । करणलक्षणेऽसाधारण-
विशेषणानुपादान ईश्वराद्येदेरपि व्यापारवत्त्वात्करणत्वं स्यात्त्रातिव्याप्ति-
वारणायसाधारणेति ॥

[४२]

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं
प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति । तत्र निष्प्र-
कारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं यथेदं किञ्चित्^१ । सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सवि-
कल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं श्यामोऽयमिति^३ ॥

1 S T W read the passage some-
what differently, though the
sense is the same; thus अवय-
विगुणभूतघटपटरूपादौ त्ववयवगु-
णभूतकपालतन्तुरूपादेः स्वपदग्राह्य-
कपालतन्तुरूपादिसमवायिकपालत-
न्त्वादिसमवेतत्वसंबन्धेनैव कारण-
त्वः तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नकारणताश्रयत्व-
मवयवगुणभूतकपालरूपतन्तुरूपादौ
वर्तते इति लक्षणसंगतिः.

2 E instead of this has किञ्चि-
दिदमिति वस्तुमात्रावगाहिज्ञानम्;
G J Q and X omit the words
altogether.

3 E adds पाचकोऽयम्, but the
addition, though desirable as
giving an instance of क्रिया, is
not supported by any other
copy.

त. दी.—प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह—तत्रेति । प्रमाणचतुष्टयमध्य इत्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य लक्षणमाह—इन्द्रियेति । इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम् । अर्थो घटादिः । तयोः संनिकर्षः संयोगादिः तज्जन्यं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ तद्विभजते—¹तद्विधिमिति । निर्विकल्पकस्य लक्षणमाह—निष्प्रकारकमिति । विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ ननु निर्विकल्पके किं प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वाद्गण्डीति ज्ञानवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशेषणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गान्निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः ॥ सविकल्पकं लक्षयति—सप्रकारकमिति । नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः । सविकल्पकमुदाहरति—यथेति ॥

न्या. बो.—षडिधेन्द्रियभूतप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्य लक्षणमाह— तत्रेति । प्रमाभूतेषु प्रत्यक्षात्मकं यज्ज्ञानं चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षं तत्प्रति करणं व्यापारघटसाधारणमिन्द्रियं भवति । अतः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणत्वं प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्षणम् । आद्यसंनिकर्षातिरिक्तचतुर्विधसंनिकर्षाणां समवायघटितत्वेनेन्द्रियजन्यत्वाभावाद्यापारत्वं न संभवतीतीन्द्रियमनःसंयोगस्यैव ²षडिधप्रत्यक्षे जननीय इन्द्रियव्यापारता बोध्या । मानसप्रत्यक्षे त्वात्मनःसंयोगस्यैव सा बोध्या³ ॥ प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणलक्षणमुक्त्वा प्रत्यक्षप्रमालक्षणमाह । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेति । आदौ लक्षणं जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वाभिप्रायेण । ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षसाधारणं लक्षणं तु ज्ञानाकरणकम् । ज्ञानाकरणकमिति प्रत्यक्षप्रमालक्षणं । ज्ञानं व्याप्तिज्ञानं सादृश्यज्ञानं पदज्ञानं च तदेव करणं येषां तानि ज्ञानकरणकानि अनुमित्युपमितिशाब्दानि तद्विन्नत्वमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रियाणामेव करणत्वान्न ज्ञानस्य करणत्वम्⁴ । इदं लक्षणमीश्वर-

1 A G J Y Z omit this sentence.

2 S U and W read बाह्य for षडिध.

3 C K R V omit this sentence, and perhaps it is spurious. O here adds विशेष्यमात्रोक्तौ स्मृतावतिव्याप्तिविशेषणमात्रोक्तौ तर्कसंज्ञितिव्याप्तिध्वंसं प्रति स्वप्रतियोगि-

नः कारणत्वादत उभयोरुपादानम्. V is nearly to the same effect.

4 The reading of U and W is adopted as being more intelligible. Other copies transpose the sentences. U adds क्षेपकं लक्षणमिदं very appropriately. See Note *loc. cit.*

प्रत्यक्षसाधारणमीश्वरप्रत्यक्षस्याजन्यत्वात् । जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वाभिप्रायेणोत्तरमाह—इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेति । जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वाभिप्रायेणेदं लक्षणम् ॥ प्रत्यक्षं विभजते—निर्विकल्पकमिति । तल्लक्षयति—निष्प्रकारकमिति । प्रकारताशून्यज्ञानत्वमेव निर्विकल्पकत्वमित्यर्थः । निर्विकल्पके चतुर्थी विषयता स्वीक्रियते । न तु त्रिविधविषयतामध्ये कापि तत्रास्ति । अतो विशेषणताशून्यत्वमिव विशेष्यताशून्यत्वं संनिकर्षताशून्यत्वमित्यपि लक्षणं संभवति ॥ सविकल्पकं लक्षयति—सप्रकारकमिति । विषयताया ज्ञाननिरूपितत्वात् ज्ञानस्य विषयतानिरूपकत्वेन प्रकारतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वं सविकल्पकस्य लक्षणम् । एवं विशेष्यतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वं संनिकर्षतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वमित्यपि लक्षणं संभवति । उदाहरणं यथेति । इदंत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितद्वित्यत्वप्रकारताशालिज्ञानं ब्राह्मणत्वप्रकारताशालिज्ञानं च सविकल्पकमित्यर्थः ॥

[४३]

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः षडिधः । संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायो विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति । चक्षुषा ²घटप्रत्यक्षजनने संयोगः संनिकर्षः । घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजनने संयुक्तसमवायः संनिकर्षः चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायात् । रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात् । श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः संनिकर्षः कर्णविवरवृत्त्याकाशस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात् गुणगुणिनोश्च समवायात् । शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् । अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावः

1 A B join the words in a compound; J reads विशेषणता च for विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च.

2 K inserts ज्ञान after प्रत्यक्ष

unnecessarily.

3 K G read प्रत्यक्षे for प्रत्यक्षजनने, and omit संनिकर्षः in the following sentence.

संनिकर्षो घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात्¹ । एवं संनिकर्षषट्कजन्यं ज्ञानं² प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्करण-
मिन्द्रियम् । तस्मादिन्द्रियं³ प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥

त. दी.—इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षं विभजते—प्रत्यक्षेति । संयोगसंनिकर्ष-
मुदाहरति—चक्षुषेति । द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे सर्वत्र संयोगः संनिकर्ष इत्यर्थः ।
आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन ततः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमु-
त्पद्यते । संयुक्तसमवायमुदाहरति—घटरूपेति । तत्र युक्तिमाह—चक्षुः-
संयुक्त इति । संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायमुदाहरति—रूपत्वेति । समवायमुदा-
हरति—श्रोत्रेणेति । तदुपपादयति—कर्णेति । ननु दूरस्थशब्दस्य कथं
श्रोत्रसंबन्ध इति चेन्न वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा शब्दा-
च्छब्दान्तरोत्पत्तिक्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशे जातस्य शब्दस्य श्रोत्रसंबन्धात्प्रत्यक्षत्व-
संभवात्⁴ । समवेतसमवायमुदाहरति—शब्दत्वेति । विशेषणविशेष्यभाव-
मुदाहरति—अभावेति । तदुपपादयति—⁵घटाभाववदिति । भूतले घटो
नास्तीत्यत्र घटाभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । एतेनानुपलब्धेः प्रमाणा-
न्तरत्वं निरस्तम् । यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत । दर्शना-
भावान्नास्तीति तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धिसहकृतेन्द्रियैर्वाभाव-
ज्ञानोपपत्तौ अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वासंभवात् । अधिकरणज्ञानार्थम-
पेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करणत्वोपपत्तावनुपलब्धेः करणत्वस्यायुक्तत्वात्⁶ । विशेष-
णविशेष्यभावो विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपमेव नातिरिक्तः संबन्धः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञा-

1 K here adds भूतलस्य विशेष्य-
त्वात्. As to the correct read-
ing of this passage, see Note
loc cit.

2 J has °पङ्कजं.

3 J omits इन्द्रियं and reads प्रत्यक्षं
प्रमाणं for प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणं.

4 C G J L M N Y omit शब्दात्,
and A C F L M P Q omit शब्दस्य,
but these are retained as help-
ing to make the sense clear.
For श्रोत्रदेशे P reads क्षयदेशे

which gives a somewhat
different though equally good
meaning.

5 A F Q here add भूतलं विशेष्यं
घटाभावो विशेषणं, which is un-
warranted and misleading.

6 N here inserts ननु विशेषण-
विशेष्यभावसंनिकर्षस्य लक्षणानाक्रा-
न्तत्वात्कथं संबन्धत्वमिति चेन्न,
but the passage appears to be
interpolated.

नमुपसंहरंस्तस्य करणमाह—एवमिति । असाधारणकारणत्वादिन्द्रियं
प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति¹ ॥

न्या. बो.—चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षकारणीभूतान् षड्विधसंनिकर्षान्विम-
जते—संयोग इत्यादिना । द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासंबन्धेन चाक्षुष-
त्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुःसंयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतवृत्तिलौकिक-
विषयतासंबन्धेन चाक्षुषत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवायस्य कारण-
त्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासंबन्धेन चाक्षुषत्वावच्छिन्नं
प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम्² । द्रव्यग्राहकाणीन्द्रियाणि
चक्षुस्त्वञ्जनासि त्रीण्येव । अन्यानि घ्राणरसनश्रवणानि तु गुणग्राह-
काणि । अतस्त्वगिन्द्रियस्थले द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासंबन्धेन त्वाचत्वा-
वच्छिन्नं प्रति त्वकसंयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । एवं द्रव्यसमवेतत्वाचत्वावच्छिन्नं
प्रति त्वकसंयुक्तसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतोष्णत्वशीतत्वा-
दिजातिस्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षे त्वकसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । एवमात्म-
रूपद्रव्यमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । आत्मसमवेतसुखादि-
मानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयुक्तसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । आत्मसमवेतसमवेत-
सुखत्वादिमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । रसन-
घ्राणयोस्तु रसगन्धतद्रतजातिग्राहकत्वेन द्वितीयतृतीययोः संनिकर्षयोरेव
रसगन्धादिप्रत्यक्षे हेतुता वाच्या । श्रवणेन्द्रियस्याकाशरूपत्वेन शब्दस्या-
काशगुणत्वेन श्रवणेन्द्रियेण च समं शब्दस्य समवायः संनिकर्षः ।
शब्दसमवेतशब्दत्वादिजातिविषयकश्रावणप्रत्यक्षे समवेतसमवायस्य हेतु-
ता ॥ अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावो नाम विशेषणतासंनिकर्षः ॥
³पञ्चसंनिकर्षेषु मध्ये संयोगस्थाने संयुक्तपदं घटयित्वा समवायस्थाने सम-
वेतपदं घटयित्वा अभावस्थले निर्वाह्यम् । तथाहि द्रव्याधिकरणकाभाव-

1 N adds प्रत्यक्षप्रसाकरणत्वादि-
त्यर्थः.

2 S T V omit this sentence

3 The whole passage from पञ्च-

विध' to इति संक्षेपः seen s to be
corrupt. The reading of W is
adopted as being the most
intelligible.

प्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तविशेषणता । द्रव्यसमवेताधिकरणकाभावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्त-
समवेतविशेषणता च । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेताधिकरणकाभावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्त-
समवेतसमवेतविशेषणता च संनिकर्षः । तत्र घटे घटत्वाभावः संयुक्त-
विशेषणतया गृह्यते । घटसमवेतघटत्वादौ पृथिवीत्वाभावः संयुक्तसमवेत-
विशेषणतया गृह्यते । घटसमवेतसमवेतरूपत्वादौ नीलत्वाभावश्च संयुक्त-
समवेतसमवेतविशेषणतया गृह्यत इति संक्षेपः ॥ इति प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः
समाप्तः ॥

[४४]

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः ।
व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवा-
नयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः^१ । तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति
ज्ञानमनुमितिः । यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो
व्याप्तिः । व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता ॥

त. दी.—अनुमानं लक्षयति—अनुमितिकरणमिति । अनुमिते-
र्लक्षणमाह—परामर्शेति । ननु संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः स्थाणुपुरुष-
संशयानन्तरं पुरुषत्वव्याप्यकरादिमानयमिति परामर्शे सति पुरुष एवेति
प्रत्यक्षजननात् । न च तत्रानुमितिरैवेति वाच्यम् । “पुरुषं साक्षात्क-
रोमि” इत्यनुव्यवसायविरोधादिति चेन्न । पक्षतासहकृतपरामर्शजन्यत्वस्य
विवक्षितत्वात् । सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता । साध्यसि-
द्धिरनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका । सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमिन्यामितीच्छायामनुमितिदर्श-
नात् सिषाधयिषोत्तेजिका । ततश्चोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दाह-
कारणत्ववत् सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारणत्वम् ॥
परामर्शं लक्षयति—व्याप्तीति । व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं स

1 E and X omit ज्ञानं परामर्शः
and perhaps for the better; G

omits अयम्.

परामर्श इत्यर्थः । परामर्शमभिनीय दर्शयति—यथेति । अनुमितिम-
भिनयति—तज्जन्यमिति । परामर्शजन्यमित्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्तेर्लक्षणमाह—
यत्रेति । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तेरभिन्नुयः । साहचर्यनियम इति लक्ष-
णम् । साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरण्यं तस्य नियमः । हेतुसामानाधिकरणा-
त्यन्ताभावाप्रातियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । पक्षधर्मता-
स्वरूपमाह—^१व्याप्यस्येति ॥

न्या. बो.—अनुमानं लक्षयति—अनुमितिकरणमिति । अनु-
मितौ व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणं परामर्शो व्यापारोऽनुमितिः फलं कार्यमित्यर्थः ।
परामर्शस्य व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यत्वे सति व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यानुमितिजनकत्वाच्च
तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकत्वरूपव्यापारलक्षणमुपपन्नम् । अनुमिति-
करणत्वमनुमानस्य लक्षणम् । अनुमानं च व्याप्तिज्ञानम् । एतस्य परा-
मर्शरूपव्यापारद्वारानुमितिं प्रत्यसाधारणकारणतयानुमितिकरणत्वमुपपन्नम् ।
परामर्शजन्यमिति । परामर्शजन्यत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वमनुमितेर्लक्षणम् । तत्र
ज्ञानत्वमात्रोपादाने प्रत्यक्षादावतिव्याप्तिरतस्तद्वारणाय परामर्शजन्यत्वे
सतीति विशेषणोपादानम् । विशेषणमात्रोक्तौ परामर्शश्चैतिव्याप्तिरतस्त-
द्वारणाय ज्ञानत्वोपादानम् । अनुमितिलक्षणघटकीभूतपरामर्शलक्षणमा-
चष्टे^२—व्याप्तिविशिष्टेति । व्याप्तिविशिष्टं च तत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं चेति
कर्मधारयः । अत्र विशिष्टपदस्य प्रकारतापरत्वात् पक्षधर्मताया ज्ञानमित्यत्र
पष्ठया विषयत्वबोधनात् पक्षधर्मतापदस्य पक्षसंबन्धार्थकत्वात्कर्मधारयसमासे
समस्यमानपदार्थयोरभेदसंसर्गलाभेन च व्याप्तिप्रकारकाभिन्नं यत्पक्षसंबन्ध-
विषयकं ज्ञानं तत्परामर्श इति लभ्यते । एवं सति धूमो वह्निव्याप्य आलो-

1 N here adds व्याप्यो नाम व्या-
प्याश्रयः स च धूमादिरेव तस्य पर्व-
तादिः रूपितवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मतेत्य-
र्थः; but the wording of the
sentence as well as its absence
in any other copy prove its

spuriousness.

2 C K R Y omit the sentence
अनुमिति—माचष्टे; and give the
full definition of परामर्शं in-
stead of the following प्रतीक.

कवान्यवत इति समूहालम्बनेऽप्युक्तपरामर्शलक्षणमस्तीत्यतिव्याप्तिः । तद्वारणाय पक्षनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितहेतुनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितव्याप्तिनिष्ठप्रकारताशालिज्ञानं परामर्श इति निष्कर्षः । एतादृशपरामर्शजन्यत्वे सति ज्ञानत्वमनुमितैलक्षणम् । अनुमितिपरामर्शयोर्विशेष्य कार्यकारणभावश्चेत्यम् । वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नसंयोगसंबन्धावच्छिन्नविधेयतानिरूपित-पर्वतत्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यताशाल्यनुमितित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-व्याप्तित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-धूमत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-पर्वतत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपित-विशेष्यताशालिनिर्णयः¹ कारणम् । वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-व्याप्तित्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताया धूमत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपित-व्याप्तित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतायाश्च अभेदानङ्गीकर्तृमते वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-विशेष्यत्वावच्छिन्नव्याप्तित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-विशेष्यत्वावच्छिन्नधूमत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-पर्वतत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितविशेष्यताशालिनिर्णयः कारणमिति वाच्यम् । स च निर्णयो वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नधूमत्वाम् पर्वत इत्याकारको बोध्यः ॥

यत्रेति । यत्रपदवीप्सावशात् धूमाधिकरणे यावति वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नमात्रायावत्पदमहिम्ना वह्नेर्धूमव्यापकत्वं लब्धम् । तदेव स्पष्टयति-साहचर्यनियम इति । नियतसाहचर्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । नियतत्वं व्यापकत्वं । साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरण्यम् । तथा च धूमव्यापकवह्निसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । वह्नेर्धूमव्यापकत्वं च धूमसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वम् । तथाहि धूमाधिकरणे चत्वरमहानसादौ वर्तमानोऽभावो घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावः । न तु वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावः । कुतः । चत्वरमहानसादौ वह्नेः सत्त्वात् । एवं सति धूमाधिकरणे पर्वतचत्वरादौ वर्तमानस्य घटाद्यभावस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं

1 The passage, which follows, seems to have been much tampered with. C K R V generally agree among themselves, though they materially differ

from the above.

2 The passage is taken from S and W, but is not found in other copies.

घटत्वादिकमनवच्छेदकं वह्नित्वं वह्नौ वर्ततेऽतो धूमव्यापकत्वं वह्नौ वर्तते । इयमन्वयव्याप्तिः सिद्धान्तानुसारेण । पूर्वपक्षव्याप्तिस्तु प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरण-साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम् । साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्न-साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताका-प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नवैयर्थ्यधिकरण्यावच्छिन्नाभाववन्निरूपितहेतुतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्न-वृत्तित्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकाभावो व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । तच्च केवलान्वयिन्यव्याप्तमिति सिद्धान्तानुसरणम् ॥

[४५]

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च । तत्र स्वार्थं स्वानुमितिहेतुः² । तथा हि स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाग्नौ संदिहानः³ पर्वते धूमं पश्यन्व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । तदनंतरं वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते । तस्मात्पर्वतो वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नधूमवानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिरुत्पद्यते⁴ । तदेतत्स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुञ्जे तत्परार्थानुमानम्⁵ । यथा पर्वतो वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नधूमवत्त्वात् । यो यो धूमवान्स वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नधूमवान् यथा महानसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादितालिङ्गात्परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

1 S W here add तथा च धूमव्यापकवह्निसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरिति फलितम्.

2 D adds परार्थं परप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः.

3 A B C D F H have गत्वा for गतः probably substituted to avoid repetition of गत. For तद्गते H has तत् आर्द्रेन्धने, a further emendation not war-

ranted by the context.

4 C reads अनुमितिरूपम् for अनुमितिः; X omits it.

5 A B C D read परं प्रति बोधयितुं which makes the construction awkward; J reads प्रतीति for प्रतिपत्ति, and C प्रयुज्यते for प्रयुञ्जे; G has पञ्चावयवोपेतं for पञ्चावयव.

त. दी.— अनुमानं विभजते— अनुमानमिति¹ । स्वार्थानुमितिं दर्शयति— स्वयमेवेति । भूयोदर्शनेनेति । धूमान्योर्व्याप्तिग्रहे साध्य-साधनयोर्भूयः² सहचारदर्शनेनेत्यर्थः । ननु पार्थिवत्वलोहलेख्यत्वादौ शतशः सहचारदर्शनेऽपि वज्रादौ व्यभिचारोपलब्धेर्भूयोदर्शनेन³ कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञानस्य व्याप्ति-^{what causes the...}ग्रहकत्वात् । व्यभिचारज्ञानं द्विविधम् निश्चयः शङ्का च । तद्विरहः क्वचित्तर्कात्क्वचित्स्वतः सिद्ध एव । धूमाग्निव्याप्तिग्रहे कार्यकारणभाव-^{the causes are...}भङ्गप्रसङ्गलक्षणस्तर्को व्यभिचारशङ्कानिवर्तकः ॥ ननु 'सकलवह्निधूमयोर-^{what is called...}संनिकर्षात्कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न । धूमत्ववह्नित्वरूपसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्या-^{what is called...}सत्यां सकलधूमवह्निज्ञानसंभवात् ॥ तस्मादिति । लिङ्गपरामर्शादित्यर्थः । परार्थानुमानमाह— याञ्चिति ॥ यच्छब्दस्य तत्परार्थानुमानमिति तच्छब्देनोन्वयः ॥ पञ्चावयववाक्यमुदाहरति— यथेति ॥

न्या. बो.— अनुमानं विभजते— स्वार्थमिति । स्वार्थानुमानं नाम न्यायाप्रयोज्यानुमानम् । तदप्रयोज्यानुमानं परार्थानुमानम् ॥ न्यायत्वं च प्रतिज्ञाद्यवयवपञ्चकसमुदायत्वम् । अवयवत्वं च प्रतिज्ञाद्यन्यतमत्वम् ॥

[४६]

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः । पर्वतो वह्नि-मानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवान्स सोऽग्नि-मान्यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम्⁴ । तथा चायमित्युपनयः । तस्मा-त्थेति निगमनम् ॥

1 J Y omit this sentence. A adds स्वार्थानुमानं विविच्य दर्शयति— तथाहीति which is superfluous, F and Q here add तद् द्वै-विध्यं दर्शयति— स्वार्थमिति । तत्रेति । उभयोर्मध्य इत्यर्थः ।
2 The passage is taken from N. A omits the whole of it, while other copies retain भूयोदर्शनेनेति, omitting the latter part, which, however, appears to be

necessary to complete the explanation.

3 M N omit वज्रादौ व्यभिचारो-पलब्धेः, while J Y Z omit वज्रादौ only; L reads वज्रप्रणौ, P हीरके, and Q मण्यदौ.

4 The reading is that of D H K; J gives the same minus one-सः and with महानसं. C E omit यथा महानसः, while A B F retain only the first three words.

त. दी.— अवयवस्वरूपमाह— प्रतिज्ञेति । उदाहृतवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञा-दिविभागमाह¹— पर्वतो वह्निमानिति । साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ॥ पञ्चम्यन्तं लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः । व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकमुदाहरणम् ॥ पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनयः । अबाधितत्वादिकं निगमनप्रयोजनम्² ॥

[४७]

स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमित्योर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एव करणम्³ । तस्मा-लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् ॥

त. दी.— अनुमितिकरणमाह— स्वार्थेति ॥ ननु व्याप्तिस्मृतिपक्ष-

1 A G L P Y Z have विशेष for विभाग.

2 The passage from पञ्चम्यन्तं to the end appears to have been tampered with. All copies except G N and Z agree in reading it as above. N and Z give a materially different version:— पञ्चम्यन्तं तृतीयान्तं वा लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः । व्याप्ति-प्रतिपादकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वच-नमुपनयः । हेतुसाध्यवत्तया पक्षप्र-तिपादकं वचनं निगमनम् । पक्षज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाप्रयोजनम् । लिङ्गज्ञानं हेतु-प्रयोजनम् । व्याप्तिज्ञानमुदाहरण-प्रयोजनम् । पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमुपनय-प्रयोजनम् । अबाधितत्वादिकं निग-मनप्रयोजनम् । G and Q agree with this from व्याप्तिविशिष्टं to the end. The repetitions and fuller explanation in this passage show that it is an interpolation. Nil. does not seem to be aware of it, especially its latter half begin-

ning with पक्षज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाप्रयो-जनम्. Having explained the definitions as read by N, Nil. notices the reading adopted in our text as a v. l. and remarks पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनय इति पाठे तु 'प्रयुज्यते' इति शेष-पूरणेन प्रदर्शितार्थ एव यथाकथं-चित् संगमनीयः । This shows that even Nil. found the text corrupt and was not satisfied with the reading usually met with. It is possible that some later writer corrected the loose definitions of उपनय and निगमन given by Annambhatta and the latter being retained, three more प्रयोजनघटित sentences were added to complete the list.

3 Curiously enough all copies except G K X read कारणं which is clearly a mistake. In J the vertical bar appears to have been erased afterwards.

धर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेवानुमितिसंभवे व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गपरामर्शः¹ किमर्थमङ्गी-
कर्तव्य इति चेन्न । वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति शाब्दपरामर्शस्थले विशिष्ट-
परामर्शस्यावश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात् । लिङ्गं न
करणम् । अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात् । व्यापारवत्कारणं करणमिति मते
परामर्शद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानं² करणम् । तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको
व्यापारः ॥ अनुमानमुपसंहरति—**तस्मादिति ॥**

[४८]

लिङ्गं त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि केवलव्य-
तिरेकि चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च³ व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि ।
यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवत्त्वम् । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्य-
न्वयव्याप्तिः । यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाहृद
इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ।⁴ अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि यथा
घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात्पटवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिनेयत्वयोर्व्यति-
रेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्यापि प्रमेयत्वादभिनेयत्वाच्च । व्यतिरेक-
मात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्ध-
वैत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् । यथा जलम् । न
चेयं तथा । तस्मान्न तथेति । अत्र⁵ यद्गन्धवत्तदितरभिन्नमित्यन्व-
यदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रस्य पक्षत्वात् ॥

त. दी.—लिङ्गं विभजते—**लिङ्गमिति ॥** अन्वयव्यतिरेकि लक्ष-
यति—**अन्वयेनेति ।** हेतुसाध्ययोर्व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । तदभावयोर्व्याप्ति-
र्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ॥ केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह—**अन्वयेति ।** केवलान्व-

1 A F and Q omit the words
व्याप्तिलिङ्गं and विशिष्ट before
परामर्शः.

2 After व्याप्तिज्ञानं A and F add
पक्षज्ञानं साध्यज्ञानं लिङ्गज्ञानं य-
त्किञ्चिज्जन्यज्ञानमात्रं वा परामर्श-
व्यापारकम्.

3 For व्याप्तिमत् C reads यत्र

व्याप्तिस्तत्.

4 C here adds यत्सत्त्वे तत्सत्त्वमन्व-
यः । यदभावे तदभावो व्यतिरेकः,
but the words are found no-
where else.

5 C G H read 'रेभ्यः; F has इतर-
भेदवत्.

यिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयि । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् ।
केवलान्वयिनमुदाहरति यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वादिति । ईश्वरप्रमावि-
षयत्वं सर्वपदाभिधेयत्वं च सर्वत्रास्तीति व्यतिरेकाभावः ॥ केवल-
व्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह—**व्यतिरेकेति¹** । केवलव्यतिरेकिणमुदाहरति
—**पृथिवीति ।** नन्वितरभेदः प्रसिद्धो वा न वा । आद्ये यत्र प्रसिद्धस्तत्र
हेतुसत्त्वेऽन्वयित्वम् असत्त्वेऽसाधारण्यम् । द्वितीये साध्यज्ञानाभावात्कथं
तद्विशिष्टानुमितिः । विशेषणज्ञानाभावे विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयात् ।² प्रतियोगि-
ज्ञानाभावाच्च्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमपि न स्यादिति चेन्न । जलादित्रयोदशा-
न्योन्याभावानां त्रयोदशसु प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्धानां मेलनं पृथिव्यां साध्यते ।
तत्र त्रयोदशत्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभावान्नान्वयित्वासाधारण्ये ।
प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्ध्या साध्यविशिष्टानुमितिव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरूपणं
चेति³ ॥

न्या. बो.—अन्वयेनेति । साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यरूपान्वयव्याप्ति-
मानित्यर्थः । **व्यतिरेकेणेति ।** व्यतिरेको नामाभावः । तथा च साध्या-
भावहेत्वभावयोर्व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । इयं च व्याप्तिः यत्र यत्र वह्य-
भावस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभाव इति । यत्रपदवीप्सया वह्यभाववति यावति
धूमाभावग्रहणे यावत्पदस्य व्यापकत्वपरतया धूमाभावे वह्यभावव्यापकत्वं

1 A J Y Z omit this sentence.
G replaces this and the next
sentence by a single one व्यति-
रेकि दर्शयति—व्यतिरेकमात्रेति.

2 M inserts अभावज्ञानाभावेन
after प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावात्.

3 The concluding passage of
T D beginning with तत्र is un-
doubtedly corrupt, and is
absolutely unintelligible as it
is read in most of the printed
editions and Mss. Only N
and J seem to give an appro-

ximately correct and intel-
ligible reading. I have sub-
stituted भेद for साध्य and
changed प्रत्येकाधिकरणं into
करणे on the single authority
of N, because the emendations
make the meaning clearer. J
F and Q alone make नान्वयि-
त्वासाधारण्ये part of the pre-
vious sentence as it certainly
ought to be. F and Q insert
साध्याभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियो-
गित्वमिति before व्यतिरेक'. See
Note loc. cit.

लब्धम् । एवं च बह्व्यभावनिष्ठा व्याप्तिः स्वाश्रयीभूतबह्व्यभावव्यापकी-
भूताभावप्रतियोगित्वसंबन्धेन धूमनिष्ठतया गृह्यत इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति-
मत्त्वेन व्यतिरेकित्वेन धूमव्यापकबहिसामानाधिकरण्यरूपान्वयव्याप्तिमत्त्वे-
नान्वयित्वेन च गीयते^१ । व्यतिरेकपरामर्शस्तु बह्व्यभावव्यापकीभूताभाव-
प्रतियोगिधूमवान् पर्वत इत्याकारकः ॥

केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह—**अन्वयेति** । व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिशून्यत्वे
सत्यन्वयव्याप्तिमत्त्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । साध्ये केवलान्वयित्वमभावाप्रति-
योगित्वम् । तथा चाभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकत्वं केवलान्वयिहेतुलक्षणम्^२ ।
एतल्लक्षणं हेतोर्यव्यतिरेकित्वेऽपि संगच्छते । साध्यस्य केवलान्वयित्वाद्य-
तिरेकव्याप्तेरभावादन्यमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयीति मूलोक्तलक्षणमुपपन्नम् ।
अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् ।^३ न चैवमाकाशाभावे संयोगा-
भावे चाव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । स्वविरोधिवृत्तिमदत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्यैव
तदर्थत्वात् । एकजातीयसंबन्धेन सर्वत्र विद्यमानत्वं केवलान्वयित्वमिति
नव्याः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह—**व्यतिरेकेति** ॥ अन्वयव्याप्ति-
शून्यत्वे सति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमत्त्वं केवलव्यतिरेकित्वम् । **यथेति** । अत्र
पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्नं पक्षः । पृथिवीतरजलादिभेदः साध्यः । गन्धवत्त्वं
हेतुः । अत्र यद्गन्धवत्तदितरभेदवदित्यन्वयदृष्टान्ताभावात् गन्धव्यापकेतर-
भेदसामानाधिकरण्यरूपान्वयव्याप्तिग्रहासंभवात् नास्त्यन्वयव्याप्तिः ॥
किं तु यत्र यत्र पृथिवीतरभेदाभावस्तत्र तत्र गन्धाभावो यथा जला-
दिकमिति व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तभूतजलादावितरभेदाभावरूपसाध्याभावव्याप-
कता गन्धाभावे दृश्यते । इममेवार्थं मनसि निधाय **यदितरेभ्यो**
न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवद्यथा जलमिति ग्रन्थेन मूलकारो व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति-
मेव प्रदर्शितवान् । एवं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहानन्तरम् इतरभेदाभावव्यापकी-
भूताभावप्रतियोगिगन्धवती पृथिवी इत्याकारकव्यतिरेकपरामर्शात् पृथिवी-

1 S and W read the passage a little differently.

2 Instead of this sentence S and W have अथवा केवलान्व-

यिसाध्यकत्वं तत् ।

3 W reads तथा च तयोः एकजातीयसंबन्धेन सर्वत्र विद्यमानत्वान्ना-
व्याप्तिः ।

त्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यतानिरूपितेतरभेदत्वावच्छिन्नविधेयताका पृथिवी इतरभेद-
वती इत्याकारकानुमितिर्जायत इति तत्त्वम् । **यथा जलमिति** । जल-
मितरभेदाभावव्यापकगन्धाभाववदिति । **न चैयं तथेति** । इतरभेदाभाव-
व्यापकीभूतगन्धाभाववती न किंतु तदभावाभाववत्त्वाद्गन्धवतीत्यर्थः ।
तस्मान्न तथेति । तच्छब्देन गन्धाभावाभावरूपस्य गन्धस्य परामर्शेन
तस्मादिति पञ्चम्यन्ताद्गन्धवत्त्वादित्यर्थोपलब्धेस्तथेतरभेदाभाववतीत्यस्यायं
भावः । तथा चैतरभेदाभावाभाववतीतरभेदवतीत्यर्थः ॥

[४९]

संदिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः । यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः ॥

त. दी.—पक्षलक्षणमाह—**संदिग्धेति** । ननु श्रवणानन्तरभावि-
मनस्थलेऽव्याप्तिः । तत्र वेदवाक्यैरात्मनो निश्चितत्वेन संदेहाभावात्किंच
प्रत्यक्षेऽपि बहौ यत्रेच्छयानुमितिस्तत्राप्यव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । उक्तपक्षताश्रय-
त्वस्य पक्षलक्षणत्वात् ॥

न्या. बो.—पक्षलक्षणमाह—**संदिग्धसाध्येति**^१ । साध्यप्रकारक-
संदेहविशेष्यत्वं पक्षत्वम् । संदेहश्च पर्वतो वह्निमान् वा इत्याकारकः । अनु-
मितेः पूर्वं साध्यसंदेहो नियमेन पक्षे जायत इत्यभिप्रायेणेदं लक्षणं प्राचीनैः
कृतम् । गगनविशेष्यकमेघप्रकारकसंदेहाभावदशायामपि गृहमध्यस्थपुरु-
पस्य घनगर्जितश्रवणेन गगनं मेघवदित्याकारकानुमितिर्जायते । गगनत्वा-
वच्छिन्नोद्देश्यतानिरूपितमेघवत्त्वावच्छिन्नविधेयताकानुमितिदर्शनात्प्राचीनमतं
विहाय नवीनैरनुमित्युद्देश्यत्वं पक्षत्वमिति स्थिरीकृतम् ॥

[५०]

निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महानसः ॥

त. दी.—सपक्षलक्षणमाह—**निश्चितेति** ॥

1, 2 The following passage seems to be corrupt. The reading of C K is adopted. S

U and W give a materially different reading.

न्या. बो.—सपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितसाध्येति । साध्यप्रकारक-
निश्चयविशेष्यत्वं सपक्षत्वम्¹ । निश्चयश्च महानसो वह्निमानित्याकारकः ॥

[५१]

निश्चितसाध्याभाववान्विपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महाहृदः ॥

त. दी.—विपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितेति ॥

न्या. बो.—विपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितेति । साध्याभावप्रकारक-
निश्चयविशेष्यत्वं विपक्षत्वम्² । निश्चयश्च हृदो वह्नयभाववानित्याकारकः ॥

[५२]

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धिबाधिताः पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः ॥

त. दी.—एवं सद्भेतुं निरूप्यासद्भेतुं निरूपयितुं विभजते—सव्य-
भिचारेति । अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वं हेत्वाभासत्वम् ।

न्या. बो.—एवं सद्भेतुं निरूप्य हेत्वाभासान् निरूपयति—सव्यभि-
चारेति । हेतुवदाभासन्त इति हेत्वाभासाः दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थः । दोषाश्च
व्यभिचारविरोधप्रतिपक्षासिद्धिबाधाः । तद्विशिष्टा दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थः ।
हेतौ दोषज्ञाने सत्यनुमितिप्रतिबन्धो जायते व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धो वा
जायते । अतो वादिनिग्रहार्थं वादिनोद्भावितहेतौ दोषोद्धानार्थं दुष्टहेतु-
निरूपणमिति भावः ॥

[५३]

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स त्रिविधः । साधारणासाधारणा-
नुपसंहारिभेदात् । तत्र साध्याभाववृत्तिः साधारणोऽनैकान्तिकः ।
यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्नयभाववति हृदे
विद्यमानत्वात् । सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तोऽसाधारणः³ । यथा शब्दो

1, 2 C F K Q and V omit the
sentence.

3 G J omit 'विपक्ष'; Q inserts
पक्षमात्रवृत्तिः before असाधारणः.

नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति । शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च¹
व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्रवृत्ति । अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारी ।
यथा सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यापि पक्षत्वादृष्टान्तो
नास्ति ॥

त. दी.—सव्यभिचारं विभजते—स त्रिविध इति । साधारणं
लक्षयति—तत्रेति । उदाहरति—यथेति । असाधारणं लक्षयति—
सर्वेति । अनुपसंहारिणो लक्षणमाह—अन्वयेति ॥

न्या. बो.—सव्यभिचारं विभज्य दर्शयति—साधारणेति । सा-
धारणाद्यन्यतमत्वं सव्यभिचारसामान्यलक्षणम् । साधारणत्वं साध्याभाव-
वृत्तित्वम्² । पर्वतो वह्निमान्प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र प्रमेयत्वहेतौ वह्नयभाववृत्ति-
त्वरूपव्यभिचारे ज्ञाते वह्नयभाववद्वृत्तित्वरूपव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।
असाधारण इति । सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वं साध्यवृत्तित्वावच्छिन्न-
प्रतियोगिताकाभावः³ । हेतौ साध्यसामानाधिकरण्ये निश्चिते साध्य-
सामानाधिकरण्यरूपव्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ अनुपसंहारिणं लक्षयति
—अन्वयेति । उभयदृष्टान्ताभावादन्वयव्याप्तिज्ञानव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानो-
भयसामग्री नास्तीत्यर्थः । सर्वस्यैव पक्षत्वात् पक्षातिरिक्ताप्रसिद्धे-
रितिभावः ॥

[५४]

साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुविरुद्धः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वा-
दिति । कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम् ॥

त. दी.—विरुद्धं लक्षयति—साध्येति ॥

1 G J omit अनित्येभ्यश्च.

2 The passage from सव्यभिचारं
विभज्य to 'वृत्तित्वम्' is not
found in C K R V.

3 The sentence is omitted in C
K R and V; U has निश्चित-
साध्यवद्वृत्तित्वम्.

न्या. बो.—विरुद्धं लक्षयति—साध्याभावव्याप्त इति । साध्या-
भावव्याप्तिः साध्याभावनिरूपितव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः साध्यव्यापकीभूताभाव-
प्रतियोगित्वम् । तथा च पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्याभावव्याप्यहेतुप्रकारकज्ञाना-
त्यक्षविशेष्यकसाध्यप्रकारकानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥

[५५]

यस्य साध्यभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः ।
यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वाच्छब्दत्ववदिति । शब्दोऽनित्यः
कार्यत्वाद्धटवदिति ॥

त. दी.—सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति—यस्येति ॥

न्या. बो.—एवं सत्प्रतिपक्षेऽपि । विरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षयोर्विशेषस्तु
विरुद्धे हेतोरेकत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षे हेतोर्द्वित्वेन च ज्ञातव्यः । सत्प्रतिपक्षं
लक्षयति—यस्येति । साध्याभावसाधको हेतुः साध्यसाधकत्वेनोपन्यस्त
इत्यसामर्थ्यसूचनमपि भवति ॥

[५६]

असिद्धस्त्रिविधः । आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासि-
द्धश्चेति । आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्दत्वात्स-
रोजारविन्दवत् । अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्येव ।
स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुणश्चाक्षुषत्वात् । अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे
नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् । सोपाधिको^३ व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः ।
साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक^४ उपाधिः । साध्यसमाना-
धिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । साधनवन्नि-

1 A B place यस्य after हेत्वन्तरं ;
B omits विद्यते; G has विद्यते
यस्य.
2 Q has अनित्यः for गुणः, and
adds रूपवत्.

3 A B C D F and Q insert हेतुः
after सोपाधिकः.
4 C H Q U and W have व्यापक-
त्वमुपाधिः, while E reads
व्यापकत्वमुपाधित्वम्.

घात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । पर्वतो धूमवान्वह्नि-
मन्वादित्यत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि^१ । यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रे-
न्धनसंयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगो
नास्त्ययोगोलक आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावादिति साधनाव्यापकता^२ ।
एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग
उपाधिः । सोपाधिकत्वाद्बहिमत्त्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धम् ॥

त. दी.—असिद्धं विभजते—असिद्ध इति ॥ आश्रयासिद्धमुदा-
हरति—गगनेति ॥ स्वरूपासिद्धमुदाहरति—शब्देति ॥ व्याप्यत्वा-
सिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह—सोपाधिक इति । उपाधिलक्षणमाह—साध्येति ।
उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः । केवलसाध्यव्यापकः पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः
साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकश्चेति । आद्य
आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । द्वितीयो यथा—वायुः प्रत्यक्षः^३ प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वा-
दित्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम्^४ । तृतीयो
यथा—प्रध्वंसो^५ विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं
भावत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथा—प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वा-
वच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् ॥

न्या. बो.—आश्रयासिद्ध इति । आश्रयासिद्धिर्नाम पक्षताव-
वच्छेदकविशिष्टपक्षासिद्धिः । यथा गगनीयत्वविशिष्टपक्षासिद्धेः सौर-

1 Some copies omit तथाहि.

2 C H K X and W omit इति
साधनाव्यापकता.

3 For प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् C J L
M Y Z read प्रमेयत्वात् which
is perhaps better.

4 G here adds स इयामो मैत्रीतन-
यत्वादित्यत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वावच्छिन्न-

इयामत्वस्य व्यापकः शाकाद्याहार-
परिणतिभेदः । प्रकारान्तरेण तृतीयो
यथा; but this is undoubtedly
interpolated.

5 J N M Q and Y read प्रागभाव
for प्रध्वंस and are supported
by the high authority of A².
See Note *loc. cit.*

भ्यानुमितिर्न संभवति । स्वरूपासिद्धिर्नाम पक्षे हेत्वभावः । तथा च हेत्वभावविशिष्टपक्षज्ञानात्पक्षविशेष्यकहेतुप्रकारकपरामर्शानुत्पत्त्या परामर्श-प्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध इति । प्रकृते धूमव्यापकत्वमाद्रै-न्धनसंयोगे गृहीतं चेद्भूम आद्रैन्धनसंयोगव्याप्यत्वं गृहीतम् । एवं वह्न्यव्यापकत्वमाद्रैन्धनसंयोगे गृहीतं चेद्ब्रह्मै तदव्याप्यत्वं गृह्यते तदेव व्यभिचारित्वम् । तथा चोपाधिव्यभिचारित्वं साधने गृहीतं चेदुपाधिसू-ताद्रैन्धनसंयोगव्याप्यधूमव्यभिचारित्वं गृहीतमेव । अनुमानप्रकारश्च पूर्वानुमानहेतुं पक्षीकृत्य वह्निर्धूमव्यभिचारी धूमव्यापकाद्रैन्धनसंयोग-व्यभिचारित्वाद्धटत्वादिवद्यो यत्साध्यव्यापकव्यभिचारी स सर्वोऽपि साध्यव्यभिचारी । एवं प्रकारेण प्रकृतानुमानहेतुभूतपक्षे साध्यव्यभि-चारोत्थापकतया दूषकत्वमुपाधेः फलम् । तथा च धूमाभाववद्वृत्तिरूपधू-मव्यभिचारे गृहीते वह्नौ धूमाभाववद्वृत्तिरूपव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।^१ न च व्याप्यत्वासिद्धेर्व्यभिचाराभेद इति वाच्यम् । धूमाभाववद्वृत्तित्वाभा-वाभावेन व्याप्यत्वासिद्धत्वं धूमाभाववद्वृत्तित्वेन व्यभिचारत्वमिति भेदात् ।

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यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधितः । यथा वह्निरनुष्णो^२ द्रव्यत्वादिति । अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षेण^४ गृह्यत इति बाधितत्वम् ॥

त. दी.—बाधितस्य लक्षणमाह—यस्येति । अत्र बाधस्य प्राह्या-भावनिश्चयत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य विरोधिज्ञानसामग्रीत्वेन साक्षादनुमितिप्रति-

1 U and W read the passage differently.

2 C K R V omit the following two sentences.

3 K reads पदार्थत्वात् for द्रव्यत्वात्.

4 The reading adopted is that of A D E K; G H J read प्रत्यक्षेण

only which amounts to the same. B has स्पर्शेन प्रत्यक्षेण, and C स्पर्शेनेन. S. C. seems to prefer the latter. Possibly both स्पर्शनं and स्पर्शेन may have been later insertions. See Note *loc. cit.*

बन्धकत्वम् । इतरेषां तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । तत्रापि साधारणस्या-व्यभिचाराभावतया^१ विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्याभावतया^१ व्यापकत्वासि-द्धस्य^१ विशिष्टव्याप्यभावतयासाधारणानुपसंहारिणोर्व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वेन च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्धयोः पक्षधर्मता-ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । उपाधिस्तु व्यभिचारज्ञानद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रति-बन्धकः । सिद्धसाधनं तु पक्षताविघट(क?)तया आश्रयासिद्धेऽन्तर्भव-तीति प्राञ्चः । निग्रहस्थानान्तरमिति नवीनाः^२ ।

न्या. बो.—यस्येति । यस्य हेतोः साध्याभावः स च प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधित इत्यर्थः । तथा च प्रात्यक्षिकसाध्याभावनिश्रयेण साध्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । बाधितसाध्यकत्वाद्धेतोर्हेतुरपि बाधित इत्युच्यते ॥ इत्यनुमानपरिच्छेदः ॥

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उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्क-रणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्यापारः^३ । तथा हि^४ कश्चिद्रवयशब्दार्थमजानन्कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाद्गोसदृशो गवय इति^५ श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन्गोसदृशं^६ पिण्डं पश्यति । तदनन्तरमसा गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते ॥

त. दी.—उपमानं लक्षयति—उपमितीति ॥

1 A and Q भाववत्तया.

2 The reading is that of N and Nzl. A C L P omit प्राञ्चः; leav- ing इति which then becomes redundant. G J Y Z omit इति प्राञ्चः. A inserts न before निग्रहं and M reads निग्रहस्था- नानन्तरम् both of which are clearly wrong.

3 Q N and W omit this sen-

tence. F omits the rest of the passage.

4 A B D omit कश्चित्; K adds पुरुषः; A B D and Q read वाच्यम् for अर्थम्. N has पदार्थं for शब्दार्थम्.

5 K H add वाक्यं after इति.

6 C adds विनिष्टं after सदृशं; H reads सादृश्यविनिष्टं and A and W सदृशपिण्डं; J omits पिण्डं.

न्या. बो.—उपमानं लक्षयति—उपमितिकरणमिति । उपमिति लक्षयति—संज्ञासंज्ञीति । संज्ञा पदं । संज्ञी पदार्थः । तयोः संबन्धः शक्तिः । तथा च पदपदार्थसंबन्धज्ञानमुपमिति रित्यर्थः । उपमानमतिदेश-वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः । उपमितिः फलम् । गोसदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इत्याकारकाद्रोसदृशत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यकगवय-पदवाच्यत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं जायते तदेव करणम् ॥ इत्युपमानपरिच्छेदः ॥

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आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् । अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इती-श्वरसंकेतः शक्तिः ॥

त. दी.—शब्दं लक्षयति—आप्तेति^१ । पदलक्षणमाह—शक्तमिति । अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलः पदपदार्थसंबन्धः शक्तिः । सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति मीमांसकाः । तन्निरासार्थमाह—अस्मादिति । डित्यादीनामिव घटादी-नामपि संकेत एव शक्तिः न तु पदार्थान्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ गवादिशब्दानां जाता-वेव शक्तिर्विशेषणतया जातेः प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात् व्यक्तिलाभस्वाक्षेपादिना इति केचित् । तन्न । गामानयेत्यादौ^४ वृद्धव्यवहारात्सर्वत्रानयनादेर्व्यक्ता-वेव संभवेन जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात् शक्तिप्रहश्च वृद्धव्यव-हारेण । व्युत्पित्सुर्बालो गामानयेत्युत्तमवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य गवानयनं च दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानस्यान्वयव्य-तिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्याश्चमानय गां बधान इति वाक्यान्तर आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरशब्दस्याश्रित्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यते । ननु सर्वत्र कार्यपरत्वाद्भवहारस्य कार्यवाक्य एव व्युत्पत्तिर्न सिद्धपर इति चेन्न ।^५ काञ्चयां त्रिभुवनतिलको भूपतिरित्यादौ

- 1 W omits this. Q adds शुक्रां दण्डेन after आनय.
2 A B D and F insert इच्छा after ईश्वर unnecessarily. C more correctly reads ईश्वरे.

च्छारूपसंकेतः.

- 3 N and Q here add वाक्यं लक्षयति-वाक्येति.
4 F and Q have वृद्धव्यवहारेण.
5 A and M read काञ्चयां.

सिद्धेऽपि व्यवहारात् विकसितपद्मे मधुकर^१ इत्यादौ प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्यव-हारात्सिद्धेऽपि मधुकरादिपदे व्युत्पत्तिदर्शनाच्च ॥ लक्षणापि शब्दवृत्तिः । शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा । गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गापदवाच्यप्रवाहसंबन्धादेव तीरोपस्थितौ तीरेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्प्यते । सैन्धवादौ लवणाश्रयोः परस्पर-संबन्धाभावान्नाशाक्तिकल्पनम् ॥ लक्षणा त्रिविधा । जहल्लक्षणाजहल्लक्षणा जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयाभावस्तत्र जहती यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयस्तत्राजहती यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यैकदेशत्यागेनैकदेशान्वयस्तत्र जहदजहती यथा तच्चमसीति^२ । गौप्यपि लक्षणैव लक्ष्यमाणगुणसम्बन्धरूपा । अग्निर्माणवक इति ॥ व्यञ्जनापि शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता । अर्थशक्तिमूला चानुमानादिनान्यथासिद्धा^३ ॥

तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजम् । तत्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरित्वं तात्पर्यम् । तात्पर्यज्ञानं च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः । नानार्थानुरोधात्तु प्रकरणादिकं तात्पर्यप्राहकम् । द्वारमित्यादौ पिधेहीति शब्दाध्याहारः । नन्वर्थज्ञानार्थ-त्वाच्छब्दस्यार्थमविज्ञाय शब्दाध्याहारासंभवादर्थध्याहार एव युक्त इति चेन्न पदविशेषजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेः शब्दज्ञानहेतुत्वात् । अन्यथा घटः कमत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यत्रापि शब्दज्ञानप्रसङ्गात् ॥

पङ्कजादिपदेषु योगरूढिः । अवयवशक्तिर्योगः । समुदायशक्ती रूढिः । नियतपद्मत्वज्ञानार्थं समुदायशक्तिः । अन्यथा कुमुदेऽपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः । इतरान्विते शक्तिरिति प्राभाकराः । अन्वयस्य वाक्यार्थतया भानसंभवा-दन्वयांशेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्पनीयेति गौतमीयाः ॥

- 1 M N F and Q add मधुनि पिबति after मधुकरः but wrongly; J supplies the ellipsis by तिष्ठति more correctly. A reads सिद्ध f r प्रसिद्ध incorrectly.
2 G here adds सोऽयं देवदत्त इति च.
3 The text of T D is here undoubtedly tampered with. J alone gives the reading adopted, which seems to be the correct one as it is supported

by Nil A L omit शक्ति before लक्षणान्तर्भूता. A L C P make अर्थशक्तिमूला च part of the previous sentence F N and Q add शब्दशक्तिमूला before and M पदशक्तिमूला after अर्थशक्ति-मूला. Q V Z make the two sentences one. Y Z have भूत-त्वात् and मूलत्वात् भूता and मूला respectively.

न्या. बो.—शब्द लक्षयति—आप्तेति¹ । पदज्ञानं करणम् । वृत्ति-
ज्ञानसहकृतपदज्ञानजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितिर्व्यापारः । वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्द-
बोधः फलम् । वृत्तिर्नाम शक्तिलक्षणान्यतररूपा । शक्तिर्नाम² घटादि-
विशेष्यकघटादिपदजन्यबोधविषयत्वप्रकारकेश्वरसंकेतः । ईश्वरसंकेतो
नामेश्वरेच्छा सैव शक्तिरित्यर्थः । शक्तिनिरूपकत्वमेव पदे शक्तत्वम् ।
विषयतासंबन्धेन शक्त्याश्रयत्वमर्थे शक्यत्वम् । शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा ।
सा द्विविधा । गौणी शुद्धा चेति । गौणी नाम सादृश्यविशिष्टलक्षणा
यथा सिंहो माणवक इत्यादौ सिंहपदस्य सिंहसादृश्यविशिष्टे लक्षणा ।
शुद्धापि द्विधा जहल्लक्षणाजहल्लक्षणा चेति³ । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण
लक्ष्यमात्रबोधिका जहल्लक्षणा यथा गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गापदशक्य-
प्रवाहसम्बन्धस्य तीरे सत्त्वात् तादृशशक्यसम्बन्धरूपलक्षणाज्ञानात्
गङ्गापदात्तीरोपस्थितिः । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यशक्योभयबोधप्रयो-
जिकाजहल्लक्षणा । यथा काकेभ्यो दधि रक्षयतामित्यत्र काकपदस्य
दध्युपघातके लक्षणा । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं दध्युपघातकत्वं तेन रूपेण
दध्युपघातकानां काकविडालकुक्कुटसारमेयादीनां शक्यलक्ष्याणां सर्वेषां
बोधात् । जहदजहल्लक्षणा वेदान्तिनां मते⁴ ॥

[६०]

आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता संनिधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः । पदस्य
पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा । अर्थाबाधो
योग्यता । पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं संनिधिः ॥

1 S T and W insert here six sentences explaining the पद-
कृत्य of the definition of शब्दः
but they are absent in older
Mss. U prints them in brac-
kets as an interpolation.

2 The reading is that of U V
and K. K omits शक्तिर्नाम, and
T and W omit घटादिविशेष्यकः;
while C reads simply शक्ति-

नामेश्वरेच्छा सैव शक्तिरित्यर्थः.

3 S T and W read त्रिविधा for
द्विविधा and add जहदजहल्लक्षणा
as a third species.

4 In the place of this short
sentence S T and W have
शक्यतावच्छेदकपरित्यागेन व्यक्ति-
मात्रबोधनाजहदजहल्लक्षणा । इयं
च लक्षणा जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यं वदतां
वेदान्तिनां सिद्धान्तरीत्या.

त. दी.—आकाङ्क्षेति । आकाङ्क्षादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः । अन्यथाकाङ्क्षादि-
भ्रमाच्छाब्दभ्रमो न स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षां लक्षयति—पदस्यति ॥ योग्यता-
लक्षणमाह—अर्थेति ॥ संनिधिलक्षणमाह—पदानामिति । अविलम्बेन
पदार्थोपस्थितिः संनिधिः । उच्चारणं तु तदुपयोगितया युक्तम् ॥

न्या. बो.—आकाङ्क्षेति । 'अव्यवहितोत्तरत्वादिसंबन्धेन यत्पदे
यत्पदप्रकारज्ञानव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तो यादृशशाब्दबोधाभावस्तादृशशाब्दबोधे
तत्पदे तत्पदवत्त्वमाकाङ्क्षा' । तादृशाकाङ्क्षाज्ञानं शाब्दबोधे कारणम् ॥
अर्थाबाध इति । बाधाभावो योग्यतेत्यर्थः ॥

[६१]

आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरश्चः पुरुषो
हस्तीति न प्रमाणमाकाङ्क्षाविरहात् । अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न
प्रमाणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चारितानि गामानये-
त्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं संनिध्याभावात्¹ ॥

त. दी.—गौरश्च इति । घटः कर्मत्वमित्यनाकाङ्क्षोदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. बो.—अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति । अत्र सेककरणत्वस्य जलादि-
धर्मस्य वहौ बाधनिश्चयसत्त्वान्न तादृशवाक्याच्छाब्दबोधः संभवति ॥
संनिधिं निरूपयति—असहोच्चारितानीति ॥ असहोच्चारितानि विलम्बे-
नोच्चारितानि ॥

[६२]

वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्सर्व-
मेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वाप्तोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् ॥

त. दी.—वाक्यं विभजते—वाक्यमिति । वैदिकस्य विशेषमाह—
वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वादिति । ननु वेदस्यानादित्वात्कथपीश्वरोक्तत्वमिति

1 R prefixes यत्पदविशेष्यक to अ-
व्यवहितं.

2 S U and W here insert a long

explanation of आकाङ्क्षा.

3 C H read संनिध्यभावात्, per-
haps better.

चेन्न । वेदः पौरुषेयो वाक्यसमूहत्वाद्भारतादिवत्¹ । न च स्मर्यमाणकर्तृत्व-
मुपाधिः । गौतमादिभिः शिष्यपरंपरया वेदेऽपि कर्तृस्मरणेन² साधनव्यापक-
त्वात् । “³तस्मात्तेपानात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त ” इति श्रुतेश्च ॥

ननु वर्णा नित्याः ‘स एवायं गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् । तथा च
कथं वेदस्यानित्यत्वमिति चेन्न उत्पन्नो गकारो नष्टो गकार इति प्रतीत्या
वर्णानामनित्यत्वात् ‘सोऽयं गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः सेऽयं दीपज्वालेति
वर्त्साजात्यालम्बनत्वात् वर्णानां नित्यत्वेऽप्यानुपूर्वीविशिष्टवाक्यस्यानित्य-
त्वाच्च । तस्मादीश्वरोक्तो वेदः ॥ मन्वादिस्मृतीनामाचाराणां च वेदमूलक-
तया प्रामाण्यम् । स्मृतिसमूहवाक्यानामिदानीमनध्ययनात्तन्मूलभूता काचि-
च्छाखोच्छिन्नेति कल्प्यते । ननु पठ्यमानवेदवाक्योत्सादस्य कल्पयितुम-
शक्यतया त्रिप्रकीर्णवादस्यायुक्तत्वान्नित्यानुमेयो वेदो मूलमिति चेन्न ।
⁴तथापि वर्णानुपूर्वीज्ञानाभावेन बोधकत्वासंभवात् ॥

न्या. बो.—वैदिकं लौकिकं चेति ॥ वैदिकं वेदवाक्यमित्यर्थः । इद-
मुपलक्षणम् । वेदमूलकस्मृत्यादीन्यपि ग्राह्याणि । लौकिकमिति । वेदवाक्य-
भिन्नमित्यर्थः⁵ । आप्तत्वं प्रयोगहेतुभूते यथार्थज्ञानवत्त्वम् ॥ इति शब्दपरिच्छेदः ॥

[६३]

वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं शब्दः ॥

त. दी.—नन्वेतानि पदानि स्वस्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति आकाङ्क्षादिमत्प-
दकदम्बकत्वात् ‘सद्वाक्यवदित्यनुमानादेव संसर्गज्ञानसंभवाच्छब्दो न
प्रमाणान्तरमिति चेन्न । अनुमित्यपेक्षया शाब्दज्ञानस्य विलक्षणस्य शब्दा-
त्प्रत्येमीत्यनुव्यवसायसाक्षिकस्य सर्वसंमतत्वात् ॥

1 N F and Q here add इत्यनु-
मानेन पौरुषेयत्वसिद्धेः; Z adds
इत्यनुमानात्.

2 A reads कर्तुः स्मर्यमाणत्वेन; N
F and Q have सकर्तृकत्वस्मरणेन.

3 Q inserts तपः before तेपानात्.

4 This is the reading of L and
M; C J N P Y Z have the
same without सा before जात्यां;

A reads सोऽयं दीप इति प्रत्यभि-
ज्ञानवज्जात्यालम्बनत्वात्.

5 A and F have तथा सति for
तथापि.

6 K R and V omit this sen-
tence, while S and W omit
the next.

7 F and Q insert here गामानय
दण्डेन इति मद्वाक्यं.

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति ‘पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्के’
इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या रात्रिभोजनमर्थापत्त्या कल्प्यत
इति चेन्न । देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्के दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वादित्यनुमाने-
नैव रात्रिभोजनस्य सिद्धत्वात्¹ । शते पञ्चाशदिति संभवोऽप्यनुमानमेव ।
इह वटे यक्षास्तिष्ठतीत्यैतिह्यमज्ञातमूलवक्तृकः शब्द एव । चेष्टापि शब्दा-
नुमानद्वारा व्यवहारहेतुरिति न मानान्तरम् । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमान-
शब्दाश्चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि ॥

सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वं स्वतो ग्राह्यं परतो वेति विचा-
र्यते । तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिः । ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकयावज्ज्ञानग्राहक-
सामग्रीग्राह्यं न वा । अत्र विधिकोटिः स्वतस्त्वम् । निषेधकोटिः परत-
स्त्वम् ॥ अनुमानग्राह्यत्वेन सिद्धसाधनतावारणाय यावदिति । ‘इदं ज्ञान-
मप्रमेति’ ज्ञानेन प्रामाण्यग्राह्याद्वाधवारणाय प्रामाण्याग्राहकेति । इदं ज्ञान-
मप्रमेत्यनुव्यवसायनिष्ठप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्रामाण्याग्राहकत्वाभावात्स्वतस्त्वं न
स्यादतस्तदिति । तस्मिन्प्रामाण्याश्रयेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहक इत्यर्थः । उदाहृतस्थले
व्यवसायेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्यनुव्यवसाये तदग्राहकत्वात्स्वत्वसिद्धिः ॥
ननु स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते घटमहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायेन घटघटत्व-
योरिव तत्संबन्धस्यापि विषयीकरणात् व्यवसायरूपप्रत्यासत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात्
पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारसंबन्धस्यैव प्रमात्वपदार्थत्वादिति चेन्न । स्वतःप्रामाण्यग्रहे
जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वेत्यनभ्यासदशायां प्रमात्वसंशयो न स्यात् । अनुव्यव-
सायेन प्रामाण्यस्य निश्चितत्वात् । तस्मात्स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वाभावात्परतो ग्राह्य-
त्वम् । तथा हि । प्रथमं जलज्ञानानन्तरं प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां जललाभे सति
पूर्वोत्पन्नं जलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवम् यथाप्रमा

1 A here adds अनुपलब्धिर्न मान-
म् । परिशेषोपि अनुमाद्यैव, but
the words seem to be spurious
as no other copy contains
them. They are also super-

fluous, as अनुपलब्धि has al-
ready once been referred to,
while it is doubtful whether
परिशेष is recognized as an
independent proof.

इति व्यतिरेकिणा प्रमात्वं निश्चीयते । द्वितीयादिज्ञानेषु पूर्वज्ञानदृष्टान्तेन तत्सजातीयत्वलिङ्गेनान्वयव्यतिरेकिणापि गृह्यते ॥

प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वमुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् । प्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं गुणः । अप्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं दोषः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षे विशेषणवद्विशेष्यसंनिर्कार्णो गुणः अनुमितौ व्यापकवति व्याप्यज्ञानं उपमितौ यथार्थसादृश्यज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञाने यथार्थयोग्यताज्ञानम् इत्याद्युहनीयम् । पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकाराभावस्य व्यवसायेनानुपस्थितत्वादप्रमात्वं परत एव गृह्यते पित्तादिदोषजन्यत्वादुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् ॥

ननु सर्वज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वादयथार्थज्ञानमेव नास्ति । न च 'शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति' ज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । रजतस्मृतिपुरोवर्तिज्ञानाभ्यामेव प्रवृत्तिसंभवात् उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव सर्वत्र प्रवर्तकत्वेन नेदं रजतमित्यादावतिप्रसङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । सत्यरजतस्थले पुरोवर्तिविशेष्यकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य लाघवेन प्रवृत्तिजनकतया शुक्तावपि रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानस्यैव कल्पनात् ॥

[६४]

अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात् । एकस्मिन्धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति । व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः यथा यदि वह्निर्न स्यात्तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति ॥

त. दी.—अयथार्थानुभवं विभजते—अयथार्थेति । स्वप्नस्य मानसविपर्ययरूपत्वान्न त्रैविध्यविरोधः ॥ संशयलक्षणमाह—एकस्मिन्निति । 'घटपटा'विति समूहालम्बनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । 'घटो द्रव्य'मित्या-

1 The passage is variously worded in different copies. The reading in the text is that of A B D F U and S. C. C G H Q and W have 'वैशिष्ट्य-

ज्ञानम्, while B J read 'विशिष्ट-ज्ञानम्'. E differs from all in giving विरुद्धनानाकोटिकं ज्ञानम्. 2 X has यद्यर्थे निर्वह्निः स्यात्तर्हि निर्धूमोपि स्यात्.

दावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय विरुद्धेति । 'पटत्वविरुद्धघटत्ववानि'त्यत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय नानेति ॥ विपर्ययलक्षणमाह—मिथ्येति । तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकनिश्चय इत्यर्थः ॥ तर्कं लक्षयति—व्याप्येति । यद्यपि तर्को विपर्ययेऽन्तर्भवति तथापि प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वाद्भेदेन कीर्तनम् ॥

न्या. बो.—यथार्थानुभवं निरूप्यायथार्थानुभवं विभजते—संशयेत्यादिना । एकेति । एकधर्मावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितभावाभावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संशय इत्यर्थः । भावद्वयकोटिकसंशयप्रसिद्धेः स्थाणुर्वेत्यत्र स्थाणुत्वस्थाणुत्वाभावपुरुषत्वपुरुषत्वाभावकोटिकः संशय इत्यर्थः¹ । विपर्ययो नाम भ्रम इत्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्यारोपेणेति । तर्कं व्याप्यस्य व्यापकस्य च 'व्यतिरेकनिश्चयः कारणम् । अन्यथाबाधनिश्चयाभाव इष्टापत्तिदोषे तर्कानुत्पत्तेः ॥

[६५]

स्मृतिरपि द्विविधा² । यथार्थायथार्था च । प्रमाजन्या यथार्था । अप्रमाजन्यायथार्था ॥

त. दी.—स्मृतिं विभजते—स्मृतिरिति ॥

[६६]

सर्वेषामनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखम्⁴ ॥

1 C K V omit this sentence, but as besides S T it is found in R also in a slightly different form, it is retained. The sentence as it stands in both S and R is corrupt and is therefore amended as above. S reads स्थाणुर्वेत्यादेः which is not intelligible, while R inserts एक before last कोटिक quite superfluously.

2 U and W read बाध for व्यतिरेक. 3 E H J K omit द्विविधा and join the two sentences. K adds इति after च.

4 It is impossible to ascertain the true reading of this and the next passage. A B C H J U and Q together with S. C. and V. V. agree in reading अनुकूलवेदनीयं and प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं respectively; while the other variants अनुकूलतया and प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं are found in D E G as well as N. I have adopted the latter as being grammatically more correct, and being supported by the high authority of N.

त. दी.—सुखं लक्षयति—सर्वेषामिति । सुख्यहमित्याद्यनुव्यव-
सायगम्यं सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम् । यथाश्रुतं तु स्वरूपकथनमिति
द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. बो.—सुखं निरूपयति—सर्वेषामिति । इतरेच्छाऽनधीनेच्छा-
विषयत्वमिति निष्कर्षः । यथाश्रुतेऽनुकूलत्वप्रकारकवेदनाविशेष्यत्वस्य
घटोऽनुकूल इत्याकारकज्ञानदशायामनुकूलत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविशेष्यत्वस्य घटा-
दावपि सत्त्वाद्धटादावतिव्याप्तिरिति निष्कृष्टलक्षणमुक्तम् । भोजनादावति-
व्याप्तिवारणायेतरेच्छानधीनेच्छाविशेषणम् । सुखेच्छायाः सुखत्वप्रकारक-
ज्ञानमात्रजन्यत्वात् ॥

[६७]

सर्वेषां प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं दुःखम् ॥

न्या. बो.—सुखं निरूपयति—प्रतिकूलेति । अत्रापीतरद्वेषान-
धीनद्वेषविषयत्वमिति निष्कृष्टलक्षणम् । द्वेषविषयत्वमात्रोक्तौ सर्पादावपि
द्वेषविषयत्वसत्त्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणायेतरेद्वेषानधीनेति द्वेषविशेषणम् ।
सर्पजन्यदुःखादौ द्वेषात्सर्पद्वेष इति सर्पद्वेषस्य सर्पजन्यदुःखद्वेषजन्यत्वा-
दन्यद्वेषानधीनद्वेषविषयत्वरूपलक्षणस्य सर्पादावसत्त्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः ॥
फलेच्छोपायेच्छां प्रति कारणं । अतः फलेच्छावशादुपायेच्छा भवति । एवं
फलद्वेषादुपायद्वेषः ॥

[६८]

इच्छा कामः ॥

[६९]

क्रोधो द्वेषः ॥

[७०]

कृतिः प्रयत्नः ॥

[७१]

विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः ॥

1 K inserts गुणः after °जन्यः unnecessarily.

[७२]

निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वधर्मः ॥

न्या. बो.—धर्माधर्मौ निरूपयति—विहितेति । वेदविहितेत्यर्थः ।
निषिद्धेति । वेदनिषिद्धेत्यर्थः ॥

[७३]

बुद्ध्यादयोऽष्टावात्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः¹ ॥

[७४]

बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना² द्विविधाः । नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्या
ईश्वरस्य । अनित्या जीवस्य ॥

[७५]

संस्कारस्त्रिविधः । वेगो भावना³ स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति । वेगः
पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः⁴ । अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतुर्भावनात्म-
मात्रवृत्तिः । अन्यथा कृतस्य पुनस्तदवस्थापादकः⁵ स्थितिस्थापकः
कटादिपृथिवीवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—संस्कारं विभजते—संस्कार इति । संस्कारत्वजातिमा-
न्संस्कारः । वेगस्याश्रयमाह—वेग इति । वेगत्वजातिमान्वेगः । भावनां
लक्षयति—अनुभवेति । आत्मादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायानुभवेति । अनु-
भवध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्मृतीति । स्मृतेरपि संस्कारजनकत्वं नवीनै-
रुक्तम् ॥ स्थितिस्थापकं लक्षयति—अन्यथेति ॥ संख्यादयोऽष्टौ
नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववेगस्थितिस्थापकाः सामान्यगुणाः । अन्ये रूपादयो विशेष-

1 C and X read आत्मनो विशेष°,
and K आत्मनि विशेष°, D omits
विशेष.

2 G J Q U W X omit द्विविधाः
and join the two sentences.

3 C K read स्थितिस्थापकः.

4 E J X have वेगाख्यः; D G X
insert मात्र after मनः.

5 D H J read तादवस्थापादकः;
C and S. C. have तद्वस्थापकः.

गुणाः । द्रव्यविभाजकोपाधिद्वयसमानाधिकरणावृत्ति-द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति^१-जाति-
मत्त्वं विशेषगुणत्वम् ॥

न्या. बो.—संस्कारं विभजते—संस्कार इति । भावनां लक्षयति ।
अनुभवेति । अनुभवजन्यत्वे सति स्मृतिहेतुत्वं भावनाया लक्षणम् ।
अत्रानुभवजन्यत्वे स्तीति विशेषणानुपादाने आत्ममनःसंयोगेऽतिव्याप्ति-
रात्ममनःसंयोगस्य ज्ञानमात्रं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणत्वेन स्मृतिं प्रत्यपि कारण-
त्वादतस्तदुपादानम् । आत्ममनःसंयोगस्यानुभवजन्यत्वाभावाच्चातिव्याप्तिः ।
तावन्मात्रे कृतेऽनुभवध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिः ध्वंसं प्रति प्रतियोगिनः कारणत्वे-
नानुभवध्वंसस्याप्यनुभवजन्यत्वात् । अतः स्मृतिहेतुत्वोपादानम् । अनुभव-
ध्वंसे स्मृतिहेतुत्वाभावाच्चातिव्याप्तिः ॥

[७६]

चलनात्मकं कर्म^२ । ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणम् । अधोदेश-
संयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम् । शरीरसंनिकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनम् । विप्र-
कृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वं गमनम् । पृथिव्यादिचतु-
ष्टयमनोमात्रवृत्ति^३ ॥

त. दी.—कर्मणो लक्षणमाह—चलनेति । उत्क्षेपणादीनां कार्य-
भेदमाह—ऊर्ध्वेति । शरीरेति । वक्रत्वसंपादकमाकुञ्चनम् । ऋजुता-
संपादकं प्रसारणमित्यर्थः ॥

[७७]

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यम् । द्रव्यगुणकर्मवृत्ति । तद्विविधं
परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादिः^४ ॥

- 1 Instead of द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति N has गुणवृत्ति. Z adds गुण after जाति-
मत्त्वं. Other copies omit the
word altogether, but wrongly.
- 2 K adds तत्पञ्चविधम्.
- 3 A B D have शरीरस्य; E H J
X insert शरीर before विप्रकृष्ट
also in the next sentence.
- 4 K omits मात्र; G J add कर्म
after वृत्ति, perhaps better; Q

U and W omit the whole
sentence.

- 5 C E G J Q U X and W omit
तद्विविधं परापरभेदात्. X has
instead परमाधिकवृत्ति । अपरं
न्यूनवृत्ति । H has परमपरं चेति
for परापरभेदात्, before द्रव्यगुण-
कर्मवृत्ति. A B D F insert जातिः
before द्रव्यत्वादिः.

त. दी.—सामान्यं लक्षयति—नित्यमिति । संयोगादावतिव्याप्ति-
वारणाय नित्यमिति^१ । परमाणुपरिमाणादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय—अने-
केति । अनुगतत्वं समवेतत्वं । तेन नाभावादावतिव्याप्तिः ॥

न्या. बो.—सामान्यं निरूपयति—नित्यमेकमिति । नित्यत्वे
सत्यनेकसमवेतत्वं सामान्यलक्षणमित्यर्थः । नित्यत्वविशेषणानुपादाने
संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिस्तत्राप्यनेकद्रव्यसमवेतत्वस्य सत्त्वात् तद्वारणाय नित्य-
त्वोपादानम् । अनेकसमवेतत्वानुपादान आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिस्तद्वारणा-
यानेकसमवेतत्वविशेषणम् । अनेकत्वानुपादान आकाशगतैकत्वपरिमाणादौ
जलपरमाणुरूपादौ चातिव्याप्तिर्जलादिपरमाणुगतरूपादेराकाशगतैकत्वपरि-
माणादेर्नित्यत्वात्समवेतत्वाच्च । अतोऽनेक इति समवेतविशेषणम्^२ ॥

[७८]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्तका विशेषाः^३ ॥

त. दी.—विशेषं लक्षयति—नित्येति ॥

न्या. बो.—नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तय इति । नित्यद्रव्येषु परमाण्वादिषु वर्त-
मानाः । अत एव व्यावर्तका इतरभेदानुमितिहेतवः । नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तित्व-
रूपपक्षधर्मताप्रयोज्येतरभेदानुमापकशालिन इत्यर्थः^४ ॥

[७९]

नित्यसंबन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकम-
विनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । यथावयवावयविनौ
गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति^५ ॥

- 1 N places this sentence after
the next, omitting आदि. Other
copies except A J Y omit the
sentence altogether Y omits
the next sentence. Q and F
insert घटाल्यन्ताभावो घटाद्यनुगतो-
प्यसमवेतः before तेन नाभावा^०.
- 2 The passage is variously read
by K R V S U and W. Mss.
C and V end here.
- 3 E G H K add अनन्ता एव after
विशेषाः; X adds पृथिव्यादिचतु-

ष्टयस्य परमाणवः आकाशादिपञ्चकं
नित्यद्रव्याणि ।

- 4 This is a portion of a long
abstruse passage in W not
found in other Mss.
- 5 A B E J omit अविनश्यत्
which is however necessary.
- 6 E G J only insert यथा; but
their reading has been adopted
as making the sentence more
grammatical.

त. दी.—समवायं लक्षयति—**नित्येति** । संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **नित्येति** । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **संबन्ध** इति । अयुतसिद्धलक्षणमाह—**ययोरिति** । नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिविशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वाद्घट्टीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः । **अवयवावयविनाविति** । द्रव्यसमवायिकारणमवयवः । तज्जन्यद्रव्यमवयवि ॥

न्या. बो.—समवायं निरूपयति—**नित्येति** । संबन्धत्वं विशिष्टप्रतीतिनियामकत्वम् । तावन्मात्रोक्तौ संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिरतो नित्येति विशेषणम्^१ ॥ **ययोर्मध्य** इति । यन्निष्ठकालनिरूपिताधेयतासामान्यं यदवच्छिन्नं तदुभयान्यतरत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

[८०]

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोन्योन्याभावः यथा घटः पटो न भवतीति^२ ॥

त. दी.—प्रागभावं लक्षयति—**अनादिरिति** । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **सान्त** इति । घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय—**अनादिरिति** । प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिः प्रतियोगिजनको भविष्यतीति व्यवहारहेतुः प्रागभावः ॥ प्रध्वंसं लक्षयति—**सादिरिति** । घटाधावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय—**अनन्त** इति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय—**सादिरिति** ॥ प्रतियोगिजन्यः प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिर्ध्वस्तव्यवहारहेतुर्ध्वंसः ॥ अत्यन्ताभाव लक्षयति—**त्रैकालिकेति** ॥ अन्योन्याभावेतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **संसर्गावच्छिन्नेति** । ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरतिव्याप्तिवारणाय **त्रैकालिकेति** ॥ अन्योन्याभावं लक्षयति—**तादात्म्येति** । प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्यससगभेदा-

1 S T and W omit this sentence and K R omit the next.

2 R and U omit भवति.

देकप्रतियोगिकयोरप्यत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोर्बहुत्वम्^१ । केवलदेवदत्ताभावो दण्ड्यभाव इति प्रतीत्या विशिष्टाभावः^२ । एकसत्त्वे द्वौ न स्त इति प्रतीत्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नोऽभावः । संयोगसंबन्धेन घटवति समवायसंबन्धेन घटाभावः । तच्च घटाभावाद्घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकसामान्याभावश्चातिरिक्तः ॥ एवमन्योन्याभावोऽपि । घटत्वावच्छिन्नः पटो नास्तीति व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावो^३ नाङ्गीक्रियते । पटे घटत्वं नास्तीति तस्यार्थः । अतिरिक्तत्वे स केवलान्वयी ।

सामयिकाभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव एव समयविशेषे प्रतीयमानः । घटाभाववति घटानयनेऽत्यन्ताभावस्यान्यत्र गमनाभावेऽप्यप्रतीतेर्घटापसरणे सति प्रतीतेः । भूतले घटसंयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरत्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामकत्वं कल्प्यते । घटवति तत्संयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरसत्त्वादत्यन्ताभावस्याप्रतीतिः । घटापसरणे च संयोगध्वंससत्त्वात्प्रतीतिरिति । केवलाधिकरणादेव नास्तीति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभावो न पदार्थान्तरमिति गुरवः । तन्न । अभावानङ्गीकारे कैवल्यस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अभावाभावो भाव एव नातिरिक्तः अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । ध्वंसप्रागभावः प्रागभावध्वंसश्च प्रतियोग्येव^४ । अभावाभावोतिरिक्त एव तृतीयाभावस्य प्रथमाभावरूपत्वान्नानवस्थेति नवीनाः ॥

न्या. बो.—प्रागभावं निरूपयति—**अनादिरिति** । ध्वंसं निरूप-

1 A's reading is corrupt and makes no sense. The reading of J has been adopted as the most intelligible: although even with it the passage is vague. N F Y Q and Z agree with J but omit अपि; W has भिन्नरव for बहुत्वम्.

2 The passage seems to have been tampered with. The reading of A J is retained in the text, as being most probably the original. After दण्ड्यभावः

P adds केवलदेवदत्तसद्भावेऽपि दण्डाभावे दण्ड्यभावः; all other copies read देवदत्ताभावात्, and some of them omit the following words up to प्रतीत्या.

3 C L M N Y Z omit the word प्रतियोगिताक, which however makes no difference of sense as both expressions are common.

4 N F and Q add इति प्राञ्जः after एव, but the words seem to be interpolated.

यति सादिरिति । अत्यन्ताभावं निरूपयति—त्रैकालिकेति¹ ॥ अन्यो-
न्याभावं निरूपयति—तादात्म्येति ॥

[८१]

सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात्सप्तैव पदार्था इति
सिद्धम्² ॥

त. दी.— ननु प्रमाण—प्रमेय—संशय—प्रयोजन—दृष्टान्त—सिद्धान्ता-
वयव—तर्क—निर्णय—वाद—जल्प—वितण्डा—हेत्वाभास—च्छल—जाति—निग्र-
हस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निश्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायशास्त्रे षोडशपदार्थानामुक्त-
त्वात्कथं सप्तैवेत्यत आह—सर्वेषामिति । सर्वेषां सप्तस्वेवान्तर्भाव
इत्यर्थः । ' आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थमनोबुद्धिप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु
प्रमेयमिति ' द्वादशविधं प्रमेयम् । प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्मौ । रागद्वेषमोहा दोषाः ।
राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः । मोहः शरीरादावात्मभ्रमः । प्रेत्यभावो
मरणम् । फलं मोगः । अपवर्गो मोक्षः । स च स्वसमानाधिकरण-
दुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीनदुःखध्वंसः । प्रयोजनं सुखं दुःखहानिश्च³ ।
दृष्टान्तो महानसादिः । प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । निर्णयो
निश्चयः । स च प्रमाणफलम् । तत्त्वबुभुत्सोः कथा वादः । उभय-
साधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनहीना वितण्डा । कथा
नाम नानावक्तृकः पूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसंदर्भः । अभिप्रायान्तरेण
प्रयुक्तस्यार्थान्तरं प्रकल्प्य दूषणं छलम् । असदुत्तरं जातिः । साधर्म्य-
वैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्णवर्णविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति-
संशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थान्तरविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनिवृत्तानित्यकार्याकार्य-
समा जातयः । वादिनोऽपजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञा-
न्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो हेत्वन्तरम् अर्थान्तरं निरर्थकं अवि-

1 S T U and W omit this, ex-
cept त्रैकालिकेति, and instead
of it give a long passage
which is not found in other
copies.

2 J K Q and W insert अपि, and

E एव, after सर्वेषां; they also
insert एव after उक्तेषु.

3 This is the reading of C G J
L P Y Z. A has सुखं दुःखं
हानिश्च which makes no sense.

N reads प्राप्तिः after सुख.

न्तरं निरर्थकं अविज्ञातार्थकं अपार्थकं अप्राप्तकालं न्यूनं अधिकं पुनरुक्तं
अननुभाषणं अज्ञानं अप्रतिभाविक्षेपः मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयो-
ज्यानुयोगः अपसिद्धान्तः हेत्वाभासश्च निग्रहस्थानानि । शेषं सुगमम् ॥

ननु करतलानलसंयोगे सत्यपि प्रतिबन्धके सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः
पदार्थान्तरमिति चेन्न । प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य कार्यमात्रे कारणत्वेन शक्ते-
रनुपयोगात् कारणस्यैव शक्तिपदार्थत्वात् । ननु भस्मादिना कांस्यादौ
शुद्धिदर्शनादाधेशक्तिरङ्गीकार्येति चेन्न¹ । भस्मादिसंयोगसमानकाली-
नास्पृश्यस्पर्शप्रतियोगिकयावदभावसहितभस्मादिसंयोगध्वंसस्य शुद्धि-
पदार्थत्वात् ।

स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् । यथेष्टविनियोगयोग्यत्वस्य स्वत्वरूप-
त्वात् । तदवच्छेदकं च प्रतिग्रहादिलब्धत्वमेवेति ॥

अथ विधिर्निरूप्यते । प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयो² विधिः ।
तत्प्रतिपादको लिङादिर्वा । कृत्यसाध्ये प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् कृतिसाध्यता-
ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम्³ । न च विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । इष्टसाधनता-
लिङ्गककृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य काम्यस्थले नित्यनैमित्तिकस्थले च विहित-
कालजीवित्वनिमित्तकज्ञानजन्यस्यैव⁴ प्रवर्तकत्वात् । न चाननुगमः स्व-
विशेषणवत्ताप्रतिबंधानजन्यत्वस्यानुगतत्वादिति गुरवः । तन्न । लाघवेन
कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यैव चिकीर्षाद्वारा प्रयत्नजनकत्वात् । न च
नित्ये इष्टसाधनत्वाभावादप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गस्तत्रापि प्रत्यवायपरिहारस्य पाप-
क्षयस्य च फलत्वकल्पनात् । तस्मात्कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः ।
ननु “ ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत ” इत्यत्र लिङा स्वर्गसाधनकार्यं

1 G reads शुद्धिदर्शनात् शुद्धिः प-
दार्थान्तरमिति चेन्न.

2 A P read प्रत्यवाय for प्रयत्न,
which is wrong : M has प्रति-
वृत्ति, which is probably a
mistake for प्रवृत्ति.

3 N and Q add कृतिसाध्ये प्रवृत्ति-
दर्शनात् after प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात्, but

it is superfluous. A P wrongly
separate ज्ञान from साध्यता
and join it to प्रवर्तकम्, which
makes no sense.

4 C L M N Q Y Z put this be-
fore नित्यनैमित्तिक°. A and Q
have ज्ञानजन्यत्वस्य; J is
doubtful.

प्रतीयते । यागस्याशुविनाशिनः कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वायोगात्त-
द्योग्यं स्थायिकार्यपूर्वमेव लिङ्गार्थः¹ ॥ कार्यं कृतिसाध्यम् । कृतेः
सविषयत्वात् । विषयाकाङ्क्षायां यागो विषयत्वेनान्वेति । कस्य कार्य-
मिति² नियोज्याकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गकामपदं नियोज्यपरतयान्वेति । कार्य-
बोद्धा नियोज्यः । तेन 'ज्योतिष्टोमनामकयागविषयकं स्वर्गकामस्य
कार्यमिति वाक्यार्थः संपद्यते । वैदिकलिङ्गत्वात्³ " यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं
जुहुयात् " इति नित्यवाक्येऽप्यपूर्वमेव वाच्यं कल्प्यते । " आरोग्य-
कामो भैषजपानं कुर्यात् " इत्यादौ लौकिकलिङ्गः क्रियाकार्ये लक्षणेति
चेन्न । यागस्याप्ययोग्यतानिश्चयाभावेन साधनतया प्रतीत्यनन्तरं तन्निर्वा-
हार्थमवान्तरव्यापारतया अपूर्वकल्पनात् । कीर्तनादिनानाश्रुतेर्न⁴
यागध्वंसो व्यापारः । लोकव्युत्पत्तिबलात्क्रियायामेव कृतिसाध्येष्टसाध-
नत्वं लिङ्ग बोध्यत इति लिङ्गत्वेन रूपेण विध्यर्थत्वम् । आख्यातत्वेन
प्रयत्नार्थकत्वम् । पचति पाकं करोतीति विवरणदर्शनात् किं करोतीति
प्रश्ने पचतीत्युत्तराच्चाख्यातस्य प्रयत्नार्थकत्वनिश्चयात् । रथो गच्छती-
त्यादावनुकूलव्यापारे लक्षणा " देवदत्तः पचति तण्डुलान्देवदत्तेन पच्यते
तण्डुलः " इत्यत्र कर्तृकर्मणोर्नीख्यातार्थत्वं किंतु तद्गतैकत्वादीनामेव ।
तयोराक्षेपादेव लाभः । प्रजयतीत्यादौ धातोरेव प्रकर्षे शक्तिः । उप-
सर्गाणां द्योतकत्वमेव । न तत्र शक्तिरस्ति ॥

पदार्थज्ञानस्य परमं प्रयोजनं मोक्षः । तथा हि " आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः
श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः " इति श्रुत्या श्रवणादीनामात्म-
साक्षात्कारहेतुत्वबोधनात् । श्रुत्या देहादिविलक्षणात्मज्ञाने सत्यप्यसं-
भावनाऽनिवृत्तेर्युक्त्यनुसन्धानरूपमननसाध्यत्वात् मननोपयोगिपदार्थ-

1 A J Z omit आदि

2 A reads wrongly अन्वेति कस्य कार्य-
मिति for अन्वेति कस्य कार्य-
मिति.

3 This is the reading of J N.
A P have वैदिकलिङ्गत्वात्, L
वैदिकलिङ्गत्वात्, M वैदिकलिङ्ग-

त्वात्, Z वैदिकलिङ्गत्वात्, all of
which appear to be wrong.

4 This is the reading of Q; J
N Y and Z read नाऽनाशं,
while A reads कीर्तनादिना न
श्रुतेस्तैः, both of which make no
sense; L M P are also corrupt.

निरूपणद्वारा शास्त्रस्यापि मोक्षोपयोगः । तदनन्तरं श्रुत्युपदिष्टयोगवि-
धिना निदिध्यासने कृते तदनन्तरं देहादिविलक्षणात्मसाक्षात्कारे सति
देहादावहमभिमानरूपमिथ्याज्ञाननाशे सति दोषाभावात्प्रवृत्त्यभावे ध-
र्माधर्मयोरभावाज्जन्माभावे पूर्वधर्माधर्मयोरनुभवेन नाशे चरमदुःखध्वंस-
लक्षणो मोक्षो जायते । ज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनं मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तेर्ज्ञानमात्र-
साध्यत्वात् " तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय " इति
साधनान्तरनिषेधाच्च । ननु " तत्प्राप्तिहेतुर्विज्ञानं कर्म चोक्तं महा-
मुने " इति कर्मणोऽपि मोक्षसाधनत्वस्मरणाज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इति
चेन्न । " नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुर्वाणो दुरितक्षयम् । ज्ञानं च विमलीकुर्वन्न-
भ्यासेन च पाचयेत् । अभ्यासात्पक्वविज्ञानं कैवल्यं लभते नरः " इत्या-
दिना कर्मणो ज्ञानसाधनत्वप्रतिपादनात् । ज्ञानद्वारैव कर्म मोक्षसाधनं न
साक्षात् । तस्मात्पदार्थज्ञानस्य मोक्षः परमं प्रयोजनमिति सर्वं रमणीयम् ॥

इति श्रीमदद्वैतविद्याचार्य-श्रीमद्राघवसोमयाजिकुलावतंस-श्रीमत्तिरु-
मलाचार्यवर्यस्य सूनुनाऽन्नभट्टेन कृता स्वकृततर्कसंग्रहस्य दीपिका
संपूर्णा⁵ ॥

न्या. बो.—सर्वेषामिति । प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्त-
सिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां
तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायस्यादिमे सूत्र उक्तानां प्रमाण-
प्रमेयादीनामित्यर्थः । विस्तरस्त्वन्यत्रानुसंधेयः⁶ ॥

1 After साक्षात् G V add तदुक्त-
माचार्यैस्तस्मादुपकारकं कर्मेति.

2 This colophon is found in J
alone, and is inserted here be-
cause it is important. It also
occurs in two other works of
our author.

3 This is the reading of R and

U. B omits प्रमाणप्रमेया—र्थः,
and joins उक्तानां to next
sentence. S and W read the
passage differently. Different
Mss. give various colophons,
while S and W add a verse
which are omitted here.

क्राणादन्यायमतयोर्बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।
अन्नंभङ्गेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायान्नंभङ्गविरचितः स्वकृतदीपिकया श्रीगोव-
र्धनकृतन्यायबोधिन्या च समेतस्तर्कसंग्रहः समाप्तः ॥

NOTES

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SECT. I.

मङ्गलम्.

"Having enshrined the Lord of the universe in my heart, and having made a salutation to the preceptor, I compose this Compendium of all knowable things for the easy comprehension of beginners."

Opening prayer.

1. Following the usual orthodox practice, the author begins his work with a prayer to the deity and a salutation to the preceptor. This मङ्गल, say the commentators, is necessary for the completion of a work, and for two reasons; first because it is enjoined by the *Śruti*, and secondly because its necessity is proved by inference. Of course there is no express Vedic text enjoining the मङ्गल, but the existence of such a text can be assumed on the authority of good usage (शिष्टाचार), by the well-known rule laid down by *Jaimini* असति ह्यनुमानम्¹ 'a *Śruti* text is to be inferred when an express one is not to be found.' The argument for inferring a *Śruti* text on the authority of शिष्टाचार is thus stated by T. D.—A मङ्गल is an act enjoined by the Vedas, because it has always been the object (विषय) of uncommon (अलौकिक) and unprohibited (अविगीत) practice of wise men, like दर्श and other rites. It is obvious that this inference is only available for the assumption of a text, when the शिष्टाचार happens to be अलौकिक (uncommon or sacred) and अविगीत (unprohibited). An अलौकिक-शिष्टाचार is that which is not रागादिप्राप्त, i. e. caused by our own inclinations, such as the ordinary human acts of eating and drinking, but which is practised as a duty rather than as a pleasure; while it is अविगीत when it is not expressly prohibited by *Śruti* like the performance of a *Śrāddha* ceremony at night.

1. *Jaim. S. I. 33.*